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THE 


TALMAG-E CASE, 

AND 

THE COMPLAINANTS 

BEFORE 

THE SYNOD OF LONG ISLAND, 


SAMUEL T. SPEAR, D. D. 


BROOKLYN : 

Eagle Job and Book Printing Department. 


1879. 



V 






ERRATA. 


Foi “ Secretary,” the 6th line from the top, p. 56, read “ Society.” 

For “ February,” the 4tli and 20th lines from the top, p. 76, read “July 
and for “ nine,” the 9th and 11th lines from the top, p. 76, read ‘‘ three.” 

For the “ 24th of February,” the 12th line from the bottom, p. 103, and 
the 2d line from the bottom, p. 107, and the 2d line from the top, p. 108, 
read the “ 10th of March”. 



















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The Talmage Case. 


INTRODUCTION. 

The complainants in this case are not aggrieved parties, 
seeking redress for alleged injuries to them. The action 
complained of, while judicially relieving Dr. Talmage of a 
grave accusation, has not harmfully touched a hair of their 
heads. If not in accordance with their judgment, this is no 
more than always happens when the views of a majority 
prevail over those of a minority. To he out-voted is cer- 
tainly no grievance. Dr. Talmage is the only party that 
could have been aggrieved by the action of the Presbytery ; 
and, being acquitted, he has had no occasion either to 
complain or appeal. 

The Book of Discipline, chapter VIII., section 4, contains 
the fundamental law of the Presbyterian Church in respect 
to complaints, and, among other things, declares that a 
complaint, the proper preliminaries having been supplied? 
“ brings the whole proceedings in the case under the review 
of the superior judicatory.” It further declares that “ if the 
complaint appears to be well founded, it may have the effect, 
not only of drawing down censure upon those who concurred 
in the judgment complained of, but also of reversing that 
judgment and placing matters in the same situation in which 
they were before the judgment was pronounced.” These 
provisions define the jurisdiction of the Synod in respect to 
this complaint. There is a general cognizance of “the 
whole proceedings in the case” of Dr. Talmage from their 
initial point to their final consummation. All these pro- 
ceedings are before the Synod for review. 

Any one of four results may ensue from this review: 1. 
.The complaint may be dismissed as resting upon no suffi- 


4 


cient grounds. 2. Some of the proceedings of the Pres- 
bytery may not be approved, while the final verdict of ac- 
quittal may be sustained. 3. The judgment of acquittal 
may be reversed, which reversal, according to the Book of 
Discipline, would have the effect of “ placing matters in the 
same situation in which they w T ere before the judgment was 
pronounced.” 4. The censure of the Synod may be in- 
flicted “ upon those who concurred in the judgment com- 
plained of.” The jurisdiction reaches to and covers all 
these points. 

Should the Synod reverse the judgment complained of, 
then the legal effect would not be to find Dr. Talmage 
guilty of “ falsehood and deceit,” as charged against him, 
but to vacate the verdict of acquittal, and, in the language 
of the Book of Discipline, place “ matters in the same situa- 
tion in which they were before the judgment was pro- 
nounced.” That situation was neither an acquittal nor a 
conviction, but simply an arraignment and a status of trial 
on the charge of “ falsehood and deceit.” To this situation 
a reversal of the judgment would restore the case, remitting 
it back to the Presbytery for further consideration and 
action under the direction and authority of the Synod. 
The language of the Book of Discipline is clear and explicit 
on this point. 

Dr. Talmage, though not the party complained of, and 
not directly on trial, is, nevertheless, deeply interested in 
the decision to be made in this case. He is the pastor of 
one of the largest churches under the care of the Synod- 
He has been tried and acquitted by his own Presbytery ; 
and the church to which he ministers is in hearty accord 
with its verdict. The complainants have" no sympathizers, 
and no representatives of their views in that church. The 
influence and usefulness of Dr. Talmage among his own 
people have not been impaired in the slightest degree by 
any disclosures made during the trial. The general judg- 
ment of the city in which he resides, concurs, by an over- 
whelming preponderance, with the verdict of the Pres- 
bytery. Unless I am greatly mistaken, the same fact 


5 


holds true throughout the country, both in the church and 
out of it. The greeting which Dr. Talmage, upon his 
recent visit, received in England, Scotland and Ireland, in- 
dicates very clearly that Christians there do not regard 
him as a liar or a deceiver. These complainants do not 
represent the prevalent judgment of this country, or of any 
other, in respect to him or the result of his trial. There is 
no general sentiment anywhere that has been violated or 
oifended by his acquittal. 

These are the sober facts in this case ; and I am quite 
clear that if the complainants could have made up their 
minds quietly to acquiesce in the judgment of the Presby- 
tery, and let the whole matter rest with that verdict, no one 
would have censured them as unfaithful to duty, or lacking 
in zeal for the honor of religion. Time, with its softening 
hand, would have gradually soothed the irritations occa- 
sioned by the trial : and Dr. Talmage would have been left 
to pursue his work without any further ecclesiastical molest- 
ation or discomfort. Such, in my judgment, is the course 
that best expresses the highest dictates of Christian wisdom. 

Two of the complainants — one of them a judge in the 
case, and the other a member of the prosecuting committee 
— proceeded, immediately after the verdict was rendered, to 
scatter their speeches in a pamphlet form broadcast through- 
out the country, especially among the ministers of the 
Presbyterian Church. They did not wait to obtain the 
judgment of the Synod in respect to the acquittal of the 
accused, but at once took an appeal to the tribunal of pub- 
lic opinion, evidently seeking to produce an impression upon 
that tribunal different from the one made upon the Presbytery 
by the evidence, thus, in effect, arraigning the Court and 
Dr. Talmage at the same time. I forbear to express any 
opinion as to the state of mind indicated by this action, 
preferring to leave that to the sober sense of a candid world. 

Very soon after the close of the trial, letters came pouring 
in upon me from all directions, sometimes at the rate of a 
dozen a day, announcing the reception of these speeches, 
expressing surprise at this singular exhibit, and suggesting 


6 


that the speech for the defense ought, in the circumstances, 
to be published and circulated, as the means of giving to 
the public the other side of the question. It was with this 
view, and in these circumstances, that seventeen ministers 
of the Presbytery of Brooklyn formally requested the pub- 
lication of that speech in a pamphlet form ; and in accord- 
ance with this request it was so published by the Session 
and Trustees of the Tabernacle Church. 

The main question involved in this complaint is, whether 
there is any just occasion for disturbing or reversing the 
action of the Presbytery in the acquittal of Dr. Talmage. 
The offense charged was of such a nature that its soul and 
essence consisted in the intentions of his mind. If, in 
respect to the matters alleged against him, there was no in- 
tention to utter a falsehood or perpetrate a deceit, then he 
was entitled to an acquittal, since the offense charged had 
not been committed. It is a simple dictate of justice that 
no such intention should be imputed to him, unless his 
words and conduct, in connection with the facts proved, can- 
not be reasonably reconciled with the hypothesis of truth- 
fulness. If they can be thus reconciled, then his innocence 
is the conclusion to be adopted. It is a duty to presume 
and assume his innocence until his guilt is proved beyond 
reasonable doubt ; and his guilt is not thus proved so long 
as the facts are capable of a rational explanation in con- 
sistency with innocence. 

There is a way of dealing with human character that is 
simply a species of logical barbarism. The purpose is to 
slaughter and destroy. The passion to be gratified is an 
intense thirst for blood. Ho explanations are heard or ac- 
cepted, and no constructions favorable to innocence are ad- 
missible. The entire effort of thought is to find guilt, and. 
nothing else ; and all the facts are grouped and combined 
solely with reference to this end. Facts are distorted, and 
facts omitted, in order that guilt may be made to appear. 
But one side of the case is looked at, and even this is not 
studied in a candid and impartial frame of mind. Some- 
times this means a cool and deliberate purpose, which is # 


simple hostility, often disguised under a professed sense of 
duty, yet none the less malignant on account of the disguise. 
Sometimes this treatment of another’s character results 
from an intense prejudice that blinds the eye of thought, 
except in one direction, and always perverts and misguides 
the understanding. In neither case is the mind in a con- 
dition to judge candidly, and in neither will it do so. 

It is hardly necessary to say that no human character 
will stand such treatment. I am sure that my own will 
not, and I doubt whether any one of the complainants 
would relish this sort of logic if applied to himself. It is 
not the logic of the judge seeking for the truth, and care- 
fully and candidly collating and weighing all the facts with 
a view to its discovery, but rather the logic of an enemy, or 
of one who has a foregone conclusion which, for some 
reason, he is interested to sustain, and which he will do his 
best to sustain, no matter what may be the injustice to the 
party he accuses, and, perhaps, means to destroy. No 
human character is so perfect that it may not be more or 
less blackened, at least in appearance, if ransacked and as- 
sailed in this way. It is a cold, unfeeling, ungenial and 
bloodthirsty way of dealing with men, and is sometimes 
practiced by those who would present a very sorry spectacle 
if their own conduct were subjected to such an ordeal. 

The truth is, that human nature is not omniscient and 
not absolutely uniform in mental conditions ; and hence it 
is marked with many inconsistencies, which, by a certain 
process of representation and argumentation, may be so 
arranged and arrayed as to discolor the character of even 
the best man. Bad motives may be imputed where good 
ones would be more reasonable ; and intentions may be 
manufactured for others that have no existence. It does 
not by any means follow that one is consciously false, or 
that he means to be a deceiver, because his actions, in a 
dozen different positions, when compared together, are not 
found in exact harmony, or because they are not always 
discreet and wise. Every one acts with a limited view even 
of the past, and a vastly more limited view of the future. 


8 


One may contradict himself, and yet be perfectly honest. 
He may at different times state opposite opinions about the 
same person, and not be false in either statement. He may 
not agree with himself in different statements of professedly 
the same facts, and yet there may be no intended violation 
of truth. He may contradict others, or be contradicted by 
them, and yet be entirely honest and sincere. He may 
state things as they are not, and yet speak the truth as he 
sees it. 

We must not, in judging of the words or conduct of men, 
assume their omniscience, or their absolute uniformity as to 
states of mind. If we do, we shall certainly misjudge them. 
It will not do to write down every inconsistent man as a 
knave and a falsifier. This rule would compel us to call all 
men liars, especially those who have impulsive and excita- 
ble natures, and hence are not likely to give themselves 
time enough for thought when they speak and act. The 
words of such men are often not exactly true to the facts, 
although they do not mean them to be false. Their failure 
to speak the precise truth does not necessarily prove that 
they are liars or deceivers. 

The complainants in this case state seven reasons why 
they find fault with the action of the Presbytery in the 
acquittal of Dr. Talmage ; and to each the Presbytery has 
made a reply. As it respects the first five reasons and the 
seventh, I see no occasion for adding a word to that reply. 
These reasons relate to alleged circumstances connected 
with the procedure; and they are either frivolous upon 
their face, or based upon false statements, revealing alike 
the inventiveness of the complainants and the poverty of 
their case. Being content with the answer of the Presby- 
tery to these reasons, I submit it as follows : — 

The Acquittal of De. Talmage. 

Resolved , That the charge be dismissed as unproved and 
disproved, and the Presbytery hereby express to Dr. Tal- 
mage its heart-felt confidence in him as a minister of Christ, 
and its earnest desire that he and his church may share 
abundantly in the divine blessing, and that his ministry 


9 


may prove the source of rich spiritual blessings to his people 
and to the community among whom he may labor. 

Answer of the Presbytery. 

It is against this action, either in itself or in the manner 
of reaching the result, that the complainants have notified 
the Presbytery of their intention to complain to the Synod 
of Long Island. The first reason assigned by them is in 
the following words : “ Because during the process of the 
trial the Presbytery allowed the presence of an audience 
who manifested their sympathy for the accused by applause, 
laughter and hisses, accompanied in several instances by 
personal indignities towards members of the Court, whereby, 
as we believe, the judgment of the Court was unduly biased 
and its dignity and authority brought into contempt.” 

To this the Presbytery answer : 1. That during the tak- 
ing of the testimony the sessions of the Presbytery were 
open to the public ; that there is no law of the Book of Dis- 
cipline or of established usage against open sessions in a 
judicial trial ; that it is the province of every ecclesiastical 
court to settle this question according to its own discretion, 
and hence that no superior judicatory has the right to 
review its decision on this point. 

2. That while there were occasional manifestations on 
the part of the audience, they were promptly rebuked by 
the Moderator and always discountenanced by the Presby- 
tery, and that the effect was to decrease such manifestations, 
and finally to suppress them altogether, and that there was 
evidently at no time any intended contempt for “the 
dignity and authority ” of the Court, and no desire to disturb 
the order of its proceedings. 

3. That the statement of the complainants that “ the 
judgment of the Court was unduly biased” by the presence 
of an audience and by the manifestations made, is without 
the slightest evidence to support it. The Presbytery most 
emphatically disclaim the imputation of a biased judgment, 
except as guided by the force of evidence, and can only ex- 
press its surprise that it should have been made at all. 

The second reason of the complainants is the following : 
“ Because a mutual agreement between the accused and a 
witness (whose sworn testimony had been openly denounced 
before the Presbytery by the accused as a pack of false- 
hoods) — a so-called covenant that neither would defend his 
character at the expense of the other — a covenant resting 
on no basis of acknowledgment either of error or of wrong 


10 


by either party — was introduced before tbe Presbytery with 
such dramatic effect that many of the members were led to 
account it a sufficient ground for condoning the falsehood 
alleged against the accused, all of which proceeding was, in 
the judgment of the undersigned, out of place, improper and 
hurtful to the interests of justice in the case.” 

To this the Presbytery reply : 1. That the witness here 

referred to is the Rev. I. W. Hathaway, who was a member 
of the Court, and in reference to whom the fourth specifi- 
cation charged Dr. Talmage with falsehood, in that in the 
winter of 1876-77 he falsely accused Mr. Hathaway, then 
a theological student, of dishonest practices, and afterward 
denied that he had done so. 

2. That this accusation against Mr. Hathaway, to which 
Dr. Yan Dyke testified as having been made to him in the 
latter part of November, 1876, was the subject of a series of 
interviews between Dr. Talmage and Mr. Hathaway in the 
early part of January, 1877, which resulted in a satisfactory 
settlement of the whole difficulty, and the resumption of 
pleasant fraternal relations, and that Mr. Hathaway, having 
accepted this settlement as final and complete, never made 
any complaint to the Presbytery, and never sought any in- 
vestigation or redress in respect to the matter involved in 
the fourth specification. 

3. That the “proceeding” to which the complainants re- 
fer, and which they designate as u a mutual agreement ” or 
“so-called covenant,” consists in the preparation of two 
letters addressed to the Moderator of the Presbytery — one 
by Dr. Talmage and the other by Mr. Hathaway — written 
after the latter had testified for the prosecution and been 
discharged as a witness, expressing the regret of each that 
the matter which had been settled between them two years 
previously should be revived in the form of specification 
four, and in view of this settlement declaring that, in re- 
spect to this matter, neither would undertake to vindicate 
his character at the expense of the other, which letters the 
Moderator announced to the Presbytery, and then re- 
quested each of these gentlemen to read his own letter in 
its hearing. 

4. That the Presbytery had nothing to do with the writ- 
ing of these letters, or with their introduction as above 
stated ; that after their introduction a motion was made to 
strike out the fourth specification, which was not adopted, 
and hence that the letters did not, so far as the Presbytery 


.11 


was concerned, in any way change or modify the course of 
procedure in the case. 

5. That it is due to Dr. Talmage to say that his strong 
denunciation of the testimony of Mr. Hathaway, made in a 
moment of high excitement, was not intended to character- 
ize that testimony in reference to any matter pertaining to 
their settlement in the early part of January, 1877, and to 
say further, a fact which the complainants omit to mention, 
that Dr. Talmage subsequently, and in a calmer moment, 
withdrew the language as openly as he had uttered it. 

6. That not counting the Eev. Mr. McCullagh and the 
Rev. Mr. Crosby, who were not entitled to vote, and Dr. 
Van Dyke, who declined to vote on the fourth specification, 
the complainants, nvith two exceptions, sustained this speci- 
fication, thereby conclusively showing that the “ so-called 
covenant,” to which they refer, had no “such dramatic 
effect ” upon their minds as to lead them to condone the 
alleged falsehood. 

7. That the ground on which the Presbytery acquitted 
Dr. Talmage of this specific accusation, was that the latter 
part of it, which sets forth an alleged denial, was actually 
disproved by the testimony of the prosecution, and that the 
former part, which declares that he had falsely accused I. 
W. Hathaway of “ dishonest practices,” was not proved, and 
hence that the evidence failed to sustain the accusation ; 
and, further, that the judgment of the Presbytery in the 
premises was not influenced one way or the other by this 
“ so-called covenant,” but was based solely upon the 
evidence. 

The third reason assigned by the complainants is as fol- 
lows : “ Because testimony for the defense, viz., the affida- 
vit of General Howard, was introduced in open violation of 
the requirement of the Book of Discipline, chapter vi., section 
13, and at such a stage in the trial as necessarily to preclude 
the prosecution from all opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness, and this violation of the rule is the more aggra- 
vated, because the affidavit in question had been in posses- 
sion of counsel for the defense for some time before it was 
presented, and bore the date of March 21, while the date of 
its presentation was April 21.” 

To this the Presbytery reply: 1. That this affidavit, 
made at Chicago and bearing date of March 21, 1879, was 
introduced by the defense on the 21st of April, with the 
distinct statement that Dr. Talmage could not claim the 


12 


right of having it accepted as evidence, and with the ex- 
pression of a wish that it might be read as a communication 
from General Howard to him, and with the further state- 
ment that General Howard was an invalid and could not 
come to Brooklyn as a witness. 

2. That, after debate, the Presbytery decided to hear the 
paper as a communication, and that the prosecution might 
prepare questions to be sent to General Howard, and that 
the paper was accordingly read, without the reading of its 
attestation as an affidavit, and hence that it was received 
by the Presbytery not as an affidavit, but simply as a letter, 
and was so regarded by the Presbytery in rendering its 
verdict. 

3. That at that stage of the trial, and in view of the un- 
certainty as to where General Howard then was, it was not 
possible to follow the rule of the Book of Discipline referred 
to by the complainants, and that in these circumstances the 
Presbytery deemed it but just and fair to the accused to hear 
the communication from General Howard, on the same 
principle that it had just heard a letter addressed by him to 
Dr. Talmage, to which the prosecution did not object. 

4. That the Presbytery is satisfied that there was no 
trick, on the part of the defense, in delaying to offer this 
paper, as is shown by the fact that the trial did not com- 
mence until the 24th of March ; that the prosecution con- 
sumed the first three weeks in presenting their evidence ; 
that during two days of the week following, the Presbytery 
was not in session, and that the paper was offered when Dr. 
Talmage was a witness, which was the earliest point of time 
at which it could be properly presented, all of which facts 
satisfy the Presbytery that there was no studied delay in 
submitting the paper, or desire on the part of the defense 
to secure any improper advantage. 

5. That the ends of justice were not in any way injured 
by hearing this communication from General Howard, since 
the points sought to be shown by it were, when all the tes- 
timony of the defense had been adduced, fully sustained 
without it. 

The fourth reason of the complainants is the following : 
“ Because on the other hand, the Moderator ruled out im- 
portant evidence by the prosecution, which should, in the 
interest of truth and justice, have been admitted.” 

To this the Presbytery reply : 1. That the complainants 
do not state what this evidence is which was thus ruled out. 


13 


2. That any ruling of the Moderator upon evidence was 
subject to an appeal to the Court, and that if the com- 
plainants or any of them did not avail themselves of this 
right, then this was purely their own fault. 

3. That the Book of Discipline, while prescribing rules as 
to the witnesses to be adduced, and as to the order to be 
pursued in their examination, and also providing that no 
question shall be put or answered except by permission of 
the Moderator, lays down no rule as to what is admissible 
evidence, and hence leaves this point to be settled by the 
wise discretion of the judicatory. 

4. That in the absence of any such rule furnished by the 
Book of Discipline, the Moderator, saying in the early part 
of the trial that an ecclesiastical court should not in the 
trial of a minister make “ its shield of protection a hair’s 
breadth less than that which civil courts provide in the trial 
for petit offenses,” announced to the Presbytery that, sub- 
ject to the right of appeal in all cases, he should be guided 
in the admission of evidence by what he regarded as the 
general rules on this subject as established in this country, 
and as found on the whole best adapted to keep out irrele- 
vant matter, and admit only evidence which is proper and 
pertinent to the issue, and further that the Moderator did, 
with entire impartiality and satisfaction to the Presbytery, 
apply these rules in the conduct of the trial, always enter- 
taining an appeal from his decision, and following the judg- 
ment of the Court. 

The fifth reason is the following : “ Because the accused, 
when under cross-examination, was allowed to make long 
and irrelevant answers to direct and plain questions, and to 
refuse to answer questions concerning matters of import- 
ance to the issue, thus obstructing the course of justice and 
confusing the minds of the judges.” 

To this the Presbytery reply : 1 . That it is not true that 
any allowance as to the answer of questions on cross-ex- 
amination, or as to a declinature to answer questions, was 
extended to Dr. Talmage that was not equally extended to 
all the other witnesses. 

2. That no such allowance was extended to any witness, 
either calculated or designed to obstruct the course of jus- 
tice or confuse the minds of the judges. 

3. That the Presbytery had no power in any case to 
coerce an answer to questions which a witness, for his own 
reasons, as was sometimes the fact, declined to answer. 


14 


4. That the conduct of the trial in respect to the exami- 
nation of witnesses and their answer to questions, whether 
on their direct or cross-examination, was impartial alike 
towards the prosecution and the defense, and hence that 
there is no just foundation for the fifth reason assigned by 
the complainants. 

The seventh and last reason is the following: “ Because 
the accused and his counsel have justified his whole con- 
duct, as set forth in the testimony, upon 'principles which 
are directly opposed to truth and righteousness, and be- 
cause the acquittal of the accused upon, or in connection 
with, such principles, is injurious not only to religion, but to 
public morals.” 

To this the Presbytery reply that its judgment in the 
case was not based upon any theories or “ principles” 
avowed by either the prosecution or the defense, whether in 
the course of the trial, or in the final summing up of the 
counsel ; but was based upon the fact, and this only, that 
the evidence adduced during the trial did not show that 
Dr. Talmage had been guilty of falsehood and deceit in the 
matters alleged against him. The question of guilt or in- 
nocence, in the light of the evidence, is the only question 
upon which it passed judgment. Hence, this seventh rea- 
son, whatever may be true or not true as to the “ princi- 
ples ” upon which “the accused and his counsel justified his 
whole conduct” — a point upon which the Presbytery sees 
no occasion to express an opinion — has no relevancy what- 
ever to the acquittal of Dr. Talmage. That acquittal had 
nothing to do with anything but the evidence, and was 
based solely thereupon. The simple fact is, that the guilt 
of the accused was not, in the judgment of the Presbytery, 
proved by the evidence, and this is the best possible reason 
why he should have been acquitted. 

The sixth reason assigned by the complainants is as 
follows : 

“Because the vote of the majority of the Presbytery 
acquitting Dr. Talmage of falsehood and deceit is in open 
conflict with the recorded testimony in the case, and the 
grounds upon which many of the majority based their deci- 
sion were irrelevant, inconsistent, and fitted to bring religion 
and morality into contempt. We believe the charge to be 
clearly proven by the facts which are admitted on both 
sides, and that in view of these facts the judgment of the 
Presbytery is injurious to the interests of religion, and cal- 


15 


culated to degrade the character of those who have pro- 
nounced it. We therefore appeal for redress to the judg- 
ment of the whole Presbyterian Church, as represented in 
her superior courts.” 

The answer given by the Presbytery is in the following 
words : 

“ To this the Presbytery reply that the judgment of the 
majority in this case is the judgment of the Presbytery of 
Brooklyn, and that the complainants, however honest in 
their views, or seemingly confident and assured in their 
statement of the same, have no just ground for assuming 
or saying that this judgment 4 is in open conflict with the 
recorded testimony in the case.’ The Presbytery most un- 
qualifiedly deny the truth of this statement, and regard the 
complainants as entirely mistaken in their estimate of the 
evidence. Moreover, the remarkable allegation that ‘the 
grounds upon which many of the majority based their de- 
cision were irrelevant, inconsistent, and fitted to bring re- 
ligion and morality into contempt ’ is utterly foreign to the 
truth, and wholly unjustifiable by anything said on the part 
of those who voted for the acquittal of Dr. Talmage. 
The Presbytery cannot for a moment concede that the com- 
plainants have any monopoly of honesty, good conscience, 
and sound judgment in this case, or that its decision was 
based on anything but the evidence, and any implication to 
the contrary is false to the facts. The Presbytery believed, 
and now believes, that Dr. Talmage, in the light of the evi- 
dence, was entitled to an acquittal, and that any other 
judgment would have been wrong, and to him a manifest 
injustice. That the complainants do not so think is a mat- 
ter of regret to the Presbytery ; but this fact, though much 
regretted, furnishes the Presbytery with no ground for 
doubting the correctness of its own judgment, especially as 
the Presbytery had the opportunity of fully hearing all they 
saw fit to say in support of the opposite view.” 

The Presbytery here joins issue with the complainants, 
denying what they affirm, and affirming what they deny. 
This issue has no relation to the sixth and seventh specifi- 
cations of the charge against Dr. Talmage, since here the 
complainants themselves voted for his acquittal, and, of 
course, do not complain of what they approve. The com- 
plaint refers to the action of the Presbytery in regard to 


16 


the first five specifications ; and these I now proceed to con- 
sider in their order. 

SPECIFICATION FIRST. 

The charge against Dr. Talmage, here made, consists in 
the alleged fact u that he acted deceitfully and made state- 
ments, which he knew to be false, in the matter of his with- 
drawal from the editorship of the Christian at Work in the 
month of October, 1876.” The vote of the Presbytery on 
this specification was twenty- five for acquittal and twenty 
for conviction. 

That part of the accusation which declares that Dr. Tal- 
mage “ made statements ” — of course, in direct connection 
with his withdrawal from the Christian at Work — “ which 
he knew to be false,” was sustained by no evidence what- 
ever, and hence may at once be dismissed as not in the 
case. The simple question then is, whether Dr. Talmage 
“ acted deceitfully” in the matter referred to — that is to say, 
whether he consciously, and of set purpose, perpetrated an 
act or acts of deceit. If what is either admitted or proved 
in this branch of the case can be reasonably reconciled with 
his innocence, then that is the end of the question. 

And now, before taking up this question, I wish to advert 
for a moment to four matters which more or less made their 
appearance during the trial, but which were not relevant or 
not proved by any evidence, and which, for one or the other 
of these reasons, should be entirely dismissed. The first is 
the interview between Dr. Talmage, Mr. Hallock and Mr. 
Corwin, at the residence of Mr. Corwin, on the 6th of 
March, 1876. I shall not comment upon that interview, 
or upon the conflict between the testimony of Mr. Hallock 
and that of Dr. Talmage and Mr. Corwin in regard to it. 
It is enough to say that the interview was about seven 
months anterior to the transaction alleged in this accusa- 
tion, and that it has no relation to it, either as being part 
of it or as proof. It simply has nothing to do, any more 
than an eclipse of the sun, with this charge against Dr. 
Talmage. 


17 


The second matter is the omission of Dr. Talmage to 
suggest any change in the circular of the paper that was 
issued on the 12th September, 1876, for the purpose of ob- 
taining subscribers, in which he was referred to as the 
editor. This is one of the five deceits which Dr. Van Dyke 
sets down to his account, forgetting that the charge against 
him applies only to his withdrawal from the Christian at 
Worli on the 9tli of October, 1876, and has nothing what- 
ever to do with a circular issued on the 12th of the previous 
September. One would think it quite sufficient to try an 
accused party for the offense charged, without trying and 
convicting him on one not charged. This circular was pre- 
pared by the business department of the paper, and, as Mr. 
Dickinson testified, with the knowledge that “ Dr. Talmage 
looked to some change on his part in the Fall and if he 
was guilty of deceit when the circular was shown to him, 
because he suggested no change, then what about Mr. 
Dickinson and Mr. Remington who prepared the circular, 
knowing that “ Dr. Talmage looked to some change on his 
part in the Fall that his contract did not extend beyond 
the then current year, and that his relation to the paper 
might be terminated at any time by a thirty days’ previous 
notice from either party? Dr. Van Dyke’s argument 
makes more sinners than one. 

The truth is, there were no sinners at all in this matter. 
The circular was drawn up in the usual form. It stated the 
facts as they were there ; and whether any change should 
occur was left for the future to determine. The attempt to 
get up an offense here on the part of Dr. Talmage, when 
this circular has no relation to the deceit charged in the in- 
dictment, besides being a specimen of hypercriticism, is a 
sort of drag-net operation that finds no favor in courts of 
justice. 

The third matter is the imputation that Dr. Talmage was 
in some way concerned with furnishing the mail|list of the 
Christian at Work to the Advance. There is not a frag- 
ment of evidence to show this, even if it was done at all. 
Dr. Talmage denies the imputation. The letter of General 

2 


18 


Howard supports that denial, and not a solitary witness 
contradicts it. Mr. Hallock did not pretend to any knowl- 
edge that traces such a fact to Dr. Talmage. 

The fourth matter is the imputation that Dr. Talmage 
had something to do with procuring the insertion of the 
Advance advertisement in the issue of the Christian at 
Work that contained his valedictory. No evidence was 
adduced that showed such a fact; and the testimony of Dr. 
Talmage, Mr. Shelly and Mr. Grask, and the affidavit of 
General Howard read as a letter, completely stamped the 
imputation into the dust. General Howard is the man 
who, without the knowledge of Dr. Talmage, was concerned 
in procuring the insertion of this Advance advertise- 
ment. 

Dismissing, then, these four items to which I have thus- 
alluded, as not in the case, I shall take the 9th of October, 
187 6, which in that year was Monday, and which was the 
day in which Dr. Talmage committed the offense, if at all, 
as a standpoint for observation, not only iu reference to the 
transactions of that day, but also in reference to any other 
transactions pertinent to this issue. Please to follow me in 
this narrative of that memorable day. 

1. The first scene is one of prayer. Dr. Talmage, embar- 
rassed with the perplexities of his connection with the 
Christian at Work , left his home in the morning to go to 
his office in New York, and, before he had proceeded far, 
retraced his steps, and went back to his study, and there 
sought wisdom from God. He so testified, and I take it 
that no one will here charge him with perjury. He certain- 
ly did not begin the day with the plans and purposes of a 
deceiver, or in a mood of mind favorable to such plans. But 
he did begin it as a Christian. I cannot think that even 
his most malignant enemy will construe this prayer into a 
hypocritical farce. He then had no idea that the fact 
would ever be known, or that he would ever have occasion 
to state it as a witness. It was then a matter between 
himself and his God. Dr. Talmage on his knees, in his 
study, there talking with God and invoking his guidance, is 


19 


a spectacle to invite commendation. The so-called deceit 
or lie does not come in very well here. 

2. The next scene is the interview between Dr. Talmage 
and Mr. Hallock, at the Astor House in Hew York, at 
about twelve o’clock, no other parties being present. Mr. 
Hallock swears that he told Dr. Talmage that he bought 
the Christian at Work on the previous Saturday, which 
was the 7 th of October, and that he proposed to him a 
written agreement by which he was to be the editor at a 
salary of two thousand dollars a year, which Dr. Talmage 
declined to sign, saying that he would give an answer the 
next day. Mr. Hallock further Swears that at an accidental 
interview with Dr. Talmage on the 6th of October, which 
was Friday, in the City Hall Park, he told him that he was 
u about to purchase the Christian at Work” insisting 
strenuously upon this phraseology, although in his paper of 
the 19tli of October, 187 6, he thus described the interview : 
u I said that I was seriously thinking of purchasing the 
Christian at Work” Here are two different editions of 
what he said — an earlier and a later one. I have no wish to 
impeach the integrity of Mr. Hallock in his testimony as to 
these interviews. I shall assume, for all the purposes of this 
argument, that he testified in good faith on the witness stand. 

Dr. Talmage, the other party to the Astor House inter- 
view, as well as to the preceding one in the City Hall Park, 
declared under oath that, in respect to the former, he did 
not understand from Mr. Hallock that he had actually pur- 
chased the Christian at Work ; and that, in respect to the 
latter, namely, the City Hall Park interview, little or no 
impression was made upon his mind. Mr. Hallock had at 
different times talked so much about buying the paper, 
without doing it, that he attached no practical significance 
to what he said on that occasion. He did not understand 
from Mr. Hallock on Friday that he was about to buy the 
paper, and did not understand from him on Monday that he 
had bought it. So he swears. 

There is here a conflict of understandings. One party 
understood himself to say what the other party did not un- 


20 


derstand him to say ; and this is no uncommon thing in the 
history of this world. Both may be perfectly honest, though 
they thus differ in their recollection as to the Astor House 
interview. 

It may, however, he said that the memorandum of an 
agreement, previously prepared by Mr. Hallock and pro- 
posed to Dr. Talmage, but not signed by the latter, shows 
that the paper had been purchased by Mr. Hallock. To 
this I reply : (1.) This memorandum does not expressly 
state the fact of such a purchase, but simply speaks of Mr. 
Hallock’s intention to clear the paper “ from debt, and put 
it on a healthy, cash-paying basis.” (2.) It does not neces- 
sarily imply the purchase as an accomplished fact, since it 
is not at all insupposable that Mr. Hallock, having the offer 
of the paper to him upon specified terms, might for his own 
reasons have chosen, before actually closing his contract 
with Mr. Remington, to settle the question of editorship 
with Dr. Talmage. (3.) The memorandum, if read to Dr. 
Talmage, or read by him, does not prove that he must 
have understood from it that the purchase of the paper by 
Mr. Hallock had been actually consummated. He swears 
positively that this was not his understanding at the time ; 
and there is nothing in the language of the memorandum 
to contradict his oath on this point. 

It is to be borne in mind that there had been repeated 
conversations between these parties, extending over the 
period of months, sometimes casually, and at others in a 
more formal manner, about the idea of the purchase of the 
paper by Mr. Hallock. Both of them swear to this fact. 
And yet it was all talk and no action, no purchase, no result. 
It had become a sort of standing joke in the mind of Dr. 
Talmage, when he met Mr. Hallock, to ask him whether he 
had yet bought the paper. These antecedents in the his- 
tory of Mr. Hallock, who, when on the witness stand, ap- 
peared as a very voluble, loose, and hap-hazard talker, 
explain why Dr. Talmage, as he swears, came to the con- 
clusion that he probably would not buy the paper at all. 
He had become accustomed to Mr. Hallock’s talks on this 


21 


subject, without any actual purchase ; and if he did not at 
the Astor House interview, either from what Mr. Hallock 
said, or from the memorandum, get the impression that the 
paper had been purchased by Mr. Hallock, the fact, in the 
circumstances, would not be at all surprising. It is perfectly 
easy to see how this might be the case. 

It, moreover, so happens that Dr. Talmage wrote a letter 
to Mr. Hallock in the afternoon of this day, which settles this 
question as to what was his understanding at the time. The 
letter reads thus : “ I have considered the offer you made 
me to the editorial chair of the Christian at Work, in case 
you purchase it , and have concluded it is my duty to decline 
it, and so I accept another position.” This letter clearly 
implies that, whatever Mr. Hallock meant to say or did say, 
Dr. Talmage did not, at the Astor House interview, receive 
the impression that he had purchased the paper. If such 
had been his idea, he certainly would not have used the 
words, “in case you purchase i£,” as qualifying the offer 
made to him, when, as he knew, and as he knew that Mr. 
Hallock knew, that he had just been informed of the fact of 
purchase by Mr. Hallock himself. Human nature does not 
work in that way. Dr. Talmage did not ingeniously insert 
these words in his letter, thus anticipating their service in a 
future trial. Though they strongly confirm his testimony 
as to his own understanding, he could not foresee this use 
when he wrote them. 

There are, moreover, some facts in evidence which throw 
light upon this letter. One is the fact that on the 4th of 
October, 1876, which was Wednesday of the previous week, 
Dr. Talmage had been in negotiation with General How- 
ard, the proprietor and publisher of the Advance , in respect 
to taking an editorial position on that paper, which negotia- 
tion, as he testified, had not reached the stage of a com- 
pleted agreement. Another fact is that on the 5th of Octo- 
ber, which was Thursday, he wrote to Mr. Remington, in- 
forming him of his purpose to retire from the Christian at 
Worlc in one month from that date, thus on his part giving 
the notice which had been stipulated for in the agreement 


22 


of May 29th, 1876, with the Christian at Work Company. 
A third fact is that in the afternoon of this famous Monday 
he had an interview with General Howard, after receiving 
certain information, of which I shall speak in the sequel, 
and closed up his negotiations with him in the form of a 
written contract. 

Now, when, not supposing that Mr. Hallock had actually 
purchased the paper, he wrote this letter to him, he wrote 
as he thought, and just as the facts were in his mind. He 
did, as he says, consider the offer made to him by Mr. 
Hallock, which he regarded as contingent upon a purchase 
yet to he made ; and he had a right to consider it, since at 
the time of the offer the negotiation with General Howard 
was not complete. He did conclude to decline the offer, 
and he had a right to do so ; and he did accept another 
position by finishing up his negotiation with General 
Howard, and he had a right to do that. 

And yet Hr. Van Dyke, by a strange criticism upon 
words and a criticism based on false assumptions, in his 
deliverance before the Presbytery, treated this letter as 
u the crowning act of deceit ” on the part of Hr. Talmage. 
His theory, without any good reason therefor, and against 
a fair and candid view of the facts, was that the letter im- 
plies what Hr. Talmage knew to be false when he wrote it, 
and hence that, in almost every word, it was at the time 
nothing but a piece of trickery. This is a very easy way of 
making out falsehood and deceit. The theory, moreover, 
strikes further than the letter, since it virtually makes Hr. 
Talmage a perjured witness. He swore positively to the 
fact which the letter implies, namely, that he did not at the 
Astor House interview understand from Mr. Hallock that 
he had purchased the paper. This letter, perfectly natural 
in the circumstances under which it was written, and just 
as unnatural and improbable, not to say stupid, upon the 
hypothesis of Hr. Van Hyke, is confirmatory of the truth- 
fulness of Hr. Talmage in thus swearing, and of the correct- 
ness of his memory as to his own understanding of the 
Astor House interview. It is documentary evidence to 


23 


this effect, introduced, not by himself, but by the prosecu- 
tion. 

The sensible view — the one that commends itself to a fair 
and candid mind — is that in respect to the Astor House in- 
terview, particularly the question of the purchase of the 
paper by Mr. Hallock, Dr. Talmage did not at the time un- 
derstand that the purchase was an accomplished fact, and 
that Mr. Hallock did think that he so understood ; and un- 
less we are determined to make one or the other a liar, we 
must assume this to he the case. There is nothing singular 
in such a misunderstanding. It is one of the most common 
things in the world. I prefer to adopt this view, rather 
than to call either of these parties a liar. I believe Dr. 
Talmage when he swears as to what was and what was not 
his thought at the time, especially when I find that his let- 
ter to Mr. Hallock, written on the same day, confirms his 
oath, and when I add the utter improbability that he should 
thus write if he did not thus think. So I believe Mr. Hal- 
lock when he swears as to what were his thoughts, and 
what he supposed were the thoughts of Dr. Talmage. 

This saves the honesty of both parties ; and this view 
must be taken, or we must impute perjury to one or the 
other, which is just the compliment that Dr. Van Dyke’s 
argument virtually pays to Dr. Talmage. 

If we assume, as we need not and should not, that one of 
these parties, when on the witness stand, was a falsifier, 
what evidence is there to show that Dr. Talmage was the 
falsifier ? None whatever, except the oath of Mr. Hallock, 
swearing to what he supposed to be the understanding of 
Dr. Talmage. Well, is not the oath of Dr. Talmage, swear- 
ing as to what was not his understanding, just as good to 
prove Mr. Hallock to be the falsifier ! There is no neces- 
sity for putting these men in the attitude of proving each 
other to be knaves ; and if we make the attempt, we cannot 
tell who was the knave. 

3. The third scene of this eventful day is the remarkable 
reticence on the part of the officers and managers of the 
Christian at Work toward Dr. Talmage. Bear in mind 


24 


that the paper was sold on the previous Saturday without 
his knowledge at the time, without any provision for him in 
the terms of the sale, and without any thirty days’ notice 
to him as stipulated in the agreement of May 29th, 1870. 
All his obligations to the Christian at Work Company were 
thus terminated by the act of Mr. Remington, who was 
virtually the Company, and whom Dr. Talmage did not re- 
gard as friendly to him. The fact of sale w T as known not 
only to Mr. Remington, but to Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Hawley, 
and Mr. Bright, who were managers of the paper. Dr. 
Talmage came over to the office on Monday morning as 
ignorant of this fact as a child unborn ; and not one of 
these gentlemen communicated the fact to him. They do 
not pretend to have done so, and he swears that they did 
not. He saw Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Hawley, and Mr. Bright, 
and they saw him, at different times during the day, and 
there was not on their lips the slightest allusion to the sale 
of the paper. It will not do to *say that they thought that 
he knew all about it. If they so thought, why was not the 
matter of his and their common knowledge, as this assumes, 
the subject of at least some conversation ? The sale of the 
paper was not so trifling a circumstance as to escape their 
notice by mere insignificance. 

This reticence toward Dr. Talmage, who was the editor- 
in-chief as well as a trustee of the Company, is remarkable 
if everything was moving along smoothly between him and 
these parties, and if there were not some reason or reasons, 
operating alike upon them all, that led to this studied 
silence toward him. It is so remarkable as to be wholly 
unnatural. It is not the way in which men usually act in 
their ordinary mood of feeling. On its face it does not ap- 
pear exactly honorable, to say the least. It would not be a 
very large stretch of fancy to conceive of it as involving “ de- 
ceit.” It looks as if the design was to keep the sale of the 
paper a secret from Dr. Talmage, for the time being. If 
such had not been the design, why was it sold at all without 
his knowledge, and why was he not, by Mr. Remiugton, or 
Mr. Dickinson, or Mr. Hawley, or Mr. Bright, informed of 


25 


the fact on the Monday following the sale ? Why this total 
silence in respect to a matter that deeply concerned him ? 

4. The fourth scene is furnished by a casual interview, 
between two and four o’clock in the afternoon, on the part 
of Dr. Talmage with an employe of the office, who told 
him that the paper had been sold. The information thus 
received was confirmed by fragments of a conversation in an 
adjoining room, which he afterward heard from his editorial 
chair, and which implied the sale of the paper. His suppo- 
sition was that the paper had been sold to a gentleman in 
Philadelphia, with whom Mr. Eemington had been in con- 
ference. It was a supposition, and not a matter of positive 
knowledge, as Dr. Van Dyke, in his deliverance before the 
Presbytery, assumed when he said that Dr. Talmage 
“ swears that he knew, and defends his whole action that 
night upon the knowledge, that the paper was already sold 
to a gentleman in Philadelphia.” Dr. Talmage did not so 
swear. What he said is this : “ I supposed the paper had 
been sold to a gentleman in Philadelphia, with whom Mr. 
Eemington had been in conference.” He does not assert 
knowledge. He got, as he swears, no such knowledge from 
Mr. Hallock or from the officers of the Christian at Work. 
He had an impression, and he tells what it was and how he 
got it. 

It must, to Dr. Talmage, have seemed very strange, with 
this impression m -mind, coming as it did, that nothing had 
been said to him by the officers of the Company about the 
sale of the paper. Such questions as these would naturally 
occur : Why this sale without any conference with me ? 
Why this silence toward me ? Why have I been kept in 
ignorance f What does this mean ? The fact that he re- 
garded Mr. Eemington as hostile to him, would give these 
questions special force to his mind, particularly as this Mr. 
Eemington was financially the great man in the concern. 

Dr. Talmage was excited and indignant. He felt out- 
raged by what he supposed to be a fact. He so felt then, 
has so felt ever since, and will continue so to feel. He con- 
demned Mr. Eemington especially, and regarded his con- 


26 


duct toward him as being “ surreptitious ” in the sense of 
being sly, secret, clandestine, not honorable. Perhaps he 
misjudged him, and perhaps he did not. Whether he did 
or not, he so judged, and sticks to that judgment to this 
day. The conduct was not, in view of his relation to the 
paper and his interest therein, fair and open dealing on the 
part of Mr. Bemington. 

It is not surprising that Dr. Talmage, in these circum- 
stances and with these views, did not seek to ascertain from 
Mr. Bemington or Mr. Dickinson the exact state of the 
facts before taking any action on his part. It is quite 
possible that the coolest kind of prudence might have sug- 
gested this course ; yet one who thinks that another has 
played a sharp game with him, or means to play such a 
game, is not apt to take that other into his counsels. He 
rather avoids him than seeks him. This sufficiently ex- 
plains why Dr. Talmage made no inquiries of Mr. Beming- 
ton, or Mr. Dickinson, or Mr. Hawley. He did not look 
upon these men as friendly to him. He naturally, as the 
matter was then presented to his mind, regarded Mr. 
Bemington and the office managers of the Christian at 
Work in an unfavorable light. He was the editor-in-chief, 
as well as a trustee and stockholder ; and here was a trans- 
action, changing the ownership of the paper, and not a 
word had been said to him about it by these parties. The 
impression upon his mind was a bad one ; and such it would 
have been upon any mind. 

5. The next scene is one in which Dr. Talmage and Mr. 
Bright, the managing editor of the paper, were the partici- 
pants. Mr. Bright fixes the time by the fact that he 
wanted to leave the office sufficiently early to catch the four 
o’clock train for Tarrytown, and this renders it probable that 
the time was not later than half-past three o’clock. It 
would take him at least half an hour to reach the train 
from the office. He presented, as he swears, the plan of the 
next issue of the paper, saying to Dr. Talmage, “ Here 
is the paper ; it is all made up ; I want to take the four 
o’clock train to Tarrytown.” Dr. Talmage replied, “All 


27 


right, go ahead;” and Mr. Bright, as he says, “bade 
him good-night and went ahead.” This is the whole of the 
scene, and, according to the statement of Mr. Bright, it was 
a matter of but a moment. 

Dr. Van Dyke, in his deliverance before the Presbytery, 
here finds one of his five instances of deceit on the part of 
Dr. Talmage. “ A fourth act of deceit,” he says, “ accom- 
panied with falsehood, was his going through the formality 
of approving the paper, as already made up, presented to 
him by Mr. Bright, when lie did not intend the paper should 
go out in that form” How does Dr. Van Dyke know that 
he did not so intend when he said to Mr. Bright, certainly 
not later than half past three o’clock, “ All right, go 
ahead ?” How does he know that at that time Dr. Talmage 
had determined to write his valedictory and retire from the 
Christian at Worli? How does he know the length of 
time between that period and the period when Dr. Talmage 
was informed of the sale of the paper by an employe of the 
office ? How does he know that this information did not 
actually come after this short interview with Mr. Bright, 
especially as Dr. Talmage fixes the time of receiving it be- 
tween two and four o’clock f How does he know what were 
the thoughts and purposes of Dr. Talmage at the moment 
in which he spoke as he did to Mr. Bright ? His statement 
is a sheer assumption from beginning to end ; and yet he 
leaps to it with the celerity of a trained athlete. 

Let it be remembered, moreover, that Dr/ Talmage was 
the editor-in-chief, and that Mr. Bright was his subordinate. 
As a subordinate, the latter had no claim to know the 
thoughts and purposes of his superior, except as the know- 
ledge might be necessary to the performance of his duties. 
When Mr. Bright had made up the paper and presented it 
to Dr. Talmage his work was ended, and whether Dr. Tal- 
mage did or did not then intend to change it, was not a 
matter in respect to which Mr. Bright was entitled to 
knowledge. The fact that he had made up the paper and 
was told to “go ahead,” did not affect the prerogatives of 
Dr. Talmage as editor-in-chief, or his right to change it 

* 


28 


either with or without the knowledge of Mr. Bright. If, 
then, we concede Dr. Van Dyke’s assumption, his inference 
does not follow at all. The premise from which he reasons 
is nothing but an assumption, and the logic founded upon 
it is no better. 

6. The sixth scene of the day is one in which Dr. Tal- 
mage and Mr. Shelly were the parties directly concerned. 
Mr. Shelly was a member of the Tabernacle Church, and 
his place of business in New York was but two or three 
blocks from the office of the Christian at W ork. Dr. Tal- 
mage came there about four o’clock, probably a little after ; 
and as to his conduct and language Mr. Shelly thus testifies ; 
“ The Doctor was kind of mad that day. He was a little 
agitated and a little out of his usual line of conduct. He 
said, 4 Mr. Shelly, I have had trouble with the Christian at 
Work ; I am sold out, and I am not going to stand it.’ ” 

Here we see the mental condition of Dr. Talmage, what 
he thought and how he felt, when the matter was fresh in 
his mind. Mr. Shelly was his friend, and he spoke to him 
just as he felt. He had no motive for going to this witness, 
and aping madness, and saying to him wliat he did, except 
upon the supposition that he thought himself wronged in 
the matter referred to. He could not then foresee that this 
scene would be of any future consequence to him, and that 
Mr. Shelly would serve him as a witness. He then had no 
idea that the sceue would be brought out in any future 
trial on the charge of falsehood and deceit. He was not 
then preparing evidence for such an emergency. He acted 
as he felt, and spoke as he thought, iu the presence of a 
friend whom he trusted. This brief interview with Mr. 
Shelly speaks volumes as to his state of mind, since it 
clearly shows that, after being informed about the sale of 
the paper as he testified, he supposed himself to be the vie- 
tim of a sharp and dishonorable game. There is no other 
reasonable way of accounting for the facts of that interview. 
Whatever Mr. Remington thought or meant, there can be 
no mistake as to what Dr. Talmage thought, or as to how 
lie felt. 


29 


7. The seventh scene, lying very near the one just 
described, occurs between Dr. Talmage and General How- 
ard. Bear in mind that the former had been in negotiation 
with the latter for some time, and that on the 4th of Octo- 
ber, which was Wednesday of the previous week, the nego- 
tiation, though not complete, was, nevertheless, so far ad- 
vanced and so likely to end in a fixed agreement, that Dr. 
Talmage, on the 5th of October, which was Thursday, 
addressed a letter to Mr. Remington, giving him thirty 
days’ notice of his intention to retire from the Christian at 
Work in one month from that date, expecting to go to the 
Advance at the termination of this period. The informa- 
tion, however, which he received on the following Monday 
about the sale of the paper, and the views which he had in 
regard to it, led him late in the afternoon of that day, prob- 
ably after his interview with Mr. Shelly, to see General 
Howard, and at once complete his arrangement with him, 
and summarily retire from the Christian at Work. He 
swears that he did so ; and the affidavit of General How- 
ard, read simply as a letter, confirms the statement. The 
purpose of retirement from the Christian at Work is now 
settled, if it was not before ; and the purpose to publish a 
farewell editorial to the readers of that paper is also settled. 
The indignation of his mind at a supposed wrong has 
reached this practical form. We cannot account for the 
action without assuming the indignation, and the indigna- 
tion as a fact is clearly proved. 

8. The eighth scene, occurring in the early evening, some- 
time between six and seven o’clock, is furnished by the tes- 
timony of Mr. Waugh. He saw Dr. Talmage go into the 
proof-room, and soon after the foreman went in, and in 
about five minutes after Dr. Talmage came out and went 
away, and that is the last he saw of him. Mr. Waugh was 
afterward ordered by the foreman to take out an editorial 
from the forms as already made up, and the valedictory of 
Dr. Talmage was set up in type and put in its place. There 
is no dispute about these facts. 

9. The ninth and last scene of the day occurs in the house 


30 


of Dr. Talmage, and is furnished by the testimony of his 
wife. She swears that it was not late when he returned 
home in the evening ; and in reference to what had taken 
place during the day, she particularly remembers that he 
walked up and down the room, and then said : “ There is one 
passage of Scripture that is continually in my mind.” Being 
asked what it was, he said that “ it has been on my mind 
all the way coming home,” and then said: “My soul has 
escaped as a bird from the snare of the fowler : the snare is 
broken, and I am escaped.” He repeated these words sev- 
eral times, and asked his wife if she did not think that his 
escape was in answer to prayer. Such is her testimony as 
to the mood of his mind in reference to the events of that 
day. 

Now, I can hardly think that any one will for a moment 
imagine that Dr. Talmage was then and there playing a 
game of false pretenses upon his wife. Who believes that 
he was then palming off a pure deceit, for no assignable 
reason, and with no prospect of any advantage therefrom ? 
Who believes that he came home reeking with deception, 
and acted the hypocrite with his wife that night, and quoted 
Scripture to help out the hypocrisy? Who believes all 
this ? Nobody. 

To suppose that he invented that home scene without 
any facts in his mind corresponding therewith, would be 
monstrous ; and to suppose that he did so for the sake of 
its future use, anticipating that it might be employed as an 
argument in his favor, attributes to him a sagacity which 
even the most expert rascals do not possess. No! No! 
This will not do. Dr. Talmage thought that he had been 
grossly wronged, and he came home with that thought, 
and his conduct there was that thought in action. 

It may be said that Dr. Talmage had no reason for such 
a thought, and that he was a fool for having it, and this is 
what Mr. Remington virtually says. Yet he had the 
thought with reason or without it. He had it when he 
talked with Mr. Shelly. He had it when he went to see 
General Howard. He had it when he determined to pub- 


31 


lish his valedictory. He had it when he came home. The 
proof is absolutely conclusive that he had the thought. He 
has the same thought to-day. The thought explains his 
action, and shows that he was doing what he thought neces- 
sary and justifiable by an emergency created not by him- 
self, hut by Mr. Remington. 

Let me now summarize this somewhat extended narra- 
tive of the events of October 9th, 1876. Hr. Talmage 
begins the day with prayer for divine guidance. At twelve 
o’clock he has an interview with Mr. Hallock, but did not 
understand from him that he had bought the Christian at 
Worlc. The managers of the paper maintain a profound 
silence toward him as to its purchase by Mr. Hallock. Be- 
tween two and four o’clock in the afternoon, he gets his 
first intimation that the paper has been sold ; and he sup- 
poses that the sale was to a gentleman in Philadelphia. At 
about half-past three o’clock occurs his short interview with 
Mr. Bright, who showed him the paper as then made up, 
and he said to him, “ All right, go ahead.” Then he sees 
Mr. Shelly, and expresses his indignation at the sale of the 
paper, and says that he “ is not going to stand it.” Then 
he sees General Howard, and closes up his contract with 
him, and determines to leave the Christian at Work at 
once and go to the Advance. Early in the evening he is in 
the proof-room, and hands his valedictory to the foreman, 
directing its insertion in the next issue of the paper. Then 
he goes home, and there occurs the scene to which his wife 
testifies. Such is the history of the day, as furnished by 
the evidence. 

Let it now be remembered that everything, as to the 
guilt or innocence of Hr. Talmage, turns upon his state of 
mind in the transactions connected with his withdrawal 
from the Christian at Worlc. He was not on trial for in- 
discretions. He was not prosecuted for damages done to 
the paper by his retirement therefrom. The sole and only 
question was whether he had been guilty of “ falsehood and 
deceit” on the 9tli of October, 1876. This was the crime 
charged, and whether he was guilty or not of this crime is a 


32 


question which, by its very nature, cannot be determined 
without ascertaining what was his state of mind at the 
time. 

What state of mind then does the evidence show ? I do 
not see how there can be any doubt upon this point. Dr. 
Talmage is, by the evidence, presented in the afternoon of 
this day as an excited, indignant, angry man, who regards 
himself as having been badly treated, especially by Mr. Bem- 
ington. His own testimony shows this. The testimony of 
Mr. Shelly and that of his wife clearly prove that he supposed 
himself to have been wrongfully and unjustly dealt with. 
His visit to General Howard and the immediate completion 
of his contract with him are thus explained. His change of 
purpose, as to the time when he would retire from the 
Christian at Work , has an adequate reason in the view 
which he took of Mr. Bemington’s action. This view led 
him not to wait a month, as he had expected to do, but to 
withdraw hum the paper at once. His purpose was 
changed by a new state of facts, as he saw them, which 
excited and angered his mind. Even if he were mistaken 
as to some of these facts, still they were facts to him, and 
produced an impression upon him as such. They were suf- 
ficiently real in his view to furnish a basis for immediate 
action on his part. 

Bow, it was in this state of mind, clearly shown by the 
evidence, that Dr. Talmage determined to write and publish 
his valedictory, and summarily close his connection with the 
Christian at Work. The motives which actuated him in 
so doing, stated by himself under oath, are as follows : 

“ I knew from the feeling of E. Bemington toward me 
that it was my only opportunity of getting my valedictory 
in the paper. I felt that if it did not go in at that time, it 
would not go in. I would go out of the paper, my name 
would be dropped, and people would never know it. My 
feeling in that respect was very much as if I left my church 
in Brooklyn to go to a church in Chicago. I felt that I 
must say good-by to my subscribers and patrons, and let 
them know where I was going. I had a very pleasant asso- 


33 


ciation with a good many people through that paper, and I 
wanted to say a pleasant good-by to them. I wrote the 
editorial on the spot.” 

This is the statement which Dr. Talmage gives of the 
operations of his mind when he wrote that now famous edi- 
torial, in connection with the circumstances then present to 
his thoughts. Who contradicts this statement? Nobody. 
Who presents any facts proving it to be false ? Nobod} r . 
Who convicts Dr. Talmage of perjury in making it ? No- 
body. Who is the mind-reader that can put the lie upon 
this language ? Nobody. Dr. Talmage had the eye of his 
mind upon Mr. Eemington, and thought that he knew 
enough of that man, and of his feelings toward him, to 
know that that was his last chance for saying a final word 
to the readers of the paper. He was then the editor, and 
no change in the actual management of the paper had yet 
been made. 

Let us then read the editorial itself, and see what it says. 
Here it is in the following words : 

“ GOOD-BY, OLD FBIEXDS.” 

“ I have accepted the position of editor-in-chief of the 
Advance, which is hereafter to he published in New York 
as well as Chicago, transferring to that paper my sermons 
and other literary work. My new headquarters will be 24 
Park Place, New York. My connection with the Christian 
at Work now ceases. My hearty thanks to all the sub- 
scribers with whom I have had years of pleasant inter- 
course. Happy myself, by the grace of God and the influ- 
ence of an ancestry who did not believe there was any 
religion in moping, I have tried to make all our readers 
happy. We leave our benediction for our old friends, and 
ask their prayers for success in the wider field we are about 
to enter. Let us all with high hope press on toward the 
kingdom. This world never seemed so bright, or heaven so 
glorious as this afternoon. Good evening.” 

This is what Dr. Talmage wrote for the purpose which he 
has set forth in his sworn statement, and in the circum- 
stances which have been fully detailed. The statement and 
the circumstances, as they existed in his mind, furnish a 
reasonable explanation of the act, without any imputation 

3 


34 


of intended deceit. They account for all the facts in con- 
sistency with innocence. An enemy may give a bad con- 
struction to this editorial ; and this is just what an enemy 
may do with reference to all the acts of men. 

To say, as one of the complainants did in his deliverance 
before the Presbytery, that Dr. Talmage meant this edi- 
torial as a business card, or to say that his‘ idea was to invite 
the subscribers to the Christian at Worh to follow him to the 
Advance , is simply another way of saying that he was a 
perjured villain when he testified as a witness. There is 
nothing on the face of the editorial, nothing in its contents, 
and nothing in the circumstances under which it was writ- 
ten, that contradicts his own explanation of it. It is nat- 
ural that he should desire to say a final word through the 
paper to his “old friends and this is what and all he did* 
and that, too, in language perfectly consistent with the ab- 
sence of any intended deceit. Had he intended more, it 
would have been natural for him to say more. 

And now, as to the right of Dr. Talmage to insert this 
editorial in that issue of the paper, it is to be remembered 
that he regarded himself as the editor-in-chief, and that he 
was such, and that he had not been ousted from this posi- 
tion, and that, as such, he had absolute control over the 
editorial columns of the paper. Dr. Prime and Dr. Porter, 
both of them gentlemen of large editorial experience, testi- 
fied to the fact that such control belongs to the editor-in- 
chief of a newspaper, unless there is some express limita- 
tion otherwise in the contract, which was not true in this 
case. They further testified that an editor-in-chief, in the 
circumstances in which Dr. Talmage thought himself to be, 
would he justified in seizing upon what was seemingly his 
last opportunity for communicating with his subscribers. 
Dr. Prime expressly declared that he would do so himself, 
and, of course, meant to say that he would not regard the 
act as involving deceit. If Dr. Talmage had the right, as 
editor-in-chief, to insert that editorial, as he certainly had, 
or if he honestly regarded himself as having this right, as 
he certainly did, then it is absurd to talk about the act as 


35 


being one of deceit. No one is open to this charge when 
he simply does what he has or honestly thinks he has a 
right to do. Mistaken he may be as to his rights, but this 
does not make him a deceiver. 

There is no pretense that Dr. Talmage deceived the 
readers of the Christian at Worlc by his valedictory, since 
he told them the truth. He did not intend to deceive Mr. 
Hallock, for he did not then know that Mr. Hallock was 
the owner of the paper. • And as to the Christian at Work 
Company, consisting mainly in Mr. Eemington, it was not 
in a condition to be deceived by the valedictory, since the 
paper had passed into another ownership on the previous 
Saturday, without the knowledge of Dr. Talmage, and with- 
out any provision in respect to him. In his own apt lan- 
guage, the paper left him, and before it actually passed 
from his editorial control, he seized upon what he thought 
to be his last opportunity to say good-by to his “old 
friends.” 

A great noise was made about Dr. Talmage by the 
Christian at Work at the time. Prejudices were excited 
against him by a system of persistent attack on the part of 
this paper. An evil rumor was spread abroad, and sought 
to be spread abroad. The land was made to echo with this 
clamor. And yet, when all the facts are explored, and all 
the circumstances are brought to light, as was the case in 
the trial of Dr. Talmage, the whole bottom drops out of 
this famous accusation. So the Presbytery judged, and it 
judged rightly. 


SPECIFICATION SECOND. 

The accusation here made is that Dr. Talmage was guilty 
of falsehood and deceit, “ in that at various times he pub- 
lished, or allowed to be published by those closely associated 
with him, without contradicting them, statements which he 
knew to be false, or calculated to give a false impression, in 
defense of his action and statements referred to in the first 
specification.” Of this accusation he was acquitted by a 
vote of twenty-five to twenty. 


36 


I was of opinion when this specification was formulated, 
as I still am, that it ought not to have been adopted at all. 
It is so general and indefinite as not to be in conformity 
with that rule of the Book of Discipline which requires that 
“ the times, places and circumstances ” of alleged offenses 
“ should, if possible, be ascertained and stated.” The speci- 
fication did not give Dr. Talmage the proper notice in re- 
spect to the matter to which he was called to plead ; and on 
this ground, when acting as his counsel, I asked the Pres- 
bytery to strike it out altogether. My motion to that effect 
did not prevail ; and hence the accusation was submitted to 
the test of evidence, and the result was an acquittal. The 
question now to be considered is whether this acquittal w T as 
a correct verdict. 

The evidence, necessary to justify a conviction, must 
show the following things : — 1. That Dr. Talmage “ pub- 
lished, or allowed to be published by those closely associated 
with him, without contradicting them,” certain statements 
“ in defense of his action and statements referred to in the 
first specification.” 2. That these statements were “false 
or calculated to give a false impression.” 3. That Dr. 
Talmage “ knew ” them to be “ false or calculated to give 
a false impression.” All these propositions must be sus- 
tained by the evidence, or the accusation fails for the want 
of proof. Was this done f 

The proof adduced in support of the specification, con- 
sisted entirely in the testimony of Mr. Pearsall, and in an 
article that appeared in the Advance of October 19th, 1876. 

Mr. Pearsall says that he Avas in the Tabernacle on the 
15th of October, 1876, which was the Sabbath imme- 
diately following the retirement of Dr. Talmage from 
the Christian at Work, and that he heard his announce- 
ment in regard to the same. These are the words of Mr. 
Pearsall : “ He stated from the platform that his connection 
with the Christian at Work had ceased, I think, on the 9th 
of October, on account of the paper having been surrepti- 
tiously sold to a Unitarian publisher without his knowledge ; 
that he was expected to go Avith the sale of paper, but that 


37 


he was a part of the goods they could not deliver.” Mr. 
Pearsall added that u a great deal more” was said, but 
that is “ the substance,” so far as he could recollect. 

The article in the Advance of the following Thursday, 
under the general head of u Topics of the Times,” reads as 
follows : 

“ At the Brooklyn Tabernacle last Sabbath, Dr. Talmage 
made the following statement, which explains the apparent 
abruptness of his recent action : 1 I have changed my news- 
paper relations, and instead of being editor of the Christian 
at Work, will hereafter be editor of the Advance. This is 
no sudden change. My final resignation was made October 
6th, when I wrote I would cease relations with the Christian 
at Work one month from that day, but last Monday I found 
that the Christian at Work had been surreptitiously, and 
without my knowledge, sold to the publisher of a Unitarian 
paper, with an impression on the part of the purchaser that 
I would go with it. After that surreptitious act 1 consid- 
ered my obligations to the paper had ceased at once and 
forever.’ ” 

As to this announcement thus reported in the Advance , 
Dr. Talmage, when on the witness stand, said : u I remem- 
ber the announcement, but what I said I don’t remember ; 
I don’t dispute it. I cannot remember any announcement. 
As to remembering announcements made three years ago 
that is impossible.” To the question whether he said in his 
pulpit that “ the paper had been surreptitiously sold,” he 
answered, u I don’t remember what I said.” The article in 
the Advance being read to him, he was asked whether he 
made that statement in his pulpit on the 15th of October, 
and he replied : “ I don’t remember ; I may have ; but as to 
the verbiage I am not responsible.” Being asked whether 
the verbiage was true, he gave the following construction to 
a part of it : u When I mentioned Mr. Hallock’s being a 
Unitarian publisher, I simply did it as I would refer to a 
Baptist or Presbyterian publisher.” Being then asked the 
direct question whether in that pulpit statement he said that 
Mr. Hallock was a Unitarian publisher, he answered: “I 
don’t remember making it ; I won’t deny it.” 

Being asked whether he stated from his pulpit that he 


38 


“ found on Monday that the paper had been sold to the 
publisher of a Unitarian paper,” Dr. Talmage answered : 
“I don’t remember the statement I made. I make ten 
or fifteen notices almost every Sabbath, and none of them 
make any serious impression on my mind.” Being further 
asked how he knew that Mr. Hallock had the impression 
that he would go with the paper, he answered : “ Well, as 
I have said four or five times, I don’t know whether I 
made that publication.” Being asked why he said that the 
Christian at Work was sold surreptitiously, he replied : 
“ The Court will observe, Mr. Moderator, that Mr. Hallock 
was not the man to give me the information according to 
the terms of the contract. Mr. Remington was the man to 
give me the thirty days’ notice. The notice ought to have 
come from Mr. Remington, and when Mr. Remington sells 
the paper without giving me any information, I being at the 
time editor-in-chief, trustee and stockholder, that was sur- 
reptitious if there was ever anything surreptitious in this 
world.” 

This is all the evidence in the case relating to the second 
specification, with the exception of Mr. Hallock’s com- 
ment on the article in the Advance , in which he thought he 
saw six lies told by Dr. Talmage, in respect to which opin- 
ion Dr. Talmage politely thought that Mr, Hallock was 
mistaken six times. And it is upon this flimsy evidence 
that the prosecution sought to convict the accused of 
“ falsehood and deceit and upon its basis twenty members 
of the Presbytery voted for conviction. Let us then look 
at the question for a moment. 

1. The testimony of Mr. Pearsall, declaring that Dr. Tal- 
mage said that he had dissolved his connection with the 
Christian at Work, u on account of the paper having been 
surreptitiously sold to a Unitarian publisher without his 
knowledge, that he was expected to go with the sale of the 
paper, but that he was a part of the goods they could not de- 
liver,” has no claim to be considered an exact statement of the 
words used by Dr. Talmage. Whatever Dr. Talmage said 
was heard by Mr. Pearsall between two and three years 


39 


prior to the giving of his testimony ; and in the meantime 
this Mr. Pearsall has become offended with Dr. Talmage, 
and left the congregation, and unless common fame be- 
lies him, is personally hostile to him. There were hund- 
reds of others who heard the statement; and why did 
not the prosecution cite some of them as witnesses ? Why 
did they not try other memories as well as his f Upon the 
face of the case there is too much uncertainty in the testi- 
mony of Mr. Pearsall, saying nothing about his feelings 
toward Dr. Talmage, to hold the latter responsible for the 
words which he puts upon his lips, especially when all he 
claims to do is to give “ the substance ” of what was said. 
The prosecution seemed to have attached little or no im- 
portance to his testimony on this point. 

2. The article in the Advance , published on the Thursday 
following tjie Sabbath on which Dr. Talmage made his an- 
nouncement, was not connected with him as being its 
author, as having anything to do with its publication, or as 
having any knowledge of it. There was no evidence show- 
ing who took down the words uttered in the Tabernacle, or 
that the words reported were the precise ones uttered, or by 
what channel these words went to Chicago, where the publi- 
cation took place, or that Dr. Talmage, either at the time 
or afterward, knew anything about this article. He was in 
Brooklyn and the paper was published in Chicago, and the 
evidence of the prosecution does not trace the article to 
him in any sense. He recollects making an announcement 
on the subject, but exactly what he said he does not re- 
member, and, moreover, expressly disclaims any responsi- 
bility for the “ verbiage” of the article. 

It is quite true that Dr. Talmage was, in that issue of the 
paper, published as its editor; yet he was in Brooklyn, 
while the paper was made up and published in Chicago, and 
what he did was to write his first editorial for that issue, 
and send it to the place of publication. The article ap- 
peared under the head of “ Topics of the Times,” which 
embraced no less than six distinct subjects. General 
Howard, who was the publisher and manager of the paper, 


40 


in a letter addressed to me since the trial, says : “I am 
quite sure that I prepared the 1 Topics of the Times 1 in the 
Advance of October 19th, 1876.” He also says that he took 
the statement, as he thinks, from a Brooklyn paper. Dr. 
Talmage did not prepare the article, and not a particle of 
evidence connects him with its insertion in the Advance , or 
shows that he ever read it. 

To say that it appeared in Ms paper and under his sane- 
tion, and that, therefore, he published it as his, is to reason 
very unjustly in view of the facts. ISTo candid man, know- 
ing the facts, will thus reason. An enemy, thirsting for 
blood, and more anxious to fix a lie upon Dr. Talmage than 
to discover the truth, might reason in this way, hut an im- 
partial court of justice will not. 

3. If we assume that Dr. Talmage did in his pulpit, on 
the 3 5th of October, 1876, use the exact words reported in 
the A dvance , even then there is no basis for his conviction 
under the second specification. Let us examine the lan- 
guage of the article. 

(1.) One of the things said by him upon this supposition 
is that u this is no sudden change.” This was said in re- 
ference to the fact stated in the previous sentence, namely, 
that he had changed his newspaper relations. It clearly 
means that he had for some time anticipated making such 
a change ; and this was the fact. Mr. Dickinson testified 
that at the time of the agreement of May 29th, 1876, Di\ 
Talmage said to him that “ the salary was too low, and he 
would make some change in the Fall.” He testified himself 
that he wrote a valedictory in the preceding June and had 
it put in type, but that he was dissuaded from publishing 
it. He had for some time been in negotiation with General 
Howard, with a view of going to the Advance ; and on the 
4th of October, 1876, this negotiation was so nearly com- 
pleted that on the next day he wrote a letter to Mr. 
Remington, notifying him of his purpose to retire from the 
Christian at Work in a month from that date. It is 
literally true that his retirement from the Christian at 
Work was “ no sudden change,” not a thing unthought of 


41 


or unexpected. The attitude of Mr. Eemington toward him, 
as he understood it, was such that he expected to leave the 
paper. 

(2.) Another thing assumed to be said by Dr. Talmage is 
that the paper was surreptitiously sold, without his knowl- 
edge. The fact is that the paper was sold on the 7th of 
October, 1876, and that he was not aware of the sale at the 
time. Neither Mr. Eemington nor the managers of the 
Christian at Work gave him the information. Dr. Talmage 
says that the sale was surreptitious in reference to him ; 
and Dr. Van Dyke regards this saying as “ the utterance 
of a falsehood.” That is to say, Dr. Talmage, when he 
characterized the act of Mr. Eemington as to its moral 
quality, when he expressed an opinion in regard to the act, 
when he stated what was simply a conclusion of his own 
mind in reference to its moral nature, did not believe in the 
truth of his own words. I do not hesitate to say that this 
position of Dr. Yan Dyke is monstrous. Nothing is more 
common than for one to express an opinion of another’s 
act. He may be mistaken iu that opinion, or he may not 
be ; but wiiether he is or not, he plainly is not chargeable 
with falsehood, either because he has the opinion, or be- 
cause he states it. 

Dr. Yan Dyke says that “ stealthily and fraudulently are 
the two terms with which Worcester defines ” surreptitious- 
ly. This is not true. Worcester’s definition is this : “By 
surreption, or stealth, fraudulently.” His definition of sur- 
reptitious is this : “ Stealthily or fraudulently done, ob- 
tained, taken away, or introduced.” One of his definitions 
of stealth reads thus : “ Secret act, clandestine practice, 
secresy, slyness — commonly used in a bad sense.” Now, if 
we are going to convict Dr. Talmage on the lexicon, let us 
have it correctly quoted. Worcester nowhere says “ stealth- 
ily and fraudulently ” when defining surreptitious or surrep- 
titiously, as Dr. Yan Dyke makes him say. 

The term “ stealth ” in the sense of a “ secret act,” a 
“ clandestine practice,” a “ secresy,” a “ slyness,” is one of 
the definitions of surreptitious; and it may or may not 


42 


involve fraud. Dr. Talmage thought the sale of the paper 
was in reference to him slyly done, secretly done, done with- 
out his knowledge ; and when he characterized the act as 
surreptitious, he expressed an opinion which was the truth 
to his mind. There is no evidence that begins to show 
that he did not believe, and does not now believe, in the 
correctness of that opinion. 

(3.) Another thing in the statement is that he (Dr. Tal- 
mage) found on the “ last Monday ” that the Christian at 
Work had been sold to the publisher of a Unitarian paper. 
I am assuming that he made such a statement in his pul- 
pit ; and if he did, then the statement, according to his own 
testimony, was not correct as to the time when he made this 
discovery. He found on the previous Monday that the 
paper was sold ; but, as he swore on the witness stand, he 
did not then know that it was sold to Mr. Hallock, who is 
the person meant by “the publisher of a Unitarian paper.” 
Here is plainly an inconsistency, assuming that we have the 
words of Dr. Talmage exactly as they fell from his lips. 

How shall this discrepancy be harmonized with the truth- 
fulness of Dr. Talmage! There is not the slightest diffi- 
culty here, unless one has made up his mind beforehand 
that he shall be a liar at any rate. It is to be remembered 
that Dr. Talmage withdrew from the Christian at Worh on 
Monday, the 9th of October ; that on the following Tues- 
day morning he went to Boston ; and that on the next 
Wednesday evening Mr. Hallock went to see him at his own 
house, as he said, “ to give him a piece of his mind,” and 
that then and there a conversation occurred between him 
and Dr. Talmage, from which the latter learned that the 
former had bought the paper. 

Now, when Dr. Talmage on the next Sabbath said in liis 
pulpit, as in this argument I concede he did say, that on 
“last Monday” he found that the paper had been sold 
thus and so, he may have inadvertently misstated the time 
of receiving this information. He did not on the witness 
stand recollect what language he used. He simply remem- 
bered that he made an announcement ; and if it be a fact 


43 


that he used the words “last Monday,” as defining the 
date of the information referred to, then that may he ex- 
plained as a simple inadvertence of his own mind at the 
moment in an ex tempore utterance. The attempt to make 
him a liar on account of the use of these two words, if he 
did use them, and virtually charge him with perjury on 
the witness stand, is simply straining at a gnat and swal- 
lowing a camel. 

No man thinks or talks with such absolute accuracy, with 
such a distinct recollection of what he has said, and with 
such a clear foresight of what he will say, as not to fall into 
numerous discrepancies and inconsistencies in the use of 
words; and if for this reason we are to make one a liar, 
then all men are liars. 

(4.) Still further, Dr. Talmage, as is assumed, said that 
he found that the paper had been sold to “ the publisher of 
a Unitarian paper,” meaning Mr. Hallock. Now, it is a 
fact that Mr. Hallock had been the publisher of such a 
paper, and that Dr. Talmage, as he swears, did not know 
that he had ceased to be such. When he thus spoke of him, 
if he thus spoke at all, he spoke as the fact was in his mind, 
and that certainly is not the utterance of a falsehood. He 
called Mr. Hallock the publisher of a Unitarian paper, just 
as, for aught that appears, he would have called him the 
publisher of a Baptist or a Methodist paper, if such had 
been the fact in his mind. I must think that the effort to 
impeach Dr. Talmage on account of this phraseology, if he 
used it, is the very smallest kind of small business. It 
shows a most extraordinary genius for scenting falsehoods 
in others. I should not like to have such a genius put on 
the track of my words ; and I doubt whether anybody would 
relish this smelling process. 

(5.) Still another thing which Dr. Talmage is made to 
say in this Advance article is that the purchaser of the 
Christian at Work , namely, Mr. Hallock, had the impres- 
sion that he would go with it. If we believe Mr. Hallock, 
this was the fact. When, then, did Dr. Talmage learn that 
such was the impression of Mr. Hallock at the time of the 


44 


purchase f The words in the Advance article, now assumed 
to be his, do not answer this question. If we are going to 
hold him to the exact letter of these words, we must not 
hold him to more than they allege ; and they do not declare 
that, on the previous Monday, Dr. Talmage made the dis- 
covery that Mr. Hallock had the impression that he would 
go with the paper. What they declare is that he had such 
an impression ; hut when the fact first became known to 
Dr. Talmage they do not say. 

Dr. Talmage may have inferred the fact from the general 
talk which had been going on between him and Mr. Hal- 
lock for months about the latter’s buying the paper, when 
he ascertained that he had actually bought it, or he may 
have made the discovery at the interview with Mr. Hallock 
on the previous Wednesday evening at his own house. The 
fact being in his mind in either or both of these ways, he 
then stated it when announcing the change of his “ news- 
paper relations.” The laws of mental association would 
naturally bring the fact to his thoughts and lead to its ut- 
terance. There is nothing in the utterance even to suggest 
the idea of deception, or to imply that Dr. Talmage did not 
speak exactly as he thought, if he did so speak, or to make 
the previous Monday the day when he first got this thought 
about the impression of Mr. Hallock. 

I do not know, and Dr. Talmage does not remember, ex- 
actly how what he said about Mr. Hallock’s impression 
found its way to his lips, if it did so at all. And until 
somebody knows more than anybody can know on this 
point, then nobody is sufficiently wise to say that the words 
formed any part of an intended deception. 

The substance of my argument, in regard to this article 
in the Advance , upon which the prosecution mainly relied 
to sustain the second specification, is this : 

1. There is no proof that traces the article to Dr. Tal- 
mage, or shows that the words there reported are the pre- 
cise words that he uttered in his pulpit ou the 1 5th of Octo- 
ber, 187(5. 

2. The article itself, if we assume it to be correct, 


45 


contains no basis for saying that Dr. Talmage then and 
there published, or allowed others to publish, “ statements 
which he knew to be false, or calculated to give a false im- 
pression.” “Not proved,” and hence entitled to an ac- 
quittal, is the proper verdict in view of this evidence, and 
this is the verdict that was rendered by the Presbytery. 

The man who conceived of the second specification, who 
put the conception into words, and hunted up what he sup- 
posed would be proof of it, was undoubtedly very much in 
earnest in his effort to catch Dr. Talmage in a lie, if possible. 
That man meant business. He is no ordinary hunter 
for lies in other people. Even the purest person might 
well be alarmed, should that man happen to get on his 
track. 


SPECIFICATION THIED. 

In this specification Dr. Talmage is charged with false- 
hood and deceit, “ in that he repeatedly made public de- 
claration, in various and emphatic forms of speech from his 
pulpit, that the church of which he was pastor was a free 
church, and that the pews were assigned without reference 
to the dollar question, although he knew such declarations 
to be false.” The vote on this specification stood thus : — 
Thirty-two for acquittal ; eight for sustaining the specifica- 
tion ; and five for sustaining it in part. 

A curious fact is here presented, which is that, of the six- 
teen gentlemen who are complainants, not counting the two 
who were not entitled to vote, six voted for an unqualified 
acquittal, and five others sustained the specification only 
in part. Six of these voters, therefore, approve of the 
action of the Presbytery in acquitting Dr. Talmage of this 
charge, and five others approve of it in part, leaving only 
five voters that entirely condemn the action. 

Turning now to the specification itself, I wish, before tak- 
ing up the testimony, to make three preliminary remarks. 
The first is that the specification does not name any date 
when the offense was committed, even by so large a period 
as a year. It simply says that the offense was repeatedly 


40 


committed ; but in what year or years it does uot say. 
This plainly is not according to the Book of Discipline, 
and Dr. Talmage was entitled to an acquittal on the legal 
ground of not being properly charged with crime. Indeed 
he ought not to have been tried at all upon such a charge. 
The Presbytery here violated his rights by not conforming 
its action to the requirements of the Book of Discipline. 

A second remark is that, in order to convict Dr. Talmage 
under this accusation, it was necessary to show the follow- 
ing things : 1. That he made the declarations imputed to 
him. . 2. That the sense in which he used the phrase “ free 
church,” and that other phrase u sittings assigned without 
reference to the dollar question,” was contrary to and con- 
tradicted by the established practice and usage of his church 
when he used these phrases. 3. That he knew of this 
inconsistency with his own public statements, and hence 
knew the statements to be false. Nothing short of proof 
sustaining these three propositions beyond reasonable doubt, 
would justify conviction. 

A third remark is that the charge carries upon its face 
the strongest probability against its truth. It supposes 
that Dr. Talmage stood before his congregation from time 
to time, and then and there repeatedly declared in their 
hearing what he knew to be false, and what he knew they 
knew to be false. This is too senseless a form of lying to 
be committed by any one who is not an idiot. It is without 
motive, since it does not and can not gain its end. It makes 
the liar consciously and knowingly publish himself as a liar 
in the very act of lying. It, moreover, makes that congre- 
gation consciously and knowingly the receivers of lies from 
the pulpit. The accusation is absurd. There v never was 
any such lying among sane people, and there never will be, 
as is here imputed to Dr. Talmage. I doubt whether it 
could be found in a lunatic asylum. At any rate, one who 
lies in this way ought to be sent there. He is not fit to run 
at large. 

I come now to the testimony that was adduced in sup- 
port of this singular charge. The two witnesses were Mr. 


47 


Pearsall and Mr. Hathaway. Mr. Pearsall, who had left 
the congregation, and, as is well known, had ceased to hold 
friendly relations to Dr. Talmage, told his story to the fol- 
lowing effect : 

He had for eight years been a member of the Board of 
Trustees and of the pew committee. He had a diagram of 
the church, made up by the order of the trustees, and he 
had a fixed price on about every pew, and assigned the pews 
according to these prices. Dr. Talmage knew that he was 
assigning the pews in this way, for he told him so. When 
the congregation was in the old church the pews were free ; 
but when it removed into the First Tabernacle, it was found 
after a year or two that the system would not pay, and he 
“ began fixing the prices of the pews.” He often spoke to 
Dr. Talmage about the matter, saying to him : “ Most 
every Sunday you announce that the pews are let without 
reference to the dollar question, and your own audience 
know that it is a humbug, and they just laugh at you 
now.” He also said to him : “ Why not rent the pews ? 
We can get more out of them by that.” The usual reply 
of Dr. Talmage was : “You know my idea is to run a free 
church.” His answer to this remark was : “ Yes, but you 
are not running a free church.” To this, Dr. Talmage 
would reply : “ When it is known that this is not run as a 
free church, I will leave it.” 

On one occasion Dr. Talmage came to his house, and 
invited him to join the church ; and he said to him that he 
was not good enough to do so, and that, if he should join 
the church, he could not stay in the pew committee, and 
assign the seats as he was then doing. Dr. Talmage laughed 
at the remark^ and thought it funny, and said that he was 
better than some members of the church. He frequently 
heard Dr. Talmage give the notice about the pews. Some- 
times he would say : “ Pews in this church are assigned 
without reference to the dollar question 5 any person want- 
ing a pew will apply to the committee.” At other times 
he would add to this : “ Any person desiring a pew in this 
church will get as good a pew for a dollar as he will for a 


48 


hundred dollars.” He frequently spoke to Dr. Talmage 
about these notices, and told him that they made it neces- 
sary for him to explain away what was thus said. Dr. 
Talmage, however, continued to give such notices “ until 
the board, as a body almost, went to him, and begged 
him to leave that off.” 

This is the case as presented by Mr. Pearsall. Dr. Van 
Dyke, in his speech before the Presbytery, said that there 
was nothing to offset or rebut this testimony, except “ the 
bald assertion of Dr. Talmage that Mr. Pearsall is mistaken,” 
and further said that the omission to cross-examine this 
witness and contradict him by other witnesses is “ a virtual 
admission that his story is true.” These are very strange 
statements. The truth is that, while the testimony of Mr. 
Pearsall is very far from establishing the guilt of Dr. Tal- 
mage, many parts of it were most emphatically contradicted, 
not by u bald assertion,” but by varied detail and by docu- 
mentary evidence. And as to the idea that the omission to 
cross-examine a witness is u a virtual admission that his 
story is true,” I am sure that no one will question Dr. Yan 
Dyke’s exclusive right to this logical invention. He need 
not take out a patent to guarantee his own interests 
therein. 

I have a few remarks to make upon the testimony of 
Mr. Pearsall, taking it just as it stands. The first is that 
his unfriendly animus appears in a studious effort to phrase 
what he said and what Dr. Talmage said, so as to give the 
impression that there was falseness on the part of the latter. 
That such an animus exists no one will doubt who has read 
his published letter to Dr. Talmage, of April 1st, 1878. He 
testified under the bias of this animus ; and . this fact is a 
circumstance affecting his credibility. 

My next remark is that no one, having common sense 
and ordinary candor, will pretend that Mr. Pearsall can, 
years after these conversations between him and Dr. Tal- 
mage, reproduce the language of either with anything like 
exactitude. His statements at the very best must be taken 
with a large allowance for the failure of memory as to 




49 

words. This is true of him, and would be true of any man 
in like circumstances. 

My third remark is that Mr. Pearsall, by his own show- 
ing, did not, at the time of these conversations, regard Dr. 
Talmage as understanding that the pews were rented at 
fixed prices, or as meaning to utter a falsehood in his pul- 
pit notices. He said to him, as he swears, “ Why not rent 
the pews ? We can get more out of them by that.” This 
question and this remark clearly imply in his own mind the 
idea that Dr. Talmage did not suppose that the pews were 
being rented, if such were the fact. Both the question and 
the remark would be absurd upon any other hypothesis. 
The answer of Dr. Talmage, “ You know my idea is to run 
a free church,” corresponds exactly with this view of the 
case. It gives the reason, which he gave to Mr. Pearsall, 
why he was not willing that the pews should be rented in 
any sense that in his view would be inconsistent with run- 
ning a free church. The further answer in the same con- 
nection, “ When it is known that this is not run as a free 
church, I will leave it,” shows that Dr. Talmage supposed 
that it was run as a free church. Mr. Pearsall gets in the 
words, “It is known,” and Dr. Yan Dyke underscores them 
as if they were a jewel. The plain meaning, as any candid 
man will see from the words themselves and the connection 
in which they were used, is that Dr. Talmage meant to say 
that when it became a known and settled fact that this 
church is not run as a free church, he would leave it. He 
would not give up his theory on this subject, and if the fact 
contradicted the theory, then he would leave the church. 
This is what he said to Mr. Pearsall, and the latter did not 
then think that he was lying in his pulpit announcements. 
The idea that Dr. Talmage was guilty of conscious and in- 
tended falsehood, if it ever existed in Mr. Pearsall’s mind, 
was born at a later date, when he had changed his relations 
and mood of feeling toward his former pastor. 

My fourth remark is that the testimony of Mr. Pearsall 
shows a strong tendency among the trustees to adopt the 
pew-rental system, and shows some facts that virtually 

4 


50 


amount to pew rentals ; but it does not show the acquies- 
cence of Dr. Talmage therein. It shows a conflict of views 
between him and the trustees. They wanted pew rentals, 
and he was determined to have a free church, as he under- 
stood it. Here was a couflict of policies, and Dr. Talmage, 
by the showing of this witness, never yielded his own policy. 
So far from yielding it, he told Mr. Pearsall that he would 
leave the church if it were a kuown and settled fact that it 
was not run as a free church. The attitude of Dr. Tal- 
mage’s mind, as presented by this witness, is wholly incon- 
sistent with the idea that he did not regard his church as a 
free church, or that he did not mean that it should remain 
such, whatever might be the wish of the trustees. The 
testimony for the defense, when I come to it, will set this 
point in a clear light. 

I submit this comment upon the testimony of Mr. Pear- 
sall, taking the whole of it into the account. If it were con- 
tradicted in no particular, but left to stand just as it fell 
from his lips, with no abatements on the score of imperfect 
memory or bias of feeling, it would fall very far short of 
sustaining the charge of “ falsehood and deceit ” against 
Dr. Talmage. Ho court would be justified in convicting 
him upon this evidence, and that, too, without any de- 
fense. 

The other witness is Mr. Hathaway, and the substance 
of his testimony is as follows : 

He was, on the J5th of February, 1875, appointed by the 
trustees to take charge of “ all negotiations for subscriptions 
or for assignments of sittings.” He had a diagram of the 
church, with the price on every pew, and his instructions 
were to get the price, and more if he could. He carried out 
these instructions from the trustees. He heard Dr. Tal- 
mage say in the pulpit that the pews were assigned without 
reference to the dollar question, and sometimes spoke with 
him on the subject. When he met with the Board of 
Trustees, Dr. Talmage was occasionally present, and he 
knew “ of the trustees pleading with him to give up his 
plan and adopt theirs,” and also knew that “ he would never 


51 


yield to the desire of the trustees to give up assigning the 
pews,” but “always stood out against it.” 

On his cross-examination, Mr. Hathaway declared that 
he never said that Dr. Talmage publicly told lies in his an- 
nouncements about the pews. He had received letters in 
respect to these announcements, but did not remember that 
he ever showed any of them to Dr. Talmage. So also he did 
not recollect that he ever showed the diagram of the church 
to Dr. Talmage, though he inferred that he was aware of its 
existence. He knew that the trustees wanted to adopt the 
rental system in regard to the pews, and that “a free church 
was the pet idea of Dr. Talmage,” and that “ he always op- 
posed the idea of the trustees of going over to the system of 
pew rentals.” Dr. Talmage stated from the pulpit that his 
church was a free church. The people, however, understood 
the practice, and hence understood “ the difference between 
the practice and the profession.” They were not deceived 
by the pulpit announcement, for “ they got used to it.” He 
did not think that Dr. Talmage was consciously lying, hut 
did think that he “ was so accustomed to deal in hyperbole 
and extravaganza that he didn’t know what he said.” He 
knew that the trustees wished that Dr. Talmage would 
stop making the announcements about “ the dollar ques- 
tion,” and thought that he “ was of such a peculiar nature 
that he might not regard them as false.” He knew also 
that the trustees would favor an increase of his salary if he 
would come over to the system of pew rentals, and that he 
refused “ any proposition looking to a change in the 
system.” 

Here is the testimony of Mr. Hathaway. I have followed 
the witness from the moment he took the stand till he left 
it, and picked out all the facts and statements that bear 
upon the point whether Dr. Talmage was consciously a liar 
in saying that his church was a free church, and that the 
pews were assigned without reference to the dollar question. 

What then is shown by this testimony, supposing it to 
be uncontradicted in any particular? Simply this — the 
policy of the trustees wishing to adopt the system of pew 


52 


rentals, and to some extent virtually adopting it in practice, 
and the policy of Dr. Talmage setting his face against that 
system, in the language of the witness, refusing “ any prop- 
osition looking to a change in the system,” namely, what he 
regarded as the free church system. Mr. Hathaway makes 
a free church the pet idea of Dr. Talmage, and if there were 
things in the practice of the trustees inconsistent with this 
idea, as he says there were, he does not fix in the mind of 
Dr. Talmage a knowledge of this fact. He shows a strong 
drifting in the trustees toward pew rentals, but he does not 
show that Dr. Talmage regarded pew rentals as the system 
established in his church, or that he stated what he knew 
to be false in his pulpit announcements. 

Mr. Hathaway regarded the announcements as not true 
to all the facts in the case, yet the picture of Dr. Talmage, 
which his testimony, taken as a whole, presents, is that of 
one who is determined to run a free church, notwithstand- 
ing the desire of the trustees to adopt the pew-rental the- 
ory, and, moreover, of one who did not regard the pew- 
rental theory as being the one actually in practice. Dr. 
Talmage, as Mr. Hathaway says, firmly resisted u any 
change in the system,” which clearly implies that the sys- 
tem he would maintain was the one that he thought to be 
in existence. 

There had been no formal abandonment of the free church 
system by a vote of the congregation, or by any official ac- 
tion of the trustees. The pews had not been auctioneered 
to bidders, and the usual course in renting pews had never 
been adopted. Dr. Talmage, with his free church theory, 
stood directly in the way of such measures. The pews 
were assigned to parties, as they had always been ; and Mr. 
Hathaway says that there were facts in connection with this 
assignment that in his judgment were not consistent with 
the public statements of Dr. Talmage. This, however, 
does not show that the latter spoke or meant to speak 
falsely. Mr. Hathaway, who was an elder of the church at 
the time, did not so regard the words of his pastor. Neither 
the session nor the trustees either said or did anything that 


53 




goes upon the supposition that they viewed him as a falsi- 
fier in his pulpit announcements ; and this is a most signifi- 
cant fact in the case. He certainly was not publishing what 
they thought to be conscious and intentional falsehoods. 
Mr. Pearsall did not think so at the time, and Mr. Hath- 
away did not think so. 

The form of making an application for a pew or for sit- 
tings in one was introduced in connection with the testi- 
mony of Mr. Hathaway. It reads as follows : “ The un- 
dersigned wishes to secure for the year commencing Febru- 
ary 1st, 1875, sittings in pew , and hereby agrees 

to pay for the support of the Gospel, payable in quar- 

terly installments.” Mr. Hathaway, as he says, used such 
a form. Is there anything here inconsistent with a free 
church ? Nothing whatever. The applicant himself names 
the amount he will give for the support of the Gospel. That 
is to say, he asks for accommodation in a certain pew, and 
subscribes what he thinks he can afford to pay toward the 
expenses of the church. There surely is nothing in this that 
is contrary to Dr. Talmage’s idea of a free church. 

And this is the whole of the evidence presented by the 
prosecution. I am at a loss to see how any member of the 
Court that tried the case could write down Dr. Talmage as 
a willful liar on such a basis. I do not see how a sensible 
and unprejudiced mind can come to any such conclusion. 
The testimony, without any defense, leaves ample room for 
the honesty and truthfulness of the accused. “Not proved” 
is the just and proper verdict. “ Utterly and absolutely dis- 
proved ” is the righteous verdict in view of the defense ; and 
to this aspect of the case I now invite attention. 

Dr. Talmage himself is one of the witnesses that fur- 
nishes this disproof. His testimony is as follows : 

u My idea of a free church,” he said, “ is a church where 
every man pays as much as he can for the support of the 
Gospel, his own conscience being the dictator.” In such a 
church he would give prominence and culture to the home 
feeling, having families sit together and retain their pews, 
whatever may be the change in their pecuniary circum- 


54 


stances. When he came to Brooklyn, he had calls to two 
other churches, and came there because he thought he 
could “ build up a church on a free basis from the very 
foundation.” When he said that the pews are assigned 
without reference to the’ dollar question, he did not mean 
“ that no money is needed to carry on Christian institu- 
tions,” but he did mean “ that no man’s seat in the church 
shall depend on the amount he can pay.” That he believed 
“ to be the Christian principle,” and he meant to act upon 
it. He changed the form of making the announcement “at 
the request of the trustees, not that there was the slightest 
deception in the act, but because they were afraid that 
some people would get the idea that no money was neces- 
sary for the support of the Gospel.” He never knew that 
pews were rented in his church at any time at fixed prices, 
and never had “ the least idea or intimation of it.” He w T as 
never told so by Mr. Pearsall. Mr. Pearsall and other 
members of the Board of Trustees at different times dis- 
cussed with him “ the advisability of going back to the pew- 
rental system.” He never knew “of a diagram of the 
church with a fixed price for the pews thereon.” Mr. Pear- 
sall’s testimony, implying such knowledge, is not correct* 
]So such impression was ever made on his mind. He was 
solicited by the officers of the church to adopt the pew- 
rental system ; but he always “ refused with a good deal of 
spirit.” He wrote a letter to the trustees relinquishing his 
salary in order to advance his free church theory. It was 
suggested to him that if he would adopt the pew-rental 
system, his salary might be raised from seven thousand to 
twenty thousand dollars, and he rejected the proposition. 
Such, in brief, is the statement that Hr. Talmage made un- 
der the solemnities of an oath. 

Mr. Corwin, who had been a member of the church for 
about twenty years, is one of its elders, and, with the ex- 
ception of a short period, had been a member of the Board 
of Trustees since April 25, 1870, is another witness who 
testified for the defense. The salient points of his testi- 
mony are as follows : 

Hr. Talmage was called to the pastorate of the church in 




55 

1809, at a salary of seven thousand dollars a year, and soon 
after he came Mr. Corwin had a conversation with him 
about the free church question, expressing his opposition to 
the idea. In that conversation Dr. Talmage remarked to 
him that he was mistaken as to his idea of a free church ; 
“ that there must be a home feeling in it, with the pews 
regularly assigned to regular occupants, just the same as 
though they paid for them ;” and that “ if God had given 
him power to attract people, he did not want them first to 
consult their own pocket-books.” He added that “ if he 
had his ideas carried out, he would rather preach in such a 
church for two thousand dollars than to preach in a church 
where the pews are rented, for twenty thousand dollars.” 

And, for the purpose of carrying out the theory of Dr. 
Talmage, Mr, Corwin and Mr. James M. Cowan were, in 
March, 1870, appointed a committee to solicit subscriptions 
for the building of a new church on this plan. In order to 
aid in getting the plan into operation, Dr. Talmage, in 
April, 1870, addressed the following letter to the trustees : 
u Gentlemen — I hereby relinquish you from all obligation 
to pay me any more salary than the income of the church 
may warrant after the first day of August next, notwith- 
standing anything that may have been agreed upon in my 
call to the church.” 

The First Tabernacle was dedicated in September, 1870; 
and on that occasion Dr. Talmage preached a sermon in 
which he said that he “ was opposed to pew rents altogether, 
on principle,” and that “ the church of God makes no differ- 
ence between rich and poor.” The trustees, at a meeting 
held October 4th, 1870, Mr. Pearsall being present, passed 
the following resolution : “ Resolved , That the instructions 
given to the clerk at an informal meeting of this Board, in 
regard to reading certain papers upon the evening that the 
pews and sittings are assigned to pew-holders and applicants, 
copies of which are entered upon the records of the board, 
be ratified and confirmed.” These papers, thus referred to 
and ratified, contained the following declaration : “So long 
as they [the occupants of pews] attend the services and 


56 


occupy the pews and comply with the rules and regulations 
now governing this Society, or any rules or regulations of 
whatever nature that may be adopted hereafter, they will 
he entitled to occupy the seat or seats ; but if not used by 
them, or they do not comply with them, then they forfeit, 
and the seats revert back to the secretary, and will be appro- 
priated to other applicants. The Gospel is to he supported in 
this Society by subscriptions , and it is expected all will want 
to help” These regulations were sent to the occupants of 
pews. Mr. Pearsall was chairman of the pew committee 
when these regulations were adopted by the trustees. 

In 1871 Mr. Wells, who was a trustee, said to Dr. Tal- 
mage, “ If you will allow us to put an auctioneer on the 
platform, we will pay you a salary of twenty thousand dol- 
lars as easily as we now pay you seven thousand.” The 
reply of Dr. Talmage was, “ When you engage an auction- 
eer you must engage a new pastor.” This response places 
upon Dr. Talmage the seal of sincerity and truthfulness in 
his pulpit announcements. A willingness to make a yearly 
sacrifice of thirteen thousand dollars, which is the difference 
between seven thousand and twenty thousand dollars, ought 
to prove, as bej-ond all question it does prove, the absolute 
sincerity of his heart when declaring his church to be a free 
church. There are but few ministers who would resist 
such a tempting inducement to abandon even a cherished 
idea. Dr. Talmage showed that he meant the thing, and 
that he could not be bought off by any appeal to his person- 
al interests. 

The First Tabernacle was destroyed by fire in 1872, and 
the second one was dedicated on the 22d of February, 1874. 
Mr. Corwin testified to the fact that the free church plan of 
the First Tabernacle was carried forward to the second one. 
In the latter part of 1874, or the early part of 1875, the 
trustees “ felt that they would receive more money and 
have less work if the pew-rent system was adopted,” and 
“ they requested the pastor to allow them to adopt that 
plan,” addressing to him a letter to this effect. He replied 
as follows : “That if they would continue to run the church 


for six months longer on the free system, he would resign at 
the end of that time and go to Europe ; that there would 
he no muss and no misunderstanding about the affair ; that 
in the meantime the church should look around for some 
one who would conduct the church upon the pew-rental 
system, and everything should be amicably settled.” His 
refusal to acquiesce in the proposition of the trustees was 
positive, and they as positively refused “ to adopt his sug- 
gestion about resigning.” In the language of the witness, 
they said, “We will put tired to tired and at it again.” 
The witness added, “ So we have ever since ” 

In 1876 the trustees adopted a series of regulations re- 
specting the assignment of pews, the third of which reads 
as follows : u As no peiv rentals are exacted , all the expenses 
necessary for the support and maintenance of the church 
must he defrayed by voluntary contribution. Each mem- 
ber of the congregation is expected, therefore, to contribute 
to the fullest extent of his or her means toward this end. 
In order that the trustees may have some assurance of the 
prospective income of the church, by which to meet its 
running expenses, all contributing members name an auuual 
subscription, and pay the same either by quarterly or weekly 
installments.” 

In the early summer of 1877, Hr. Talmage requested Mr. 
Corwin and Mr. John F. Talmage to secure seats in the 
Tabernacle for the parents of the Sunday-school scholars 
who had no church privileges ; and, they failing to attend 
to the work, he, after the summer vacation, enlisted the 
teachers of the Sunday-school in it, who were to visit the 
families of the children, and if they found any without 
church privileges, to offer to them sittings in the Taberna- 
cle without price. This missionary work was performed to 
some extent, and sittings were thus assigned in consequence 
of it. 

On his cross-examination Mr. Corwin was asked to ex- 
plain the manner of assigning pews. He answered, “ Oh, 
when an application comes, we say, 6 There’s a pew, there’s 
a pew, there’s a pew, which do you like best ? ’ He will 


58 


say , 4 That one,’ and we will say, 4 Now, sir, how much will 
you give for the support of the Gospel in this church V ” 
To another question he replied, “We [the trustees] have 
often told Dr. Talmage that we could get a larger revenue 
if he would allow us to rent the pews.” In answer to an- 
other question, he declared that he knew of no instance in 
which the trustees had represented to Dr. Talmage that his 
pulpit notices were inconsistent with “ the practical opera- 
tion of the system.” He himself expressed the opinion that 
they were not inconsistent, that the church was a free 
church, and that it provided “ people with church homes 
who would otherwise he without them.” 

This is the substance of Mr. Corwin’s testimony, himself 
an elder and a trustee, and it covers the whole period of 
Dr. Talmage’s ministry in the Tabernacle Church. In re- 
spect to the vital points involved in the question at issue, it 
is confirmed by documentary evidence. 

The third witness for the defense was Mr. Nicholls, who 
is also an elder, a trustee, and the present chairman of the 
pew committee. His testimony was comparatively brief, 
yet it confirmed that of Mr. Corwin and Dr. Talmage. He 
had never known of any system of pew rents in that church 
at fixed prices, and did not believe that it had ever been 
practiced. The pews, according to this witness, were as- 
signed to applicants, and their pleasure, so far as possible, 
consulted as to location. After the assignment the appli- 
cants are asked to indicate the amount they will contribute 
for the expenses of the congregation. Some give more, 
and some less, and some nothing, except in the collections 
made on each Sabbath. If the occupants are unable to 
pay as much as they formerly did, by reason of a change in 
their circumstances, they are not disturbed. Mr. Nicholls 
mentioned several cases illustrating and corroborating this 
statement. The practice,, as stated by Mr. Nicholls, is to 
assign pews “ without reference to the dollar question,” in 
the sense in which Dr. Talmage has explained that phrase ; 
and Mr. Nicholls, though for many years a member of the 
congregation, was not aware that any other practice had 
ever prevailed. Such is the substance of his testimony. 


59 


Now, upon the evidence of these five witnesses — two for 
the prosecution and three for the defense — the Presbytery, 
by an overwhelming majority, came to the conclusion that 
the third specification was not sustained. Only five of the 
judges voted against an absolute acquittal of this accusa- 
tion. The wonder is that there were five who could thus 
vote in view of the evidence. 

The charge was so intrinsically improbable upon its very 
face, that nothing but the most conclusive testimony could 
establish it ; and even then it would prove Dr. Talmage an 
idiot rather than a liar. The testimony that was adduced 
to sustain the charge did not prove him „ to be either an 
idiot or a liar ; and this I endeavored to show when com- 
menting on that testimony. Neither Mr. Pearsall nor Mr. 
Hathaway, however, correctly or incorrectly they may have 
testified as to facts, fix in the mind of Dr. Talmage the 
knowledge of a pew-rental system, in distinction from a free 
church system, as being established in the practice of his 
church, or any knowledge of facts that would necessarily 
make his pulpit notices the utterance of a falsehood. Mr. 
Hathaway had the candor to admit that he did not so 
regard these notices as they fell from the lips of Dr. Tal- 
mage. 

The testimony for the defense, while it shows — what that 
for the prosecution equally shows — a tendency and wish on 
the part of the trustees to adopt the pew-rental system, 
conclusively proves that the charge against Dr. Talmage is 
absolutely false. His own oath as to his knowledge of facts, 
and as to what he meant by a free church, and meant when 
he spoke of the sittings as being assigned without reference 
to the dollar question, is amply sufficient for this purpose- 
The story which Mr. Corwin tells, covering his entire min- 
istry in the Tabernacle Church, stamps the charge into the 
dust as a baseless, if not a base accusation. His conversa- 
tion with Mr. Corwin about the free church question, soon 
after he came to the city ; his voluntary surrender of his 
salary in 1870 for the purpose of giving to his idea a prac- 
tical form ; his sermon when the First Tabernacle was dedi- 


GO 


cated ; the action of the trustees on the 4th of October, 
1870, regulating the assignment of pews, and declaring 
that the Gospel is to be supported by subscriptions ; the 
emphatic words of Dr. Talmage in 1871, “ when you engage 
an auctioneer, you must engage a new pastor,” uttered in 
response to the proposition of Mr. Wells to pay him a sal- 
ary of twenty thousand dollars, if he would consent to have 
the pews sold at auction ; his reply to the pew-rent propo- 
sition, made by the trustees in the latter part of 1874 or the 
early part of 1875, suggesting that he would resign his po- 
sition and that they might then procure some one who 
would run the church on the pew-rental system ; the action 
of the trustees in 1876, declaring that “ no pew rentals are 
exacted,” and that the expenses of the church are “de- 
frayed by voluntary contribution ;” the efforts of Dr. Tal- 
mage in the summer of 1877 to secure sittings for families 
that had no church privileges; the facts as stated by Mr. 
Mcholls — this array of evidence shows that the charge of 
falsehood and deceit, in the matter referred to, whether 
made by saints or sinners, friends or enemies, is a cruel in- 
justice. A more causeless accusation was never brought 
against the good name of any man. 

It is to be remembered that the free-churcli system which 
Dr. Talmage had in mind, and which he meant to maintain, 
was not one in which the people were to be scattered hither 
and thither, with families separated, the parents sitting in 
one pew and the children in another, and with no regular 
occupancy of any pew by the same persons. This was not 
his idea at all when he made his pulpit announcements. 
His idea was that the pews should be regularly assigned to 
occupants; that these occupants should retain the pews 
during their pleasure, if conforming to the general rules of 
the Society; that they should by voluntary subscription 
indicate what they felt able to pay toward the support of 
the Gospel ; that if they were not able to make such a sub- 
scription, they should, nevertheless, have pews or sittings 
assigned to them ; and that no pew rentals at fixed prices 
should be exacted. Dr. Talmage swears that this was his 




61 

idea of a free church, and Mr. Corwin testified that he thus* 
explained the phrase to him. 

Now, the evidence for the defense shows not only that 
Dr. Talmage did not regard this idea as being abandoned, 
but that it was not abandoned. It was adopted in the old 
church, and, as Mr. Pearsall admits, carried forward to the 
First Tabernacle, and, as Mr. Corwin swears, carried forward 
to the Second Tabernacle, that was dedicated in the early 
part of 187 4. What did the trustees mean when they said 
in 1870 that “the Gospel is to be supported in this society 
by subscriptions , and it is expected all will want to help V 7 
What did they mean when, in the latter part of 1874, or 
the early part of 1875, they requested Dr. Talmage “to 
allow them to adopt ” the pew-rental plan, and what did 
they understand him to mean when, in answer to their 
request he proposed to resign his position, in order 
that they ’might put their wish into practice? What 
did the trustees mean when they said in 1876 that “as 
no jpeiv rentals are exacted, all the expenses necessary 
for the support of the church must be defrayed by voluntary 
contribution P What does all this mean, if the pew-rental 
theory, as distinguished from the ffee-church theory of Dr. 
Talmage, were the one in acknowledged practice ? 

The truth is, the evidence for the defense contradicts Mr. 
Pearsall, as well as Mr. Hathaway, by living witnesses and 
by documentary proof, so far as the testimony of either was 
designed to show the adoption of the pew-rental theory. It 
completely exculpates Dr. Talmage from the imputation of 
falsehood and deceit in his pulpit announcements. He 
spoke as he thought, and as he meant. 

Common fame lied when she brought this chqrge, and 
the Presbytery was wofully misguided when it listened to 
her voice. It made the best reparation in its power when 
it said that there was no just foundation for the charge. 
There was none, and there is none. It was an unjust 
accusation. 

I was amazed when I heard the argument of Dr. V^n 
Dyke, before the Presbytery, with reference to this accusa- 


62 


* tion, and still more amazed when reading it in the printed 
form. I concluded, judging from the character of the argu- 
ment, that he had unfortunately seen almost nothing, 
except the story told by Mr. Pearsall, and that he had not 
clearly seen all parts of that story. His vision of even Mr. 
Hathaway was exceedingly partial and one-sided. When 
he came to the testimony for the defense, he summarized it 
under three heads, mis-stating it in part, and strangely 
overlooking nearly the whole of it. That testimony, as I 
have already shown, conclusively proves that there is noth- 
ing in this charge other than a false accusation ; and yet it 
seems with Dr. Van Dyke to have passed for nothing, if 
we are to judge of his mental action by its expression in his 
speech. 

No one, not having heard or read the evidence for the 
defense, would gather any idea of it from the speech. And 
any one who had read or heard the evidence, if hearing or 
reading the speech, could hardly fail to be surprised at the 
remarkable omissions of the latter. I do the speech no in- 
justice, but utter the simple truth in regard to it, when I 
say that it almost entirely ignores the evidence for the 
defense. 

I find also a very singular omission in Dr. Van Dyke’s 
reference to the testimony of Mr. Pearsall, who was a wit- 
ness for the prosecution, and who expressly testified that 
he, in a conversation, a part of which Dr. Van Dyke quotes 
upon his authority, said to Dr. Talmage : “ Why not rent 
the pews f We can get more out of them by that . 17 These 
were the words of Mr. Pearsall when he w T as talking to Dr. 
Talmage ; and they clearly imply that the former did not 
then suppose that the latter understood that the pew^s were 
being rented, especially when taken in connection with the 
immediate answer of Dr. Talmage to him, “ You know my 
idea is to run a free church.” 

Now, Dr. Van Dyke was in direct contact with these im- 
portant words of Mr. Pearsall, as shown by the fact that he 
quotes all round them ; and yet, by a strange mishap of 
mind, he fails to see them. They imply exactly the reverse 


of what he was seeking by his argument to establish. How 
he happened not to see them I do not know; yet I do 
know that a full and fair presentation of the testimony of 
Mr. Pearsall is not made without these words which, as he 
says, he addressed to Dr. Talmage. They show very clear- 
ly that he did not then think that Dr. Talmage was delib- 
erately lying in his pulpit announcements. If he thinks so 
now, it is not at all unlikely that his change of feeling to- 
ward Dr. Talmage may have given him some new light. 

Dr. Yan Dyke was one of the five judges that, without 
qualification, voted to sustain the third specification ; and 
when I study his mental operations through his argument, 
I am not at all surprised that he did so. It is not surprising 
that one who, for whatever reason, whether it he lack of 
comprehension, or a special bias of feeling, or any other 
reason, sees only a part of a whole case, should come to a 
conclusion not at all warranted by all the facts that make 
up that case. It is not surprising that one who does not 
take what John Locke calls “ a round-about view,” but 
does take a limited, partial and one-sided view, should be 
led into a mis-judgment. He does not see things as he 
would see them if he saw more ; and this is just my criti- 
cism upon the argument of Dr. Yan Dyke before the 
Presbytery, considered as an index to the action of his 
mind. Of his motives it is not my province to speak. 
These are with himself and his God. I simply speak of 
what appears to me as the obvious blunder of his reason- 
ing, and here I cannot repress my astonishment. The rea- 
soning I cannot regard as judicial in any proper sense. Its 
radical fault consists in the fact that it overlooks and ignores 
most material evidence in the case ; and this destroys its 
claim to he regarded as judicial. 

SPECIFICATION FOUETH. 

The charge made against Dr. Talmage in this specifica- 
tion is, that “in the winter of 1876-7, he falsely accused I. 
W. Hathaway of dishonest practices, and afterward denied 


64 


that he had done so.” The vote of the Presbytery stood 
thus: Twenty-six for acquittal; seventeen for sustaining 
the specification ; and one for sustaining it in part. 

There are some things in the history of this accusation, 
as disclosed by the testimony, that are plain, and other 
things that will always seem strange, if not mysterious, to 
candid and impartial minds. The plain things are these : 

1. That Mr. Hathaway, the party here alleged to have 
been falsely accused of dishonest practices, never appeared 
before the Presbytery as a complainant against Dr. Talmage, 
and that he was opposed to bringing the subject-matter in- 
volved in this accusation before the Presbytery at all. 

2. That the allegation that Dr. Talmage stands charged 
by common fame with falsehood and deceit, u in that, in the 
winter of 1876-7, he falsely accused I. W. Hathaway of 
dishonest practices, and afterward denied that he had done 
so,” was itself false when made, there being no such com- 
mon fame until it was created by the Presbytery in formu- 
lating this accusation against him. 

3. That the historical tap-note of this specification is to 
be found in an article published in the Presbyterian of 
November 4th, 1876, and written by Dr. Van Dyke under 
the signature of “ Augustin,” which article contained state- 
ments in regard to the Tabernacle Church that were offen- 
sive to Dr. Talmage and his people, because, as they judged, 
hostile in their intent and calculated to make a false im- 
pression. 

4. That, soon after the publication of this article, Dr. 
Talmage had an interview with Dr. Van Dyke on the sub- 
ject, and, deriving from him the impression that Mr. Hath- 
away had furnished the alleged facts about the Tabernacle 
Church, he spoke of Mr. Hathaway in a manner that was 
derogatory to his character. 

5. That the fact of such speaking subsequently came to 
the knowledge of Mr. Hathaway, and that this led to a se- 
ries of interviews between him and Dr. Talmage, which 
finally ended in an honorable and satisfactory settlement of 
the whole difficulty in the early part of January, 1877. 


6. That thereafter Dr. Talmage and Mr. Hathaway re- 
sumed friendly relations to each other, both alike regarding 
the whole matter as permanently adjusted and settled. 

These are the plain things in the case, and they are all 
very plain. There is no mystery about them. They were 
brought out into the clear light of day by the evidence. 
The very plainest of these plain things is that the difficulty 
between Dr. Talmage and Mr. Hathaway, growing out of 
what the former had said about the latter, was entirely set- 
tled between themselves, and had been for more than two 
years before the specification was formulated, and that the 
alleged offense was utterly unknown to common fame until 
the proceedings taken in the case made it known. The 
public had never heard of it, and not a newspaper had ever 
mentioned it. 

Passing, then, from these plain things, we come into the 
region of strange things ; and here mysteries and shadows 
darken the sky and obscure the vision. The great mystery 
— one that I confess I have never been able to fathom, 
without such an impeachment of motives as it would not 
become me to express, even if I thought it true — we have 
in the fact that, in the light of these plain things, this ac- 
cusation should have ever been put to the test of judicial 
trial. I am confident that it never would have been, if all 
the members of the Presbytery had seasonably understood 
the facts in the case. The facts show that there was no 
occasion for touching the subject at all, especially on the 
ground of common fame as charging Dr. Talmage with 
falsehood and deceit in the matter alleged. Not only was 
there no such occasion ; but the charge itself invaded the 
cemetery, where quietly slept a difficulty between two 
Christian men that had by themselves been honorably set- 
tled, and demanded that it should come to life again as an 
accusation against one of the parties. This upon its face is 
a very strange spectacle. It looks as if somebody was so 
anxious to get up matter of accusation against Dr. Talmage 
that even graveyards must be ransacked to find the mate- 
rial. Buried difficulties, honorably settled, must not be 
permitted to enjoy their repose. 


GG 


It is to be remembered that the fourth specification, like 
all the others, was formulated in the first instance by the 
committee appointed to investigate the nature and extent 
of the alleged common fame against Dr. Talmage. The 
presumption is that the chairman of the committee drafted 
the specification. Now, the point which has always excited 
my curiosity is this : How was that committee put on the 
track of this Talmage-Hathaway trouble that came into 
existence and went out of existence more than two years 
previously ? How did the committee get wind of it at all ? 
How did the committee learn that Dr. Talmage, “ in the 
winter of 1876-7, falsely accused I. W. Hathaway of dis- 
honest practices,” and how did it learn that “ afterward he 
denied that he had done so ?” The matter itself was 
originally known to Dr. Van Dyke, Dr. Talmage, Mr. 
Hathaway, the elders of the Tabernacle Church, and possi- 
bly a few other persons. It lay within a very narrow circle 
of knowing ones ; and how did it get beyond this circle, and 
pass into that of this investigating committee more than 
two years after it had gone into peaceful retirement ? Who 
dug it up, and, if there were more diggers than one, who 
did the digging ? That is the question which perhaps will 
not be fully answered till the day when all secrets shall be 
revealed. 

And yet my curiosity is, and has been so intense that I 
have often found myself marching around the question and 
asking questions about the question. Did the matter come 
to the committee by intuition on their part ? This will not 
do, since human nature is not gifted with such intuitions. 
Did it come to the committee from an exercise of memory ? 
This will not do, since no member of the committee was 
one of the original knowing ones, and memory recalls only 
past knowledge. Did it come to the committee, or some 
member thereof, by information, and if so, who was the in- 
former? Was common fame the informer? There was 
no common fame on the subject. Was Dr. Talmage the 
informer ? I can hardly think that he gave the committee 
any information. Did the elders of the Tabernacle Church 




67 

tell the story to the committee ? I presume not. Dicl Mr. 
Hathaway put the committee on the track of this matter ? 
He swears that he did not, and that when he came into 
conference with its chairman, the latter was already on the 
track, and sought the conference in order to find out the 
facts from him, and that when he expressed his opposition 
to bringing up the subject at all, he was reminded that that 
w 7 as not for him to determine. 

Ao one of these questions, and not all of them put to- 
gether, elicit to my mind a satisfactory answer to the main 
question which has puzzled me ever since I became ac- 
quainted with the contents of this Hathaway specification. 
Who started this accusation f Who supplied the first hints 
to it ? How did the facts, or any part of them, come to the 
knowledge of the committee, or any member thereof, either 
before or after its appointment? I am forbidden in so 
grave a matter to substitute, for positive knowledge, any 
random guesses in answer to these questions, and hence I 
content myself with simply asking them. 

There is another mystery that puzzles me, and that is 
this : Assuming that the committee knew what they were 
about when they formulated this specification, and hence 
that they understood the essential facts intended to be cov- 
ered by it, as I am sure that the Presbytery did not when 
it adopted the specification, I have never been able to see 
how the committee, with the light which they must have 
had, and which the Presbytery did not have, could formu- 
late the accusation at all. I have said so to one of the 
j members whom I honor and respect. 

How could that committee say that Dr. Talmage was 
charged thus and so by common fame, when nothing was 
more palpable than that he was not so charged ? How could 
that committee, appointed to investigate the nature and 
extent of an alleged common fame, declare that to be a 
fact which was not a fact f The chairman of the committee 
admitted on the witness stand that there was no common 
fame in respect to this subject ; and if so, why did he say 
that there was, as a member of that committee f Why 


68 


did that committee, knowing, as I must presume it did 
know, that this whole difficulty between Dr. Talmage and 
Mr. Hathaway had been honorably settled by the parties 
themselves, and that Mr. Hathaway was .entirely satisfied 
with the settlement, drag this buried difficulty out of its 
retirement, and blazon it before the Church and the world, 
no matter who pointed its attention to the place where it 
slept, with neither head-stone nor foot-stone to mark the 
spot ? Why did not that committee, informed, as 1 must 
presume it was, give the Presbytery at least a little light 
on the subject before it acted ? 

These questions puzzle me when I remember that these 
gentlemen are Christian men, and that they were perform- 
ing at least a quasi-judicial service — and they will puzzle 
me to my dying day. I have no capacity to see any just 
theory upon which that committee proceeded, and, with no 
disrepect to any of them as individuals, I hold that their 
action was most grossly wrong on its very face. Has it 
come to this that when one party speaks reproachfully of 
another in the hearing of a third party, whether justly or 
unjustly, and tli e two have in a Christian manner settled 
the difficulty arising therefrom, and the parties have for 
two years resumed pleasant relations — I say, has it come to 
this that, in such a case known only to a small circle of per- 
sons, the accusing party, without the complaint of the ac- 
cused party, and against his wishes, shall be formally ar- 
raigned before an ecclesiastical court as charged with 
falsehood and deceit by a common fame that does not exist? 
I say, has it come to this, since this is the real case in hand? 
If so, then it is high time that all ecclesiastical courts were 
abolished. Their existence would be a nuisance to Chris- 
tianity. It would be far better to do without them than to 
tolerate their ethics. 

The perplexities of my mind on this subject are not re- 
lieved by the theory that particular offenses, not known to 
or charged by common fame, may, for the purposes of in- 
dictment and trial, be made matters of accusation under a 
general charge professedly based on common fame. I have 


(19 


several objections to this theory as applied in this case, or 
in any case. 

1. The indictment against Dr. Talmage declared that he 

u stands charged by common fame with falsehood and deceit ” 
in seven enumerated particulars, of which the fourth specifi- 
cation is one, when, as a matter of fact, he was not thus 
charged in respect to this particular ; and hence the indict- 
ment declared that to be true which was not true. The 
fact was not as it was stated. ^ 

2. The Book of Discipline, chapter iii., section 5, express- 
ly provides that, before a judicatory shall take cognizance 
of an offense on the ground of common fame, the common 
fame u must specify some particular sin or sins.” This 
cannot mean less than that it must point, with more or less 
accuracy, to the act or acts which constitute the offense. A 
common fame that calls a man a rascal or a thief, but does 
not state in what his rascality or thievery consists, plainly 
is not the common fame which the Book of Discipline 
means to make the basis of judicial action. It does not 
particularize anything. It does not specify any particular 
sin or particular sins. JSTo sin, according to the Book of 
Discipline, not thus specified, can be prosecuted on the 
ground of common fame, and this is fatal to the theory I 
am considering. 

3. The theory, if admissible in respect to one particular sin 
not known to common fame, would be equally admissible in 
respect to any number of such sins not thus known ; and 
hence a person might be arraigned on some general charge 
based on common fame, and tried for a series of particular 
sins, when not a single one of these sins had been a matter 
of any common fame at all. This would be the conse- 
quence of the theory. If it may be applied to one sin, it 
may be to a dozen. It would only be necessary to get up 
some general charge under a class-term, placing that on 
common fame ; and then the party might be tried on all the 
particulars embraced therein, whether there had been any 
common fame about them or not. This is contrary to the 
Book of Discipline, which requires that the particular sin 


70 


or sins shall be specified by common fame, as the condition 
precedent to any judicial cognizance thereof on this ground. 
A general charge under some class-term is not such a par- 
ticular specification ; and to a general charge no one can 
plead. 

4. The theory opens the way for monstrous abuses, of 
which we have a conspicuous and painful example in this 
fourth specification. Here was a difficulty between two 
Christian men that had been satisfactorily adjusted and set- 
tled for more than two years ; and common fame had never 
breathed the first breath in regard to it. It was dug up and 
brought to trial under the general charge of falsehood and 
deceit on the ground of common fame, which charge falsely 
declared that this specific accusation was made by common 
fame. If this is not an abuse of the common-fame basis of 
judicial procedure, then it is difficult to conceive what would 
be an abuse ; and yet to just such abuses, under the im- 
pulse of prejudice or animosity, the theory exposes every 
man in the church, provided we adopt it. 

Having said thus much about my perplexities, I turn 
now with some relief of mind to clearer skies, where ques- 
tions of law and evidence invite my thoughts. I find no 
difficulty here in making what I regard as a perfectly clear 
case for the acquittal of Dr. Talmage. Let us take our 
bearings, see just where we are, and whither going. 

Who in this issue was the prosecutor of Dr. Talmage ?' 
One answer to be made is that Mr. Hathaway was not the 
prosecutor, bringing the charge, declaring that Dr. Talmage 
had made certain accusations against him, proposing to 
prove this fact, demanding redress for the same, and im- 
posing upon Dr. Talmage the necessity of proving the truth 
of the charge as a means of his own justification. Another 
answer, and the true one, is that the Presbytery of Brook- 
lyn was the prosecutor, making the charge on the basis of 
common fame, and acting through a prosecuting committee. 
The Presbytery, being both prosecutor and judge, instituted 
the suit and determined the issue. This results from the 
provisions of the Book of Discipline in regard to common 
fame. 


71 


What then is the charge which, the Presbytery, on this 
basis, brought against Dr. Talmage, and which it was ne- 
cessary affirmatively to prove in order to justify his convic- 
tion ? The accusation contained these two propositions : 
1. That Dr. Talmage was guilty of falsehood and deceit 
“ in that in the winter of 1876-7 he falsely accused I. W. 
Hathaway of dishonest practices.” 2. That he was guilty 
of falsehood and deceit, in that “ he afterward denied that 
he had done so,” namely, denied that he had falsely accused 
I. W. Hathaway of dishonest practices, as alleged in the 
first proposition. Such is the charge made in the fourth 
specification ; and upon it the accused was arraigned for 
trial. 

The party making this charge, which in this case was the 
Presbytery of Brooklyn, proceeding on tbe basis of common 
fame, must affirmatively prove its truth, or the whole case 
fails here for the want of proof. Mr. Greenleaf, in his treatise 
on the “ Law of Evidence,” vol. i., pp. 66, 93, says : “ The 
burden of proving a proposition or issue lies on the party 
bolding the affirmative.” “ It is, therefore, generally deemed 
sufficient, where tbe allegation is affirmative, to oppose it 
with a bare denial, until it is established by evidence.” Mr. 
Wharton, in his treatise on the “ Law of Evidence,” vol. i., 
p. 299, says that “ whether the party claiming the judgment 
of the court asserts an affirmative or negative proposition, 
he must make good his assertion.” The same doctrine is 
stated by Mr. Best, Mr. Starkie and Mr. Phillips, in their 
treatises on the law of evidence. This was the doctrine of 
the old Koman law, and has its basis alike in equity and 
common sense. 

The Presbytery then, in this fourth specification, pre- 
sented to Dr. Talmage two affirmative allegations of fact, 
in each of which it charged him with the crime of falsehood 
and deceit. In pleading thereto he confessed the truth of 
neither allegation, but denied both. 

It was, therefore, for the Presbytery to prove one or both 
of these allegations ; and if it proved neither, then the case 
was a total failure without any defense, unless we adopt the 


72 


absurd doctrine of conviction upon a charge not proved. 
The fact that the Presbytery, and not a private individual, 
accused Dr. Talmage on the basis of common fame, does 
not affect his rights under the law of evidence. He is to be 
presumed innocent of the alleged falsehood and deceit, and 
that, too, without any proof on his part, until the contrary 
is shown ; and the affirmative proof must be furnished by 
the party making the accusation. 

The fact, moreover, that the character of a man, in this 
case, of Mr. Hathaway, is involved in the offense said to have 
been committed, does not change the nature of the issue in 
the slightest degree. The issue is one of “ falsehood and 
deceit,” and nothing else. If the alleged falsehood and de- 
ceit had related to a bill of exchange or the purchase of a 
span of horses, and not to the conduct and character of Mr. 
Hathaway, the issue would have been exactly what it now 
is ; and it now is just what it would then have been. The 
single question is, whether Dr. Talmage was a liar 
in the matter set forth. I say, that this is the single 
question, because it was the only thing charged against 
him. He was not charged with profanity, or stealing, or 
murder, but with “ falsehood and deceit;” and the fourth 
specification was framed to set forth the things in which 
the falsehood consisted, and which must be shown as facts, 
in order to maintain the charge. 

One part of this charge — the part that I shall first con- 
sider — alleges that “ afterward,” namely, after falsely accus- 
ing 1, W. Hathaway of dishonest practices, Dr. Talmage 
u denied that he had done so,” namely, that he had thus 
falsely accused Mr. Hathaway. The offense here set forth 
consists entirely in this alleged denial, and, of course, the 
denial must be proved, or the offense is not proved. Was 
it proved f Far otherwise. What was proved is that Dr. 
Talmage, in the presence of Mr. Hathaway, and afterward 
in the presence of Dr. Van Dyke and Mr. Hathaway, de- 
nied that he used the word “defaulter” in application to 
the latter, and Dr. Van Dyke himself does not swear that 
he did use this word, but simply says that he used words 




73 

that made such an impression on his mind. And, more- 
over, Dr. Van Dyke does not pretend to swear to the exact 
words of Dr. Talmage. He swears only to the impressions 
which he received. It was further proved by Mr. Hatha- 
waj r that Dr. Talmage said that u Dr. Van Dyke had mis- 
interpreted what he said.” This is all that was proved as 
to the alleged denial. 

And, in the light of this evidence, it is simply amazing 
that seventeen members of the Court should have voted for 
sustaining the fourth specification, without any qualifica- 
tion. I cannot well think what they were thinking of. If 
it had been proved that Dr. Talmage had denied that he 
u falsely accused I. W. Hathaway of dishonest practices,” 
this would not show that he was guilty of any falsehood in 
making such a denial, since he might have thought that he 
had justly accused him, and hence might very properly 
deny that he had falsely accused him. He might have made 
the denial and yet have spoken just as he thought, and this 
certainly would be no lie. 

The case, however, as proved, is far weaker than this, 
since the only denials that rest upon any proof relate to the 
use of the word “ defaulter,” and the general remark of Dr. 
Talmage that u Dr. Van Dyke had misinterpreted what he 
said.” That Dr. Talmage did use the word “ defaulter ” 
Dr. Van Dyke does not swear. And nothing could he 
more monstrous than to convict Dr. Talmage of a denial in 
the sense of uttering a willful lie, because he said that “ Dr. 
Van Dyke had misinterpreted what he said.” Dr. Van 
Dyke is not infallible in either hearing or remembering the 
words of others ; and Mr. Hathaway is not infallible in 
either of these processes. Neither of them is infallible in 
stating what he has heard. It is very easy to suppose that - 
Dr. Talmage, when hearing from Mr. Hathaway the repre- 
sentation which Dr. Van Dyke had given him of his words? 
honestly thought that Dr. Van Dyke had misinterpreted 
these words, either by attaching a meaning to them which 
he did not intend, or by putting words on his lips which he 
did not use. There is important significance in the fact 


74 


that this remark about misinterpretation was made in direct 
connection with his denial to Mr. Hathaway that he had 
used the word u defaulter ” in application to him, which 
word Dr. Van Dyke does not pretend that he did use. This 
specific denial very naturally suggested, and very properly 
qualifies, the application of the remark made in immediate 
connection therewith. 

I am almost ashamed to reason thus minutely upon the 
denial alleged in the indictment, and I would not do so if I 
did not remember that seventeen members of the Pres- 
bytery thought , as shown by their votes, that Dr. Talmage 
was here guilty of falsehood as shown by the proof. My 
proposition is that the proof justifies no such conclusion. 
These seventeen men were entirely mistaken in their esti- 
mate of the evidence ; and the twenty-six men that voted 
for a complete acquittal voted according to the evidence. 
“^7ot proved” is the verdict demanded by the facts; and 
any other verdict would have been grossly unjust. 

This brings us to the other part of the accusation, which 
is that Dr. Talmage, “ in the winter of 1876-’77, falsely ac- 
cused I. W. Hathaway of dishonest practices.” I wish 
here, before going into the evidence, to say that it was not 
possible to convict Dr. Talmage of falsely imputing dishon- 
est practices to Mr. Hathaway, without inquiring and de- 
termining whether the latter had been guilty of such prac- 
tices. Both of these men must virtually be tried, one on 
the question of falsehood, and the other on the question of 
honesty ; and the latter must be found innocent in order to 
convict the former. The Presbytery had no right to inves- 
tigate the question of Mr. Hathaway’s honesty, and thus in 
effect put him on trial ; and yet the specification was so 
drawn that the Presbytery could not convict Dr. Talmage 
of falsely accusing him without doing so. The simple 
truth is, that the specification did not present a triable 
issue ; and on this ground the accused was entitled to an 
acquittal on the very face of the case. 

The propositions to be proved, in order to sustain this 
charge, are these : 1 . That Dr. Talmage, in the winter of 


75 




1 876-77, did accuse I. W. Hathaway of dishonest practices. 
2. That the accusation was not true ; and to prove this the 
character of Mr. Hathaway, as just remarked, must be in- 
quired into. 3. That Dr. Talmage Imeiv the accusation to 
he false when he made it. These propositions must be 
affirmatively shown by the prosecution, or no case is made 
out. Was this done? 

One of the witnesses placed on the stand was Dr. Van 
Dyke, whose testimony shows that in the latter part of No- 
vember, 1876, and not in the winter of 1876-77, Dr. Tal- 
mage made certain general statements which impeached 
the truthfulness and honesty of Mr. Hathaway. This is 
all that the testimony shows. As to the question whether 
these statements were false , and as to the further ques- 
tion whether Dr. Talmage thought them false when he 
made them, Dr. Van Dyke gave no light. There could 
plainly be no conviction simply on his testimony, since 
it failed to establish two material points, namely, the 
untruth of the accusations and the falsity of Dr. Tal- 
mage in making them. We are to bear in mind that 
Mr. Hathaway is not the complainant in this case, and that 
the charge against Dr. Talmage is not that of slander, but 
simply that of falsehood, and hence that all the constituents 
of falsehood must be affirmatively shown, or the charge falls 
to the ground. Dr. Van Dyke does not show all of these 
constituents. Indeed, his testimony does not show any 
falsehood at all. It simply shows accusations as matters of 
fact. 

Mr. Pearsall is another witness introduced by the pros- 
ecution ; and being questioned as to the character of Mr. 
Hathaway and his management of church finances, so far as 
committed to him, he spoke well of him in both respects. 
This, however, does not prove that the accusations of Dr. 
Talmage were false, or that he thought them such when he 
made them. Dr. Talmage might have known or heard 
some things about Mr. Hathaway which Mr. Pearsall did 
not know and had not heard. This witness clearly does not 
fix the lie upon Dr. Talmage in what Dr. Yan Dyke swears 


76 


* 


that he said. Dr. Talmage may have had reasons for the 
opinions which he expressed, of which Mr. Pearsall has no 
knowledge. 

A letter written by Dr. Talmage in the previous Febru- 
ary, introducing Mr. Hathaway to the professors at Prince- 
ton, and speaking of him in commendatory terms, was also 
presented by the prosecution. This letter, however, does 
not show that Dr. Talmage spoke falsely , or meant to do 
so, when nine months after writing it he spoke as Dr. Van 
Dyke swears that he did speak. He may have heard things 
about Mr. Hathaway in the course of these nine months 
which changed his views, and gave him an unfavorable im- 
pression, especially when, as he supposed from his conversa- 
tion with Dr. Van Dyke, this very man, whom he had in 
various ways befriended, had had something to do with the 
offensive statements made in the u Augustin ” letter, which 
were a matter of discussion between Dr. Talmage and Dr. 
Van Dyke when he said what he did say about Mr. Hath- 
away. This is just the fact in the case; and hence the 
February letter to the Princeton professors is very far from 
fixing conscious falsehood upon Dr. Talmage in the accusa- 
tions which he made in the latter part of the following No- 
vember. What he said in the first instance may be differ- 
ent from what he said in the second; but this is easily 
explained by a simple change of views, than which nothing 
is more common. 

So also the preamble and resolution of January 12, 1877, 
adopted by the Session of the Tabernacle Church, was in- 
troduced as evidence against Dr. Talmage. It is to be 
remembered that, after Mr. Hathaway returned from 
Princeton to Brooklyn in the latter part of December, 
1876, and became informed of what Dr. Talmage had said 
to Dr. Van Dyke, there was a series of interviews between 
him and Dr. Talmage, and that the last interview, namely, 
the one at which the whole matter ^as settled, occurred in 
the presence of the Session of the Tabernacle Church, on 
the 12th of January, 1877, or nearly two months after the 
time of the accusations as sworn to by Dr. Van Dyke. This 


interview resulted in the adoption, by the Session, of a pre- 
amble and resolution, the preamble reading as follows: 
“Mr. I. W. Hathaway having appeared before us, com- 
plaining of having been slandered by reports in circulation 
concerning him, and that such reports have arisen from 
constructions put upon inadvertent remarks made by mem- 
bers of this church, and the whole matter having been 
inquired into and satisfactorily explained” 

This preamble shows the following things: 1, That there 
were evil reports in circulation concerning Mr. Hathaway. 
2. That these reports arose from constructions put upon in- 
advertent remarks made by members of the church. 3. 
That the whole matter as to these reports had been 
“ inquired into and satisfactorily explained” Dr. Talmage 
was aware of these reports. He had heard of them when 
he spoke as he did to Dr. Van Dyke. 

Now, the session, in view of the facts recited in the pre- 
amble, Dr. Talmage being present and concurring with the 
action, passed the following resolution: u Resolved, That 
we, the Session of this church, hereby express our continued 
confidence in Mr. Hathaway’s Christian character, and de- 
clare that we are satisfied that any and all charges which 
may have been floating in the community affecting his 
moral character, are false and slanderous, this resolution be- 
ing passed by the Session and accepted by Mr. Hathaway 
as a final and satisfactory adjustment of the whole mat- 
ter.” 

We thus see, by the showing of the prosecution, that 
there were evil reports about Mr. Hathaway, which had 
undoubtedly come to the knowledge of Dr. Talmage. We 
further see that the matter involved in these reports was 
inquired into by the Session and satisfactorily explained, so 
as in the judgment of the Session to exculpate Mr. Hath- 
away. This lets in a flood of light upon the case, not 
against Dr. Talmage, but in his favor. When he spoke as 
he did to Dr. Van Dyke nearly two months prior to this 
satisfactory adjustment of the whole matter, having heard 
these evil reports, and being indignant at the supposed com- 


78 


plicity of Mr. Hathaway with Dr. Van Dyke in the “Au- 
gustin” letter, he spoke as he then thought. This same 
Dr. Talmage, having had interviews with Mr. Hathaway 
after thus speaking, and being present and part of the Ses- 
sion when the whole matter was inquired into and satisfac- 
torily explained, concurred with the Session in declaring 
these evil reports to be false, and thus took back his own 
accusations made to Dr. Van Dyke, and in this way made 
an amende therefor. Air. Hathaway on his part accepted 
the action as satisfactory. He could now go back to 
Princeton with his character endorsed by the Session, in- 
cluding Dr. Talmage, after an inquiry into and proper ex- 
planation of the evil reports that had been floating in the 
community. 

Dr. Talmage ought to thank the prosecution for intro- 
ducing this action of the Session as a part of their case, 
since, although not so intended, it completely disposes of 
the case. It is very difficult, even admitting all that Dr. 
Van Dyke says, to see where the lie comes in. Dr. Tal- 
mage, indignant and excited for what he supposed to be 
good reasons, spoke evil of Mr. Hathaway because he then 
thought evil. There were evil rumors about him, and this 
the prosecution has shown. Dr. Talmage subsequently 
joined with the Session in speaking well of him, after inquiry 
and satisfactory explanation, because he then thought dif- 
ferently, and this too the prosecution has shown by its own 
evidence. This sweeps away the whole case, so far as the 
question of lying is concerned, which is the only point in 
issue. No man lies who makes different statements about 
the same thing or the same person, provided in each he 
speaks as he thinks at the time. The statements may be 
even contradictory, yet this mere fact makes no one a liar. 
Falsity as to a fact, and falsity in intention, are widely dif- 
ferent. The one is a mistake of the head, and the other is 
a vice of the heart. 

Nothing is more common than a change of opinions 
about men. I have myself undergone such a change as the 
result of this trial. It sometimes happens that men 


79 


sharply accuse each other in certain circumstances, in cer- 
tain moods of feeling, and with certain thoughts in their 
minds ; and then, fortunately for our race, these same men, 
subsequently, and under different circumstances, may, as 
the result of conversations and explanations, take back 
their own words, adjust their differences, and resume 
friendly relations. This, according to the showing of the 
prosecution, is just what Dr. Talmage did in respect to Mr. 
Hathaway. He accused him in what he said to Dr. Van 
Dyke, and then, in the settlement of the matter, after 
inquiry and satisfactory explanation, he took back the ac- 
cusation, and Mr. Hathaway was satisfied. The attempt, 
in view of the facts, to make Dr. Talmage a liar in any part 
of this affair, is either malignant or prompted by a preju- 
dice too blind and too intense to deserve any respect. 

I have now examined all the evidence introduced by the 
prosecution for the support of the fourth specification, and 
it so happens that this is all the evidence that was before 
the Presbytery. The defense introduced no evidence at all. 
Why did not the defense place Dr. Talmage on the stand to 
testify as to what he said to Dr. Yan Dyke? Why did it 
not place witnesses on the stand to impeach and assail the 
character of Mr. Hathaway, and prove the truth of the accu- 
sations against him? 

The controlling reason why this was not done arose from 
the fact that Dr. Talmage and Mr. Hathaway, not origin- 
ally at their own seeking, but at the suggestion of the 
Moderator of the Presbytery, had a conference with each 
other during the trial, and after all the evidence in support 
of the fourth specification had been presented. The re- 
sult was that each agreed to address a letter to the Presby- 
tery, in which each would express his regret that the 
difficulty between them that was settled in January, 1877, 
should have been revived in the form of Specification 4, and 
in which each would declare his purpose, not to attempt to 
vindicate himself in respect to this matter at the expense of 
the other. Such letters were written, and read before the 
Presbytery, and the defense acted accordingly in not intro- 


80 


ducing any evidence, but in leaving the case just as it was 
placed by the prosecution. The whole matter had once 
been honorably settled by these men, and in this confer- 
ence they determined to abide by that settlement, and 
they did so. 

I am of the opinion that the Moderator did a very wise 
thing in suggesting this conference, and that Dr. Talinage 
and Mr, Hathaway acted as wisely in the course which 
they pursued. Dr. Talmage consented to leave the case 
against him just as it stood, without introducing evidence to 
break down the character of Mr. Hathaway ; and this re- 
lieved the latter from the necessity of introducing any evi- 
dence to sustain his own character. Thus the Presbytery, 
I regret to say, not by its own wisdom at the time, but by 
the interposition of the Moderator and the co-operation of 
these parties, was saved from what would have been a dis- 
grace to the body itself, in the virtual trial of the question 
whether Mr. Hathaway was an honest or a dishonest man. 
The Presbytery had no right to touch this question, since 
Mr. Hathaway was not a party in the record, and should 
not have entertained an indictment against Dr. Talmage 
which could not be established without raising and deter- 
mining this question. 

These men — both of them ministers of Christ — were, by 
a great blunder on the part of the Presbytery, drifting into 
a desperate onset upon each other,* each for his own vindi- 
cation. Under the counsels that then prevailed there 
seemed to be no escape from it ; and there would have been 
none if these parties had not been wiser than the Presby- 
tery. The spectacle would have been shameful to the very 
last degree. I never in ray life dreaded anything so much 
as I did the task of acting as counsel in an effort to assail 
Mr. Hathaway’s character as the means of defending that 
of Dr. Talmage. I felt that it would be outrageous, and I 
feel so now ; and to me it was a great relief when the men 
themselves on this point took their case into their own 
hands, and, wiser than the Presbytery, furnished an escape 
horn this necessity. 


81 


And yet, strange to say, the complainants find in the ac- 
tion of these men one of the matters of which they com- 
plain. They ought rather to sing psalms of joy, and thank 
God for the action. Would it have been a pleasure to them 
to have fifteen or twenty witnesses march to the stand and 
testify against Mr. Hathaway, who was not a party on trial, 
and perhaps as many more to testify for him? This is just 
what would have occurred if that had not occurred of which 
they complain. If this had occurred, it would have been a 
grievous wrong to Mr. Hathaway, and a gross violation of 
just rules of judicial procedure. Were the complainants so 
anxious to fix the lie upon Dr. Talmage, that they would 
rush, without law, without justice, and against law, upon 
the trial of the question whether Mr. Hathaway was an 
honest or a dishonest man when he had not been indicted ? 
I fondly hope not, and hence set down their attitude to a 
mistake of the judgment. 

The complainants speak of the letters of these men as 
having been introduced before the Presbytery with u drama- 
tic effect.” It is true that the Moderator, to whom the let- 
ters were addressed, introduced them with a few appropriate 
remarks ; and then each of these gentlemen read his own 
letter, declaring his purpose that, whatever the Presbytery 
might do, he would adhere to and abide by the satisfactory 
settlement of the whole difficulty made in January, 1877. 
It was a solemn moment. The moral exhibit was impres- 
sive ; and if this be what is meant by “ dramatic effect,” 
then, while I do not think the words well chosen, I do not 
object to the idea. If, however, the meaning be that the 
scene was artfully gotten up for effect, or to evade any issue 
of justice, or conceal criminality that would not bear expo- 
sure, then I unhesitatingly declare the language to be 
utterly false. These parties were not stage-actors in that 
scene, but doing an eminently Christian thing, alike credit- 
able to both. 

It should be remembered that neither Dr. Talmage nor 
Mr. Hathaway originated the arrangement to which both 
agreed. They simply accepted it, after a fraternal confer- 

6 


82 


ence with each other, at the wise suggestion of the Mod- 
erator. Each saw that this was the best thing to be done ; 
and each felt that the difficulty between them that was set- 
tled in January, 1877, should not have been revived in 
1879, as an accusation against Dr. Talmage on the ground 
of common fame. What both did is what all candid men, 
if understanding the facts as they were at the time, cannot 
fail to approve. That the complainants should see any- 
thing in this action to condemn, is one among the many 
marvels of this extraordinary case. 

Having thus commented upon the fourth specification, I 
desire, in a word, to recall attention to what was proved, and 
what was not proved, in regard to it. As to the allegation 
that Dr. Talmage had “ falsely accused I. W. Hathaway of 
dishonest practices,” it was shown by the testimony of Dr. 
Van Dyke that he had spoken of Mr. Hathaway in a way 
that impeached his character for truth and honesty, and 
further shown by other testimony that the difficulty arising 
therefrom had been entirely settled. It was not shown by 
any testimony that Dr. Talmage did not believe in the truth 
of the accusation against Mr. Hathaway when he made it, 
or that he had not then reasons for believing in its truth. 
Ho falsehood of intention was, therefore, proved here, and 
hence none that would justify conviction, even if it had been 
positively proved, as was not the case, that the statements 
of Dr. Talmage in regard to Mr. Hathaway were not true, 
as a matter of fact. 

As to the allegation that Dr. Talmage “afterward denied 
that he done so,” namely, that he had u falsely accused 
I. W. Hathaway of dishonest practices,” it was proved that 
he denied using the word “ defaulter ” in application to 
Mr. Hathaway, and was not proved that he did use this 
word. It was further proved that he declared that “ Dr. 
Van Dyke had misinterpreted what he said ;” but it was 
not proved that this was a false statement, or that he 
thought it such when he made it. 

“Hot proved” was the verdict of the Presbytery in 
regard to this particular charge; and “not proved” is 
clearly the verdict demanded by the evidence. 


83 


SPECIFICATION FIFTH. 

Dr. Talmage is here charged with falsehood and de- 
ceit, “in that in the early part of the year 1878 he 
endeavored to obtain false subscriptions towards the pay- 
ment of the debt of the church, to be deceitfully used for 
the purpose of inducing others to subscribe.” The vote on 
this specification stood thus : Twenty-eight for not sustain- 
ing it ; twelve for sustaining it ; and five for sustaining it 
in part. 

The only definite thing in this charge is the date of the 
offense. It was committed, as alleged, “ in the early part 
of the year 1878.” As to what is meant by “ false subscrip- 
tions ;” as to the act or acts which constituted the endeavor 
“ to obtain ” them ; as to the particular church whose debt 
was to be paid ; as to the method or methods by which 
these “ false subscriptions ” were “to be deceitfully used 
for the purpose of inducing others to subscribe ;” as to the 
persons who were thus to be deceived — as to all these points 
the specification gave the accused no information. 

A criminal indictment, so vaguely drawn as this, would 
be kicked out of court at sight. No court of justice would 
subject a person to trial on such an indefinite and ambigu- 
ous charge of crime. The accusation plainly does not 
conform to that rule of the Book of Discipline which re- 
quires that “the times, places and circumstances ” of alleged 
offenses shall be so set forth as to give the accused the 
proper information in regard to the offense charged, and 
thereby enable him to know beforehand what he is to meet, 
as well as to prepare his defense. For this reason the speci- 
fication ought not to have been adopted at all ; and for the 
same reason, if for no other, Dr. Talmage was entitled to 
an acquittal. He had not been legally charged with crime, 
and ought not, on this specification, to have been tried at 
all. 

The crime charged consists in an endeavor to do some- 
thing ; and the description of this endeavor is that it was 
made “ to obtain false subscriptions toward the payment 


84 


of the debt of the church,” and that the design of Dr. Tal- 
mage in so doing was “ deceitfully ” to use these said 
subscriptions “ for the purpose of inducing others to sub- 
scribe.” The endeavor is thus described ; and all parts of 
the statement must he shown as facts in order to justify a 
conviction. 

The evidence adduced by the prosecution consisted in two 
telegrams, the authorship of which, as Mr. Pearsall swore, 
was acknowledged by Dr. Talmage in the Gelston case tried 
before the City Court of Brooklyn. The first of these tel- 
egrams reads thus : 

“ Brooklyn, January 30th, 1878. 

“ To John F. Talmage, JEutaiv House , Baltimore : 

“ Whole community agitated about foreclosure ; fever for 
debt-raising high. If your house will subscribe five thou- 
sand dollars, and Mr. Hobbs the same, three others will do 
the same, and the thing is done. If you cannot, the matter 
will not be undertaken. It is to-night or never. Nothing 
unless all debt, church and college. For the Lord’s sake 
say yes. Telegraph immediately. 

“ T. De Witt Talmage.” 

The second telegram was as follows : 

“Brooklyn, January 30th, 1878. 

“ To John F. Talmage, Eutaw House , Baltimore: 

u Will you and Mr. Hobbs allow me to pledge you each 
for five thousand dollars, provided I make up to each of you 
privately the difference between your subscriptions and five 
thousand ? Telegraph immediately. 

“ T. De Witt Talmage.” 

This is the entire evidence offered by the prosecution to 
sustain the high-sounding charge that Dr. Talmage had 
“ endeavored to obtain false subscriptions toward the pay- 
ment of the debt of the church,” and that his design was 
“ deceitfully ” to use these subscriptions “ for the purpose of 
inducing others to subscribe.” There is no pretense of any 
wrong in the first of these telegrams. The whole offense, 
if any, was committed in the second one. Let us then com- 
pare the offense charged with this telegram, and see whether 
the latter proves the former. 


85 


1. One part of the offense consists in an endeavor “ to 
obtain false subscriptions toward the payment of the debt 
of the church.” Does the telegram show such a fact ? Not 
at all. 

It is plain on the face of the telegram that the proposi- 
tion of Dr. Talmage did not contemplate a false subscrip- 
tion in the sense of a forgery. He asked Mr. John F. Tal- 
mage whether he and Mr. Hobbs would “ allow ” him to 
pledge each of them for five thousand dollars. He was in 
Brooklyn, and they in Baltimore ; and he solicited from 
them, in the form of a question, the authority to make such 
a pledge in their names. 

It is equally clear that the subscriptions were not to he a 
sham , but to be made in good faith on the part of Dr. Tal- 
mage and on the part of these gentlemen, as to the ques- 
tion of payment. This is evident from his seeking their 
authority thus to pledge them, and, also, from the impli- 
cation involved in his question, that, in the event of re- 
ceiving such authority from them, he would be willing to 
“ make up ” privately, to each of them, “ the difference ” be- 
tween the amount subscribed and such a part thereof as 
they might choose to give themselves. All this goes upon 
the supposition of honaftde subscriptions, to be paid by the 
parties making them. They were to be the subscribers 
through Dr. Talmage, and to pay the subscriptions ; and, in 
the theory of the question, he was to “make up ” to them, 
either before or after payment, such a part thereof as they 
might choose to demand. This “ difference ” thus made up 
by him, whatever it might he, whether fifty or five hundred 
dollars, would be directly a gift to them from Dr. Talmage, 
and indirectly, through them, a gift for the object in respect 
to which he wished each of them to subscribe and pay five 
thousand dollars. There is no sham in such a proposition. 

It may, however, be said that if Mr. John F. Talmage, 
for example, had subscribed five thousand dollars, and Dr. 
Talmage had furnished twenty-five hundred dollars of the 
amount paid by the former, then the subscription would 
• have been a false one. W ould it f Let us see. 


86 


Mr. John F. Talmage would have been bound in honor 
to pay five thousand dollars, and, if a man of his word, he 
would have done so. The subscription would not have 
been false as to the intention of payment. Dr. Talmage, 
by the supposition, would donate twenty-five hundred dol- 
lars to Mr. John F. Talmage for the purpose of payment • 
and the donation, when a completed act, would make the 
money the property of Mr. John F. Talmage for the object 
in question. That is to say, Mr. John F. Talmage would 
pay his own money, a part of which would be a gift from 
Dr. Talmage. Would that be a false subscription ? It is 
the sheerest nonsense to call it such. Calling it such 
assumes that the source whence the money is derived that 
is used in liquidating the obligation of a contract, fixes the 
character of that contract. This is worse than straining at 
a gnat and swallowing a camel. A subscription is a con- 
tract to pay money ; and now, what difference does it make 
in respect to the contract, whether the money paid is 
derived by a gift from another, or from interest on bonded 
investments, or from the operations of legitimate trade 1 
It is a new doctrine that the source of funds paid in the ful- 
fillment of a subscription is to determine whether that sub- 
scription is true or false. 

Suppose that a friend of mine should say to me : “ I 
want you to subscribe a thousand dollars to build a church. 
If you will put down your name for that sum, or allow me 
to put it down for you, I will, when the obligation matures 
for payment, draw my check in your favor for one thousand 
dollars, understanding, of course, that you are to pay the 
subscription. This is a matter between you and myself, 
and I wish you to keep it as such. I have my own reasons 
for the wish.” Suppose that I should reply : “I am not 
able to subscribe anything ; but if you will give me the 
money, I will make the subscription and pay it.” Suppose 
further, that this proposition is actually carried into effect, 
and the thing is done. I make the subscription and in due 
season pay it with the money which my friend gives me, 
and which he had pledged himself to give on the condition 
named. 


87 

By and by some hunter after “falsehood and deceit” 
gets on the track of this friend, and an enemy furnishes 
him a letter which the friend had written, and which con- 
tains his proposition to me. “ Ah !” says this keen-eyed 
hunter, “ now I have got him in a tight place. He has 
been guilty not only of endeavoring to obtain, but of actually 
obtaining a false subscription to build a church ; and here 
is his own letter showing the fact. Give me a pen, and I’ll 
put this offense into the form of an ecclesiastical indictment, 
and then I’ll convict him if I can.” 

Now, is there any court in the land — is there any com- 
mon sense in the land — if, understanding the facts as I have 
supposed them to be, that would for a moment say that this 
friend of mine had been guilty, not only of endeavoring to 
procure, but of actually procuring a false subscription, to build 
a church? Would not every candid man at once say that 
the term “false,” as used in this connection, is worse 
than a humbug, by being a vile slander? Would not every 
sensible person say that this hunter after “ falsehood and 
deceit ” was himself the victim of an insane delusion, or af- 
flicted with a malady of the sensibilities, best explained by 
referring it to the category of disordered feeling ? 

And yet the case supposed is worse than that proved in 
respect to Dr. Talmage. He simply “ endeavored,” and he 
“ endeavored ” by asking a question, and the thing that he 
thus “ endeavored” to do was not done at all. He is a mild 
offender when compared with this friend of mine, who carried 
the endeavor into effect, and actually secured the false sub- 
scription, and then capped the climax of the falseness by 
giving me the money with which to pay it. Hang Dr. Tal- 
mage, and let that man go scot-free ! No, never. Hang 
both or neither. Hang neither, for there is no offense which 
can be detected by the strongest magnifying power of a 
moral microscope. 

The allegation that Dr. Talmage “ endeavored to obtain 
false subscriptions” for any purpose, so far as the evidence 
of the second telegram goes, is itself a false statement. The 
subscriptions that appear in this telegram were not to be 


88 


false, but real, and to be paid in good faitli ; and to call 
them false is a misnomer. The man who drew this part 
of the indictment drew upon his fancy, and, withal, did not 
evince the highest order of training in the selection of ap- 
propriate words. The term “false” has no application to 
the thing disclosed in the telegram. 

2. The other part of the offense consists in the alleged 
fact that Dr. Talmage, when he endeavored to obtain sub- 
scriptions, not shown to be “ false ” at all, intended “ deceit- 
fully ” to use them “ for the purpose of inducing others to 
subscribe.” This imputed intention is material to the case 
as stated in the indictment ; and unless it be shown as a 
fact, then the whole accusation is but a mass of empty 
words, so far as the question of guilt is concerned, though,, 
considered relatively to Dr. Talmage, it would be a cruel 
slander. 

Now, does the second telegram furnish any proof of the 
intention here imputed to the accused f One may read 
that telegram for a day or a century ; and he will not find 
the first word that even remotely suggests or implies the 
purpose alleged. I challenge all the exegetes that ever 
lived or died, to point to a solitary syllable or letter in the 
telegram which shows such a purpose. I do not absolutely 
know that Dr. Talmage did not have the imputed purpose 
in his mind when he wrote the telegram ; but I do know 
that he neither expressed nor implied any such purpose. It 
is not in the language used, any more than the five books 
of Moses are in that language. It is a slanderous assump- 
tion to put it there, unless there be some other reason for 
so doing. 

The fact that Dr. Talmage, in his first telegram, said to 
Mr. John F. Talmage, u If your house will subscribe five 
thousand dollars, and Mr. Hobbs the same, three others 
will do the same, and the thing is done,” does not justify 
the inference that, in the second telegram, he was laying a 
plan to practice deceit upon these “ three others ” by pro- 
curing u false subscriptions ” from Mr. John F. Talmage 
and Mr. Hobbs. When he sent the first telegram he had 


89 


no idea of sending the second ; and, when he sent the sec- 
ond, it is not at all probable that he had in his mind the 
exact words used in the first telegram. In the first tele- 
gram he expressed the opinion — for what reasons and upon 
what assurances from these “ three others ” I do not know 
— that if Mr. John F. Talmage and Mr. Hobbs would sub- 
scribe five thousand dollars each, “ three others ” would do 
the same. Perhaps he stated, in respect to these “ three 
others,” his confident hope rather than an explicit and for- 
mal pledge on their part. When, however, Mr. John F. 
Talmage replied in the negative, as he did, and assigned 
inability as the reason for the refusal, then Dr. Talmage 
sent his second telegram and requested permission to 
pledge Mr. John F. Talmage and Mr. Hobbs for bona fide 
subscriptions of five thousand dollars each, with the under- 
standing between him and them that he would, if nec- 
essary, aid them out of his own funds in the payment, 
and undoubtedly with the hope that they would authorize 
him to make the subscriptions, and then pay them them- 
selves, without asking anything from him. The question 
whether he should “ make up ” to them any part of their sub- 
scriptions was left for them to decide. 

Now, to say that Dr. Talmage, by his effort as appear- 
ing in the second telegram to obtain subscriptions of five 
thousand dollars each from Mr. John F. Talmage and Mr. 
Hobbs, was playing a trick of deception upon these u three 
others, ” from whom he hoped in this way to get subscrip- 
tions of five thousand dollars each, and that trickery was 
the theory of his mind at the time, is to show a most amaz- 
ing eagerness to convict him of deceit. Who knows that 
he had any such theory in his mind ? Who knows that 
these “three others” had formally stipulated that they 
would subscribe five thousand dollars each, on the express 
condition, and no other, that Mr. John F.. Talmage and 
Mr. Hobbs would do the same thing ? 

The telegrams certainly do not so connect the action of 
these “ three others ” with that of Mr. John F. Talmage and 
Mr. Hobbs as to imply that Dr. Talmage was trying to de- 


90 


ceive the former when he was endeavoring to get a subscrip- 
tion of five thousand dollars each out of the latter, or that he 
would not have been entirely willing to read the second tele- 
gram to these u three others,” and thus inform them of its 
exact nature, had they been present when it was written. 
There is nothing here to suggest that, so far as his own 
action was concerned, he had any wish or design to conceal 
from these u three others ” the arrangement which he was 
willing to make with Mr. John F. Talmage and Mr. Ilobbs. 
These telegrams, about which such a causeless rumpus has 
been made, and upon which the enemies of Dr. Talmage have 
fattened themselves, do not, unless supplemented by a series 
of pure assumptions, with the addition of a false statement 
as to what is a false subscription, fix any deceit or trickery 
in the mind of their author. 

And yet it was upon this evidence, without a solitary 
word or fact in it that either proves or implies an intended 
deception, that the prosecution asked the Presbytery to 
brand Dr. Talmage as a deceiver. I have already said that 
an y court of justice would have kicked such an indictment 
out of court upon its very face ; and I now add that any 
court of justice would kick the case out of court upon the 
showing of such evidence. The gulf between the premise 
furnished by the evidence, and the conclusion sought to be 
drawn, is one over which no judicial logic can travel. To fly 
over it would task the wing of even malignant fancy. 
Nothing can be more unreasonable than to read these tele- 
grams, and then proceed to say, on the basis thereof, that 
Dr. Talmage was guilty of endeavoring u to obtain false sub- 
scriptions toward the payment of the debt of the church,” 
with the intent of “ deceitfully” using them u for the purpose 
of inducing others to subscribe.” 

If the accusation were not to Dr. Talmage so grave a 
matter, it would be an amusing exercise to study the psycho- 
logical structure of the mind, especially in its emotional 
workings, that started with the telegrams and ended with 
this charge. What a mind that was, and, if still extant, 
what a mind it is ! The matter in hand is, however, so 


91 


serious to the party accused, and the accusation, in the light 
of the evidence adduced to support it, is so palpably unjust, 
that I will not turn aside to analyze this singularly con- 
structed mind. Others may do that at their leisure. My 
concern is with the guilt or innocence of Dr. Talmage as a 
judicial problem to he determined by evidence. 

It will be perceived that, thus far, I have dealt only with 
the evidence presented by the prosecution. Let us, then, 
turn over the leaf, and read the page furnished by the evi- 
dence for the defense. Mrs. Talmage, the wife of the ac- 
cused, than whom a nobler woman never honored a hus- 
band, happens to be personally conversant with all the facts 
connected with these telegrams, and to be herself partici- 
pant in all that was done by her husband She took the 
stand as a witness for the defense, and told the story as fol- 
lows : 

“The telegram was sent at the time we were attempting 
to raise the church debt. Mr. John F. Talmage, who was 
President of the Board of Trustees, was in Baltimore at 
that time, and so was Mr. Hobbs. Mr. Talmage felt that 
if twenty-five thousand dollars could be raised by the Board 
of Trustees the balance could be quite freely raised among 
the congregation; but he felt that twenty-five thousand 
dollars must be raised among the Board of Trustees before 
he would be willing to start in the matter at all. So he 
telegraphed to Mr. Talmage and Mr. Hobbs, asking them 
if they would be willing to give five thousand dollars, pro- 
vided the rest of the money was raised. The answer came 
back that they did not feel able to do so. We were very 
much disappointed, Mr. Talmage particularly so. He said: 
4 I don’t know what to do ; I don’t feel like undertaking 
this unless twenty-five thousand dollars is raised in the 
Board.’ Finally he said to me : ‘I will tell you what I will 
do if you approve of it. I will send a telegram to John 
Talmage and tell him that if he and Mr. Hobbs will do their 
best, giving everything they are able to, I will make up the 
balance to them.’ I replied: 4 1 don’t think you are able to 
do that,’ because he had promised five thousand dollars 
already. Then he brought his fist down violently upon the 
table and said : 4 1 would give every cent of my salary for 
one year to have the church debt raised, and I will do it 
too if you are willing.’ I thought we were not able to do it. 


Mr. Talmage itemized how he could support his family dur- 
ing the year, provided they accepted the offer. He said it 
would be a matter of domestic economy. I finally con- 
sented to do so, but I made this remark: ‘ If you make such 
a sacrifice the people won’t understand that you are making 
such a sacrifice as they are.’ He said : 4 1 don’t care any- 
thing about any credit in this matter at all ; all I want is 
to have the church debt raised.’ I was willing, and he 
made out a telegram and read it to me, and 1 said : ‘ 1 do 
not think it would be pleasant to them to have it known. 
Perhaps you had better give them to understand that this 
would be a matter between themselves and ourselves.’ So 
Mr. Talmage said : 4 1 will put the word privately in.’ I said : 

1 I don’t think they would understand it.’ He said : 6 You 
can’t put everything in a telegram.’ I was the one that sug- 
gested the word privately, and these were the circumstances 
under which it was suggested, and the telegram was sent.” 

Here we have the inside view of these “ false subscrip- 
tions” which Dr. Talmage “ endeavored to obtain toward 
the payment of the debt of the church, to be deceitfully 
used for the purpose of inducing others to subscribe.” The 
wife’s story, confirmed by that of the husband, brands the 
accusation as cruelly unjust and grossly false. 

Dr. Talmage wanted to have the debt of the church 
paid, which certainly was right; and for this purpose he had 
already promised to give five thousand dollars, and thought 
it necessary that twenty-five thousand dollars should come 
from the Board of Trustees. Two of these trustees, one of 
them his nephew, happened to be in Baltimore at the time. 
He telegraphs to the nephew, asking each of them to give 
five thousand dollars, and expressing the opinion that there 
were three others who would do the same. The answer 
that comes back is that they do not feel able to do so. The 
want of ability is the ground of refusal. 

Dr. Talmage is disappointed, and for the moment does 
not know what to do. Speedily a suggestion occurs to his 
mind, by which he proposes to relieve this want of ability, 
and which he thus expresses to his wife : “ I will tell you 
what I will do, if you approve of it. I will send a telegram 
to John F. Talmage, and tell him that if he and Mr. 


93 


Hobbs will do tlwir best, giving everything they are able to, 
I will make up the balance to them.” The only thought in 
his mind was to pay back to them what they were not able 
to give, provided they would authorize the subscriptions, 
and “ do their best ” to give the whole amount themselves. 
His wife hesitated on the score of his ability, especially as 
he had already promised to give five thousand dollars ; and 
he then said : “ I would give every cent of my salary for one 
year to have the church debt raised.” After a moment’s 
consultation as to the support of his family during the year, 
his wife expressed the opinion that the people would not 
understand that he was making such a sacrifice, and he an- 
swered : “I don’t care anything about any credit in this 
matter at all. All I want is to have the church debt raised.” 

“ These were the circumstances,” says his wife, and these 
were the mental operations, on his part and hers, under 
which “ the telegram was sent.” 

Now, where, according to this story, does the deception 
come in ? Where is the idea expressed ? Where is the 
evidence of any purpose of deception ? Where is the en- 
deavor to obtain u false subscriptions ? ” Where is the 
proof that Dr. Talmage intended deceitfully to use the sub- 
scriptions that he was seeking to obtain, “ for the purpose of 
inducing others to subscribe ?” I submit, in all candor and 
conscience, that the charge, as made against Dr. Talmage, 
does not at all fit the facts as show n by the evidence. It 
falsely characterizes these facts. The evidence places no 
idea of deception or any species of trickery in the mind of 
Dr. Talmage, or in that of his wife. It does not impeach 
the character or sincerity of these parties in the musings of 
thought, the comparison of views, and the sacrifice proposed, 
which stand connected with the sending of the second 
telegram. The evidence puts upon both the stamp of moral 
nobility, so far as feeling and purpose are concerned. The 
Presbytery judged righteously, according to the evidence, 
when it decided to acquit Dr. Talmage of this charge. The 
marvel is that any member of the Court, if mindful of the 
evidence and controlled thereby, could entertain a different 
opinion. 


94 


The counsel for the defense, in discussing a point of cas- 
uistry, not at all essential to an acquittal, ventured to express 
an opinion upon that point that filled Dr. Yan Dyke “ with 
amazement.” That opinion had its basis in two very sim- 
ple propositions. One was “that every man has a right to 
give away his own money for such purposes and objects as 
seem to him good.” The other was “ that he has the right 
to do so under his own name, or do it anonymously, or under 
the name of another.” An inference from these premises 
was that, if one gives away his own money through the 
name of another, and thereby withholds from the public the 
knowledge of himself as the actual giver, he is not guilty 
of any deception. Nobody is entitled to the knowledge he 
withholds ; and where there is no right of knowledge there 
can be no deception by the mere lack of knowledge. The 
cases are innumerable in which one has a perfect light to 
withhold knowledge from others, and keep in his own bosom 
what he thinks or does ; and in all such cases there can be 
no deception by so doing. I stated these principles* in my 
argument before the Presbytery, believing in them then, and 
believing in them now, but not for a moment dreaming that 
they would fill Dr. Yan Dyke “ with amazement.” I had 
no idea of producing such an impression upon his mind, and 
I must add that I was myself amazed when I discovered 
that he had been amazed. 

There is, however, no evidence that Dr. Talmage at the 
time considered any of these points, or passed judgment 
upon them at all. He seems rather to have assumed, with- 
out any discussion with himself or with his wife, that he had 
the moral right to make the use of his own money implied 
in the second telegram, which was nothing more or less than 
giving that money to the parties addressed in the telegram, 
to be used by them for the purpose understood between 
them. If he had considered this question, then, speaking 
not in the name of the Presbytery, but in my own name as 
an individual, I maintain that he had a perfect right to give 
his money in this way, and that, if choosing to do so, he 
would be under no obligation to make the fact known to 


95 


anybody, and would not be the deceiver of anybody by not 
making it known. There would be no deception in such a 
case ; and any horrified amazement over it would be simply 
a very foolish amazement. 

It is easy, by false parallels, which are simply a species of 
logical deceit, to mis-state and misrepresent the case of Dr. 
Talmage, as shown by the evidence ; and this is precisely 
what has been done for the purpose of making him out a 
conscious and willful deceiver. One may through another 
give away another man’s money. This is not the case of 
Dr. Talmage. So one may through another give his 
money for an evil purpose, which is not the case under con- 
sideration. One may resort to this method of giving as a 
mere trick to gain a selfish end, which is not the case in 
hand. One may withhold knowledge from those to whom 
it is due, with the intention of misleading them; and 
this surely is not the case presented by the evidence. 
These suppositions do not cover this case. They are not of 
the same class and not parallel with it. The attempt to 
befog the case of Dr. Talmage by false parallels, and lying 
analogies, for the sake of throwing dirt at him, is simply a 
trickery of logic, if not a trickery of the heart. 

It may be said that Dr. Talmage designed to get up a 
strong popular enthusiasm, and with a stiff breeze blow 
away the debt of his church. Such, as I doubt not, was his 
general intention. He meant to have the debt of the 
church paid. And this explains his action when he pledged 
himself to pay five thousand dollars ; when he proposed 
that the trustees should subscribe twenty-five thousand 
dollars of the amount ; when he desired that Mr. John F. 
Talmage and Mr. Hobbs should subscribe five thousand 
dollars each ; and when he was willing, if necessary, to sup- 
plement the ability of these two gentlemen by an increased 
sacrifice on his own part, giving to them from his own 
resources so much, not of false but of Iona fide subscriptions 
to be made by them, as they might not themselves feel able 
to pay. He undoubtedly intended to give the debt-paying 
movement a good start with the Board of Trustees, as the 


96 


means of encouraging and inspiring the congregation to do 
what all concede to be a proper thing to be done. 

Let all this be conceded, and what then ? Here, accord- 
ing, to the theory of Dr. Talmage, is a subscription of five 
thousand dollars, made by himself. Here also is an aggregate 
of twenty-five thousand dollars in bona fide subscriptions, 
made by the trustees. This provides for thirty thousand 
dollars of the debt ; and as there is no sham in the provision, 
there would, of course, be no falsehood or deceit in announc- 
ing the fact to the people, and in asking them to put their 
shoulders to the wheel and complete the work. The money, 
according to this programme, would be actually pledged to 
this amount. 

Suppose, now, that the announcement, assumed to be made 
in these circumstances, should not state to the people where 
Dr. Talmage had gotten or expected to get the five thousand 
dollars that he had pledged, or where Mr. John F. Talmage and 
Mr. Hobbs had gotten or expected to get the five thousand 
dollars pledged by each of them, or where any other mem- 
ber of the Board of Trustees had gotten or expected to get 
the amount pledged by him. The amount in good and 
Iona fide subscriptions is stated ; but as to the question 
where the men making these subscriptions, and expecting 
to pay them, have gotten or would get the money with 
which to do so, no statement is made. What of that f 
The congregation manifestly has here no right of knowl- 
edge whatever ; and hence there is no deception of the peo- 
ple by their ignorance on this point. It is a matter of no 
consequence, for any purpose affecting their action, where 
or how these subscribing parties had gotten or expected to 
get the money with which to fulfill their contracts, provided 
the subscriptions be real, and the money be lawfully obtained. 
The reality of the subscriptions, as made and intended to be 
paid in good faith, is the only thing of any importance to 
the people. 

But, if Dr. Talmage furnished a part of the money sub- 
scribed by Mr. John F. Talmage, would not the latter 
appear to be giving more than he actually did give f If this 


97 


be conceded, then Mr. John F. Talmage would be the direct 
sinner, if there were any sinner at all, and the fault of Dr. 
Talmage would be that of aiding him in a false appearance. 
The fact, however, is, that there would be no falsity or de- 
ceit in the case as thus supposed. The subscription of Mr. 
John F. Talmage would be genuine. It would be paid, and 
the money paid would be his oivn money, every dollar of it. 
A part of it, according to the supposition, would be a gift 
to him from Dr. Talmage for this purpose, which is certainly 
a lawful mode of acquisition, and another part would have 
been acquired in some other way. 

How, what have the people to do with the question that 
relates to the manner, supposing it to be lawful, in which 
Mr. John F. Talmage has gotten or expects to get the 
money with which his subscription is to b’e paid ? Ethically, 
nothing whatever. They have no right of knowledge as to 
whether this money was a gift to him, in whole or in part, 
or was earned by the sweat of his brow. He is not bound 
to tell them how he obtained it, or expects to obtain it, any 
more than one is bound to tell his grocer how he got the 
money with which to settle his grocery bill ; and whether the 
people give him more or less credit than he deserves for his ap- 
parent liberality, is not a matter that morally affects the ac- 
quisition of the money he subscribes and expects to pay. The 
subscription would not be false, and the people would not be 
deceived, even if some one had donated all the money to 
him to be used for this very purpose, and he omitted to state 
this fact. He would have a perfect right to keep the fact to 
himself, and pay the subscription with money that was to 
him a gift. What the people think or do not think about 
him as the subscriber, in no way affects this right or morally 
vitiates his action. 

The theory that would charge Mr. John F. Talmage with 
deception in the case, as supposed, and Dr. Talmage with 
being a party to that deception, assumes that, when one 
makes a subscription for a given object, all other parties 
cognizant of the fact and asked to subscribe for the same 
object, have the right to know how he has obtained or is 

7 


98 


expecting to obtain the money with which to pay his sub- 
scription. They must be let into the personal and private 
secrets, which really belong to no one but himself, as to the 
quo modo of his procurement of the money, or else they will 
be deceived. It will be some time, I imagine, before the 
world will be educated up to this extraordinary refinement of 
ethics. The phenomenon will not occur until common sense 
has bid farewell to human nature. No one, in his sober 
senses, holds any such foolish notion. 

Ah ! but Dr. Talmage was at least a little tricky in this 
second telegram. The thing was not exactly square. He 
had a secret game of his own and meant to play it. He 
would not have been willing that the people should know 
that he proposed to pay a part of the subscriptions of Mr. 
John F. Talmage and Mr. Hobbs if the parties themselves 
would not pay the whole, and the reason why he would not 
have been thus willing is the fact that such knowledge 
would have exposed the intended deception. All this is 
very easily said. It is just as easy to say it as it is to tell 
a lie. Who knows that there was any trickery in the mind 
of Dr. Talmage, or in that of his good wife, when on the 
spur of the moment, and without much reflection, the thing 
was done that was made the basis of the fifth specification f 
Who knows that he had in his mind the idea of making 
Mr. John F. Talmage and Mr. Hobbs stool pigeons with 
which to entrap other pigeons ! Who knows that he went 
through an elaborate process of thought as to how the 
thing would work ? Who knows that he thought that the 
subscriptions which he proposed to these men would be 
tainted with the element of falseness f Who knows that it 
was his design to procure false subscriptions, “ to be deceit - 
fully used for the purpose of inducing others to subscribe ? ” 
Who knows all this ? Where did the man who drew this 
accusation against a minister of the Gospel get all this 
knowledge ? 

The testimony of Mrs. Talmage and that of her husband 
utterly and absolutely exclude these propositions, and brand 
them as a tissue of false statements. It gives the lie to 


99 


them, and no man can believe them without virtually 
charging these witnesses with perjury. No fact appears 
which contradicts their testimony. The attempt by mere 
speculation, without adequate premises in the evidence, and 
against the evidence, to burrow into the heart of Dr. Tal- 
mage and there logically create by pure assumption the 
fact of falsehood and deceit in respect to this matter, is 
simply shameful. Let those make the attempt who have a 
fancy for this kind of work, but let me have no share in 
their counsels. Theirs is not my way of dealing with hu- 
man souls. It is too savage for that charity that “thinketh 
no evil.” 

How this telegram business was originally brought to the 
public ear I do not know ; but I do know that Dr. Talmage 
has been hunted by a newspaper clamor on this subject, 
alike ignorant of the essential facts of the case and unjust 
in its imputations, as well as largely hostile and malignant 
in its spirit. The disclosure of the facts made by his trial 
reveals not the falsifier and the deceiver, but rather the 
zealous and self-denying Christian. The Presbytery, after 
patiently hearing the whole case, concluded that the charge 
was not proved, and hence rendered a verdict of acquittal. 
Any other verdict would have been an outrage to justice. 


Having thus considered the question of guilt or inno- 
cence under the first five specifications, and in respect to 
each shown that the verdict of acquittal was correct ac- 
cording to the evidence, I might here pause in this discus- 
sion. I should do so if there were not some important 
points in the case not embraced in the previous argument, 
except by an occasional reference to them. These points 
relate mainly to the procedure by which the trial was in- 
augurated, and Dr. Talmage subjected to the necessity of 
making a defense before the Presbytery. I am of the opin- 
ion that this procedure, in several vital particulars, violated 
his constitutional rights, and in this sense did him a serious 
injustice. And this I propose now to show. 


100 


THE INAUGURATORY PROCEDURE. 

I. The first action of the Presbytery in the case was 
taken on the third of February, 1879, and consisted in the 
adoption of the following preamble and resolution : 

“Whereas, The Rev. T. De W. Talmage is charged by 
common fame with falsehood and deceit, and with using im- 
proper methods in preaching which tend to bring religion 
into contempt, and — 

Whereas, It is the duty of the Presbytery to protect the 
good name of its members when they are unjustly assailed,, 
and to subject those who offend to proper discipline, there- 
fore — 

j Resolved, That a committee, consisting of three ministers 
and two elders, be appointed to investigate the nature and 
extent of the common fame referred to in the preamble, 
and report to the Presbytery what, if any, further action 
should be taken.” 

All this was done at a single meeting of the Presbytery, 
upon the motion of one of its members, after the discussion 
of but two or three hours, and without any conference with 
Dr. Talmage as to the matters involved. The accusation, 
so far as the Presbytery in its organic character was con- 
cerned, loomed up at once into astounding proportions. 
Whatever individual members may have privately thought, 
or heard, or said, the silence of death had reigned in the 
Presbytery until this meeting, and then common fame sud- 
denly thundered with 'an imperious clamor. 

The Book of Discipline, chapter iii., section 5, says that 
u taking up charges on this ground, of course, requires great 
caution, and the exercise of much Christian prudence.” I 
submit that here was no “ great caution,” and no “ exercise 
of much Christian prudence.” The action was precipitate 
and hasty. The Presbytery, without inquiry and without 
ever before having heard the accusation upon its floor, 
plunged itself at once into a formal and authoritative dec- 
laration that Dr. Talmage was charged thus and so by com- 
mon fame. [It passed the ecclesiastical Rubicon with a 
single leap, and made it necessary either to enter upon a 


101 


trial of the accused or recede from its own position. Noth- 
ing was left, if the Presbytery proceeded upon the basis of 
the preamble, but to formulate this alleged common fame, 
and test its truth by a trial. 

The common fame which a judicatory is authorized to 
declare as the basis of action is thus described in the Book 
of Discipline, chapter iii., section 5: “In order to render 
an offense proper for the cognizance of a judicatory on this 
ground, the rumor must specify some particular sin or sins ; 
it must be general or widely spread ; it must not be tran- 
sient, but permanent, and rather gaining strength than de- 
clining ; and it must be accompanied with strong presump- 
tion of truth.” No rumor that does not embody all of these 
characteristics is the common fame known to the Book of 
Discipline ; and manifestly no judicatory has the right to 
allege against any one subject to its jurisdiction the exist- 
ence of any other common fame. To make such a declara- 
tion is a very grave matter to the party thus accused ; and 
if it be not made in strict conformity with the Book of 
Discipline, it is an abuse of power and a trespass upon his 
rights. 

Now, did the Presbytery, when it heralded Dr. Talmage 
to the world as being charged by common fame with false- 
hood and deceit, hnow that he was so charged ? If it did, 
why did it appoint a committee to investigate the nature and 
extent of this common fame, and report whether any, and, 
if any, then what, action should be taken in the premises f 
This investigation plainly should have preceded the declara- 
tion The truth is that the Presbytery, in the preamble, 
assumed to know the existence of a common fame, such as 
the Book of Discipline defines ; and then it confessed that it 
had not this knowledge when it adopted the resolution pro- 
viding for the appointment of a committee to investigate the 
nature and extent of this common fame, namely, to inquire 
whether it charged any “ particular sin or sins ” against 
Dr. Talmage, and whether it was “general or widely spread.” 
The very things which the committee were to investigate, 
the Presbytery had already affirmed as matters of fact. The 


102 


resolution and the preamble are inconsistent with each other. 
This inconsistency shows that the Presbytery was proceed- 
ing with haste, and without due consideration of its own 
action. 

The very first step of the procedure was ill-advised, inex- 
pedient, and not in conformity with the Book of Discipline. 
If there were occasion for doing anything, the thing that 
ought to have been done is not the thing that was done. It 
was a very unfortunate hour when the Presbytery launched 
off in this business as it did. A very respectable minority 
thought so at the time. The general voice of the church at 
once said so, and the sequel has abundantly proved that it 
was so. 

II. The next action was taken on the 17th of February, 
1879. The committee that had been appointed reported 
as follows : 

“ Your committee report progress, and as to the minds 
of some members of this committee, there is a doubt as to 
the extent of our powers, we would ask Presbytery to in- 
struct us whether, in case we should be compelled to re- 
commend a judicial trial, we should be expected to present 
with such recommendation a charge and specifications. 
And we suggest that when Presbytery adjourn it be to 
meet at 2 o’clock on Monday of next week, when the com- 
mittee will be ready to report in full.” 

In answer to this request the Presbytery adopted the 
following resolution : 

u Resolved , That the committee are instructed that if 
they find that the common fame against Dr. Talmage ful- 
fills all the conditions of the requirements of the Book of 
Discipline, chapter iii., section 5, they shall formulate such 
common fame into a charge with specifications, and the 
names of witnesses to support it, and submit the same to 
Presbytery.” 

Two remarks will sufficiently characterize this action. 
First, the Presbytery here confessed that, when it declared 
that common fame charged Dr. Talmage with falsehood 
and deceit, it did not know that the common fame, thus 
alleged, did fulfill all the conditions prescribed in the Book 


103 


of Discipline, and lienee virtually confessed that it ought 
not then to have made the declaration. Secondly, the 
Presbytery submitted to the judgment of a committee, for 
the purpose of making a report and formulating a charge 
and specifications, the decision in the first instance of the 
grave question whether the common fame known to the 
Book of Discipline really existed; and in the event that the 
committee should decide affirmatively and proceed to form- 
ulate and report a charge and specifications, the Presbytery 
took the most effective steps to create a common fame 
against Dr. Talmage, whether it had previously existed or 
not. 

Several members of the Presbytery strenuously opposed 
this action, and sought to induce it to recede from what 
seemed to them an improper course, and, if anything 
needed to be done, to appoint a committee to confer with 
Dr. Talmage and his Session, and endeavor to adjust the 
whole matter without resorting to a judicial trial. They 
thought the action unjust and not properly considerate of 
the reputation of Dr. Talmage as a minister of the Gospel. 
They were right in this opinion, and profoundly is it to be 
regretted that their opinion did not prevail. 

III. The committee, thus instructed, pursued its work, 
and, coming to the conclusion that such a common fame as 
the Book of Discipline designates did exist, formulated the 
same into a charge with seven specifications, and, on the 
24th of February, 1879, reported the result to the Presby- 
tery. The report was adppted, and this settled the ques- 
tion that a trial must be had. The indictment reads as 
follows : 

Charge : The Bev. T. De W. Talmage stands charged by 
common fame with falsehood and deceit. 

Specifications — First — In that he acted deceitfully and 
made statements which he knew to be false in the matter of 
his withdrawal from the editorship of the Christian at Work, 
in the month of October, 1870. 

Second — In that at various times he published or allowed 
to be published by those closely associated with him, with- 

8 


104 


out contradicting them, statements which he knew to be 
false, or calculated to give a false impression, in defense of 
his action and statements referred to in the first specifica- 
tion. 

Third — In that he repeatedly made public declaration, in 
various and emphatic forms of speech from his pulpit, that 
the church, of which he was pastor was a free church, and 
that the sittings were assigned without reference to the dol- 
lar question, although he knew such declarations to be false. 

Fourth — In that, in the winter of 1876-’77, he falsely ac- 
cused I. W. Hathaway of dishonest practices, and afterward 
denied that he had done so. 

Fifth — In that, in the early part of the year 1878, he en- 
deavored to obtain false subscriptions toward the payment 
of the debt of the church, to be deceitfully used for the pur- 
pose of inducing others to subscribe. 

Sixth — In that, in the year 1878, he acted and spoke de- 
ceitfully in reference to the matter of the re-engagement of 
the organist of the Tabernacle Presbyterian Church. 

Seventh — In that he publicly declared on Sunday, Febru- 
ary 2, 1879, that all the newspapers said he was to be ar- 
raigned for heteredoxy, and used other expressions calcu- 
lated to give the impression that he expected to be arraigned 
on that charge, although he knew that he would be ar- 
raigned, if at all, on the charge of falsehood, thereby deceiv- 
ing the people. 

These specifications are seven separate and distinct alle- 
gations of crime, all grouped under the general title of 
“ falsehood and deceit,” and all based on common fame. 
The last two specifications, the sixth and the seventh, are 
not involved in the case before the Synod. Dr. Talmage 
was unanimously acquitted of both charges. This leaves the 
first five specifications as setting forth the matter at 
issue. In regard to the second, third and fifth of these 
specifications, I have already called attention to the fact 
that they are radically defective in not stating “ the times, 
places, and circumstances” of the offenses alleged, as 
required in the Book of Discipline, chapter iv., section 7 . 
This I did when considering them in relation to the evi- 
dence. My proposition then was, and now is, that they did 
not, with reasonable definiteness, inform Dr. Talmage as to 


105 


u the times, places, and circumstances ” of the crimes im- 
puted to him, and that he ought not to have been put upon 
trial on such ambiguous charges. On this point I have 
nothing more to say. 

What I now propose, is to show that all the crimes 
charged in the whole five specifications were excluded from 
trial by limitation of time. And in doing so I am not the 
defender but rather the critic of the Presbytery. Here I 
find fault with its action, condemning what, as I suppose, 
these complainants approve. 

The first clause of chapter xi., section 5, of the Book of 
Discipline, reads as follows : “ Process, in case of scandal, 
shall commence within the space of one year after the crime 
shall have been committed, unless it shall have recently 
become flagrant.” Let us pause a moment in explanation 
of this law. 

“ Process,” as here used, is a technical word. It means 
the proceeding taken, including the adoption of a charge of 
crime or crimes, and the serving of the proper notice to the 
accused party, for the purpose of bringing him to trial. 

The phrase, “ in case of scandal,” qualifies and limits the 
application of the rule to such cases. A “ case of scandal ” 
is made up of two elements. The first is u the crime ” said 
to have .been committed, and the second is the defamatory 
rumor, or what is elsewhere called “ common fame,” charg- 
ing “ the crime,” which, being the matter of such rumor 
and affirmed by it, makes it “ a case of scandal.” The crime 
being what it is, then the publicity, the common talk, creates 
a scandal. If the crime were unknown, there would be no 
scandal. The publicity, though distinguishable from the 
crime itself, is, nevertheless, a part of the case. 

The law is that process in such a case — that is to say, 
process based on common fame, must commence within one 
year, if at all, after the crime shall have been committed, 
“ unless it,” namely, the rumor-element of the case, the 
notoriety, the scandalous report, “ shall have recently be- 
come flagrant.” The term “flagrant” relates not to the 
crime-element of the case, as marking its nature or heinous- 


10 <) 


ness, but rather to the rumor-element which alleges the 
crime, and, by alleging it, makes it a “case of scandal.” A 
slight transposition of words will show the meaning of the 
language : “ Process shall commence within the space of one 
year after the crime shall have been committed, in case of 
scandal, uidess it shall have recently become flagrant.” The 
rumor-element that stands connected with the crime is the 
thing supposed to become “ flagrant.” The crime is what 
it is, and does not change by lapse of time ; yet the rumor 
relating to it and affirming it may change. 

And unless this rumor “shall have recently,” namely, 
recently with reference to the time of commencing the pro- 
cess, “become flagrant,” namely, active, intense, general, 
widely spread, attracting the attention of the people, no 
process shall be instituted on the ground of such rumor, if 
more than one year has elapsed since the commission of the 
crime alleged by it. This, except in the case specified; de- 
bars all jurisdiction, on the ground of common fame, after 
the lapse of one year from the date of the crime. A judica- 
tory clearly has no right to create flagrancy by its own 
action, as the means of acquiring jurisdiction. Such a 
course would be a fraud against the law of limitation. The 
flagrancy must exist, if at all, independently of and prior to 
the action of the judicatory. 

This provision is a very wise one, since it compels judica- 
tories to act upon the subject, if at all, seasonably, when 
both the rumor and the crime are recent, and when the 
proper testimony can be readily procured. It says to these 
judicatories that, if they suffer one year to elapse after the 
commission of “ the crime,” and thus give no heed to the 
scandal, they shall not thereafter take up the case at all for 
judicial action, unless the scandal “ shall have recently be- 
come flagrant.” They shall not go back of one year, and 
rake up the antecedent history of the party thus accused, 
in order to find crimes for which to arraign him on the 
ground of common fame. Personal animosity or prejudice 
shall not have the privilege of thus working up accusations 
against any one, and at the same time skulking under com- 


107 


mon fame. The rule is designed to make judicatories prompt 
in the discharge of their duty, and also prevent abuses of the 
common-fame ground of judicial accusation. 

Let it now be observed that the Presbytery of Brooklyn, 
when adopting the charge and specifications against Dr. 
Talmage, and basing them on common fame, made no pre- 
tense that this common fame had “ recently become fla- 
grant.” There is not a word or syllable in the action that 
implies such a fact in respect to the matters set forth in the 
accusation. It appears in no preamble or resolution, and 
was not affirmed by anybody when the subject was under dis- 
cussion. The action was not based upon any recent fla- 
grancy of the alleged common fame. Had it been the 
purpose of the Presbytery to claim and exercise jurisdiction 
on this ground, it should have formally incorporated the 
fact, either in the indictment, or in some preamble or reso- 
lution. It did not do so, and hence there is no evidence 
before the Synod that any such fact existed. Indeed, the 
omission of the Presbytery to affirm the fact is a virtual 
confesion of its non-existence. It is now too late to cor- 
rect the record on this point. The indictment has been 
framed, and the trial had, with no pretense that the common 
fame on which it was based, had “ recently become flagrant,” 
and, therefore, that the Presbytery might take jurisdiction 
over the matters alleged by it, in consistency with the Book 
of Discipline. 

If, then, I shall succeed in showing that all the crimes 
charged in these five specifications were committed, if at all, 
more than a year prior to the commencement of this 
process against Dr. Talmage, the result will be that the 
Presbytery had no jurisdiction in the case, and violated a 
fundamental law of the Presbyterian Church in putting 
him on trial. This is just what I propose to show. 

Please, then, to observe that the first step in the case was 
taken by the Presbytery on the 3d of February, 1871), and 
that the “ process ” for the purpose of trial was not adopted 
and issued until the 24th of February, 1879. One year 
prior to the former of these dates would carry us back to 


108 


the 3d of February, 1878, and one year prior to the latter 
date would carry us back to the 24th February, 1878. Let 
us suppose the year within which Dr. Talmage must have 
committed the crimes charged, if at all, to extend from the 
3d of February, 1878, to the 3d of February, 1879. Did 
he then commit the offenses alleged within that year ? Let 
us see. 

The first specification, declaring that Dr. Talmage “ acted 
deceitfully and made statements which he knew to be false 
in the matter of his withdrawal from the editorship of the 
Christian at Work ,” locates the offense “ in the month of 
October, 1876.” This, upon the face of the accusation, is 
three years and eight months prior to the commencement 
of the process. The crime, if committed at all, considered 
as a “ case of scandal,” was outlawed by lapse of time. The 
Presbytery had no jurisdiction over it on the ground of 
common fame. 

The second specification charges falsehood and deceit 
upon Dr. Talmage “in that, at various times, he published,, 
or allowed to be published by those closely associated with 
him, without contradicting them, statements which he knew 
to be false, or calculated to give a false impression, in de- 
fense of his action and statements referred to in the first 
specification.” There is here no date of the crime ; yet the 
proof offered in support of the charge locates the offense in 
the month of October, 1876, just after the offense previously 
charged. Hence this crime, too, if committed at all, was 
excluded from trial by lapse of time. 

The third specification renews the charge of falsehood and 
deceit against Dr. Talmage, “ in that he repeatedly made 
public declaration, in various and emphatic forms of speech 
from his pulpit, that the church of which he was pastor was 
a free church, and that the sittings were assigned without 
reference to the dollar question, although he knew such 
declarations to be false.” The two witnesses introduced to 
sustain this charge were Mr. Hathaway and Mr. Pearsall ; 
and in their testimony there was not the smallest fragment 
of proof that located even a single act constituting the 


109 


offense charged, between the 3d of February, 1879, and the 
3d of February, 1878. The facts to which they testified 
occurred, so far as they occurred at all, prior to the latter 
of these dates, or more than a year before the commence" 
ment of this process. Mr. Hathaway did not receive his 
appointment to assign pews until the 15th of February, 
1875, and in June, 1876, he retired from the service, and 
went to Princeton. All the facts that he swears to occurred 
between these two periods. 

Mr. Pearsall, the other witness, was elected as a trustee 
in the autumn of 1870, and resigned his office April 1st, 
1878, and at once quit the congregation altogether, since 
which period he has had nothing to do with its affairs. His 
testimony does not locate a solitary fact within one year 
prior to the commencement of this process. It is true that 
he was a trustee and a member of the pew committee in 
that part of the year which extends from the 3d of February, 
1878, to the 1st of April, 1878, making a period of less than 
two months ; but he did not place any of the fads to which 
he testified within this period. 

The testimony of Dr. Talmage, Mr. Corwin and Mr. 
TSTicliolls, the last of whom became chairman of the pew 
committee, April 26, 1878, shows conclusively that, neither 
during the year prior to the commencement of this process, 
nor at any preceding period, had the crime been committed 
which is charged in this specification. The result is that 
the offense charged was not only excluded from trial by the 
law of limitation, but was actually disproved altogether. 

The fourth specification repeats the charge of falsehood 
and deceit against Dr. Talmage, ‘‘ in that, in the winter of 
1876-’77, he falsely accused I. W. Hathaway of dishonest 
practices, and afterward denied that he had done so.” This 
was about three years prior to the commencement of the 
process, and, of course, goes out by limitation of time. 

The fifth specification brings the following charge against 
Dr. Talmage : “In that, in the early part of the year 1878, 
he endeavored to obtain false subscriptions toward the pay- 
ment of the debt of the church, to be deceitfully used for 


110 


the purpose of inducing others to subscribe.” The proof 
offered to support this allegation consisted of two telegrams 
sent by Dr. Talmage to Mr. John F. Talmage, both of which 
were dated on the 30th of January, 1878, which was more 
than a year prior to the 3d of February, 1879, the date we 
have assumed for the commencement of this process. This 
accusation, then, does not come within the limit fixed by the 
Book of Discipline, and hence is excluded by the lapse of 
time. 

Thus, as we see, all these specifications, every one of 
them, allege crimes which, if committed at all, were com- 
mitted more than a year prior to the commencement of the 
process. For this reason the Presbytery had no jurisdiction 
to try them as making a “ case of scandal,” unless the com- 
mon fame said to affirm them had “ recently become fla- 
grant ; ” and the record shows no pretense of any such fact, 
as it must do, provided this is to be taken as the ground 
upon which the Presbytery claimed jurisdiction. The fact 
of the recent flagrancy must be set forth in the record, since, 
upon this hypothesis, it is indispensable to the jurisdiction 
claimed on the basis of such a fact. The Book of Discipline, 
chapter iv., section 23, expressly declares that “ nothing, 
but what is Contained in the record, may be taken into con- 
sideration in reviewing the proceedings in a superior court.” 
What the record shows in this case is the declaration by the 
Presbytery that Dr. Talmage was charged thus and so by 
common fame; but it does not show any declaration that 
this common fame had “ recently become flagrant.” No 
such fact is, therefore, brought to the judicial knowledge of 
the Synod. 

It will not do to say that this is merely a technical point. 
If a church judicatory is going to exercise over a person the 
powers of law by trying him for an alleged offense, and 
thereby put him in peril, it must do so according to law. If 
he is held responsible under law, then he is entitled to all 
the protection that law affords. The judicatory that tries 
him is not the law, and not the law-maker, and is bound to 
follow the law in its whole procedure. 


Ill 


How, then, it may be inquired, did the Presbytery get 
itself into this strange muddle of undertaking to try a man 
for alleged offenses that were excluded from trial by limita- 
tion of time ? The answer is that when the charge and 
specifications were presented to the Presbytery, this fact did 
not appear in respect to all of them, and hence was not at 
the time known to the Presbytery. The Investigating Com- 
mittee, if they knew the fact, did not disclose it. The first 
specification, the second as being immediately connected 
with the first, and the fourth, upon their face, charged 
offenses that were excluded by lapse of time. This, how- 
ever, was not the case with the other specifications, since it 
did not appear upon their face that the offenses therein 
charged were also excluded. 

Why, then, did the Presbytery put Dr. Talmage on trial 
for those offenses whose date of alleged commission was 
known to be more than a year prior to the commencement 
of the process ? The theory adopted was that if any of 
these offenses came within the time prescribed by the Book 
of Discipline, this fact would virtually revive those that had 
been outlawed, and hence that the Presbytery might legally 
put them into the indictment. The offenses, not then known 
to be excluded by limitation of time, were assumed to give 
vitality, for the purposes of trial, to those that would other- 
wise have been excluded. I say, this was the theory. And 
in respect to this theory I have two lines of argument which 
I wish briefly to submit. 

The first is the fact that the theory breaks down in this 
case for the want of the requisite conditions to support it. 
The sixth and seventh specifications are as if they had 
never been adopted, since of these charges Dr. Talmage 
was unanimously acquitted, which is equivalent to saying 
that he had not, at any time, committed the offenses 
alleged. As to the other five specifications, which are 
before the Synod, I have shown thafc not one of them, as to 
the date of the offense alleged therein, comes within the 
limits prescribed by the Book of Discipline. The result is 
that not one of these specific charges of crime can be made 


112 


the basis for working in other similar specific charges, under 
the general charge of “ falsehood and deceit,” that would 
otherwise be excluded by limitation of time. The fact is, 
they were all outlawed by the date of the offenses alleged ; 
and there was hence no offense, not outlawed, to revive the 
others, or furnish a basis for their trial. 

That this was not discovered at the time of adopt- 
ing the indictment does not alter the law in application 
to the case. It surely will not be pretended that a 
judicatory can, by indicting a man for offenses which are 
themselves excluded, create the right to try him for other 
offenses which are also excluded. The Book of Disci- 
pline says that process “ shall commence within the 
space of one year after the crime shall have been 
committed.” If the judicatory blunders, whether by mis- 
take or design, and does not commence the process within 
one year after the alleged crime was committed, or makes a 
false charge of crime which, by acquittal, is shown not to 
have been committed at all, this will not change or suspend 
the law of limitation. The law stands, notwithstanding the 
blunder or the false charge of crime. 

But — and this is my other line of argument — if it be con- 
ceded that some of the specific charges against Dr. Tal- 
mage that were grouped under the general charge of false- 
hood and deceit, were not excluded from trial by lapse of 
time, even then the theory upon which the Presbytery pro- 
ceeded in trying him on specific charges that were thus 
excluded, was a false one. This theory assumed that the 
general charge would hold good if any of the specific 
charges were not excluded by the law of limitation ; and 
further, that, upon this supposition, other specific similar 
charges, though dating back more than a year in the time 
of the alleged offenses, might be included under the general 
charge, and submitted to the test of judicial trial. This was 
an invention for the purpose of getting into the indictment 
accusations against Dr. Talmage that upon their face were 
outlawed. Upon this theory and its application in this 
case, I submit the following observations : 


113 


(1.) What is called “the charge,” declares that “the 
Rev. T. De W. Talmage stands charged by common fame 
with falsehood and deceit.” This, if taken by itself, is no 
charge at all in the sense of the Book of Discipline. It 
does not locate the alleged offense anywhere, or in any- 
thing, or at any time. The Book of Discipline, chapter 
iv., section 8, says that, “in exhibiting charges, times, 
places and circumstances should, if possible, be ascer- 
tained and stated.” The bald declaration that a party is 
charged with an offense, designated by a class-term, but 
with no statement of facts setting forth the time, place 
and circumstances of the offense, is not such a charge as 
is known to the Book of Discipline. It simply gives a 
title to the crime or crimes that must be otherwise charged, 
or no case is presented that admits of trial. 

(2.) Each one of the “ specifications,” so-called, of this 
indictment, is itself a distinct and separate charge of 
crime, and of a distinct and separate crime. Each crime 
is distinct from every other in the time, place and circum- 
stances of its commission. In each specification is im- 
plied the language used in what is called “ the charge.” 
Take, for example, the fourth specification; and what is 
here alleged is that Dr. Talmage is charged by common 
fame with falsehood and deceit, “in that, in the winter of 
1876- ’77, he falsely accused I. W. Hathaway of dishonest 
practices, and afterward denied that he had done so.” 
The charge of crime is made in stating these alleged facts 
as constituting the crime. The same principle is applied 
to every other specification. Each specification is the 
charge of the particular crime which it sets forth. The fact 
that all these crimes can be designated by a common title, 
or are so designated, does not, legally or historically, make 
them one crime. However similar they may be in their 
moral nature, they are different offenses in the time, place 
and circumstances of their commission. Their constituent 
facts are different. They present different issues of fact, 
and are distinctly and separately charged. 

Moreover, each specification contains, in express terms. 


114 


the declaration that the acts set forth are criminal. In the 
first, Dr. Talmage is said to have “ acted deceitfully and 
made statements which he knew to be false.” In the 
second, he published, or allowed to be published, state- 
ments “ which he knew to be false, or calculated to make 
a false impression .” In the third, he made certain dec- 
larations, “ although he knew such declarations to be 
false.” In the fourth, he “ falsely accused I. W. Hatha- 
way.” In the fifth, he “ endeavored to obtain false sub- 
scriptions, to be deceitfully used,” etc. In the sixth, “ he 
acted and spoke deceitfully.” In the seventh, he made a 
declaration contrary to what he thought, “thereby de- 
ceiving the people.” 

Thus the so-called “charge” is not only implied, but 
positively expressed, in each specification. Each specifi- 
cation, while reciting acts, characterizes those acts as 
coming under the moral category of falsehood and deceit. 
If what is called “ the charge ” were dropped altogether, 
this would not make the slightest difference with the con- 
tents of the indictment. These contents are given in the 
so-called specifications, in the facts therein set forth, and 
in the characterization of those facts. These specifications 
are in reality the several charges made against Dr. Tal- 
mage. 

(3.) The Book of Discipline knows nothing about this 
assumed distinction between a general and a specific 
charge of crime. The term “specification” does not oc- 
cur in the Book at all. It speaks of a person as “ charged 
with a crime.” It speaks of “ a crime or crimes alleged.” 
It says that the accused must have “a copy of each 
charge.” It says that “ in exhibiting charges, times, 
places,” etc., must be stated. It says that the testimony 
of more than one witness is necessary “ to establish any 
charge,” with the qualification that if several witnesses 
“ testify to different similar acts , belonging to the same 
general charge, the crime shall be considered as proved.” 
This qualification relates to “similar acts” which, being 
taken together and proved by different witnesses, make 
up the crime charged. 


115 


Now, in all this, there is not a word about specifica- 
tions or specific charges in distinction from a general 
charge. The theory of the Book of Discipline is that 
the party arraigned, or to be arraigned, must he accused 
of some definite crime or a number of such crimes, and it 
calls this accusation a charge or charges, accordingly as 
there may be one or more offenses set forth by it. It 
speaks of a crime or crimes as the thing or things to be 
charged. A charge, in the sense of the Book, is the 
verbal statement of a crime, with the proper exhibit of 
time, place and circumstances, and hence there are just 
as many charges as there are crimes thus stated, and 
that, too, whether the crimes be similar or different. 

(4.) The fact that several particular crimes, distinct 
from each other in the time, place and circumstances of 
their commission, may be or are, on account of their re- 
semblance, all grouped under and designated by a class- 
term that is applicable as a title to them all, in no way 
affects the law of limitation, with reference to these 
crimes, as laid down in the Book of Discipline. Each 
one of them holds a relation to some time when it was 
committed; and the law is that no process shall be com- 
menced for any of these crimes on the ground of common 
fame, after the lapse of one year subsequent to the com- 
mission of the same, unless the common fame “ shall 
have recently become flagrant.” The Book, in stating 
this law, speaks of “ the crime,” evidently meaning some 
particular crime that lias a time, place and circumstances, 
and that can be made the subject-matter of evidence, 
and not of a mere generic title that may embrace a dozen 
different crimes, with not a single one of them specified 
or described. The law of limitation is not to be evaded 
by generalizing crimes under such a title. 

The crimes that were really charged against Dr. Tal- 
mage are those described in the seven specifications, 
each one of which is a charge of crime in the sense of the 
Book of Discipline. He was charged with seven separate 
crimes, distinct from each other in their time, place and 


110 


circumstances, and not the less so because they were in 
the outset grouped under the general description of u false- 
hood and deceit.” The issues of fact were made with 
reference to these crimes. 

(5.) This theory, if admitted at all, is essentially destruc- 
tive of the law of limitation. Admit the theory, and it 
would require but little ingenuity so to apply it at any 
time as wholly to subvert and nullify the law. Suppose 
the so-called general charge to he put in the most general 
form. Let it be in the form of improper conduct, or un- 
ci iristian conduct, or immorality'. Under this general 
charge place the specific accusations of lying, stealing, 
forgery, embezzlement, drunkenness and adultery, set- 
ting out these particular accusations as to time, place 
and circumstances, and basing them all on common fame. 
Let the charge read thus : u Mr. John Smith stands 
charged by common fame with immorality.” Let the so- 
called specifications state, with the requisite detail, these 
several forms of immorality as being all embraced in the 
general charge. 

Now, suppose that the lying, the stealing and the for- 
gery, as set forth, were committed more than a year prior 
to the commencement of the process, and that there had 
been no increase of the common fame alleging these of- 
fenses. Suppose that the embezzlement, the drunken- 
ness and the adultery, as set forth, were committed with- 
in the year immediately preceding the commencement of 
the process. Would it then do to drag in the first three 
offenses under the general charge of immorality, and put 
the party on trial therefor, because this charge is not ex- 
cluded in respect to the last three offenses, and because 
the first three, like the last three, are immoralities, and, 
if proved, would show an immoral or depraved habit of 
mind ? Would it do to leap over the law ^of limitation 
and try offenses excluded by it, by blending them in a 
general charge with offenses not excluded, and hence 
triable ? Would it do, through a general charge of im- 
morality, to hang these offenses, outlawed by limitation, 


117 


to those that are not outlawed, and get them all in for 
trial, because some of them may he tried in consistency 
with the law ? 

I can hardly think that anybody, at all conversant with 
the Book of Discipline, or having any proper idea of what 
is intended by a law of limitation, will answer these ques- 
tions in the affirmative. And yet this, in the principle 
involved, is precisely what was done in respect to three 
of the offenses charged against Dr. Talmage, and what may 
be done at any time and to any extent, if we concede the 
theory adopted and applied in this case. All we have to 
do is to make the. general charge sufficiently general to 
cover, as a descriptive title, all sorts of crimes, and then, 
under this theory of construction, we can make the law of 
limitation entirely inoperative, and ransack the antece- 
dent history of the party accused by common fame at our 
pleasure, going back five, ten, or even twenty years, if we 
choose, for the matters of accusation. The theory enables 
a judicatory to abrogate the law of limitation by the magic 
potency of a class-term, and thus do what the Presbytery 
of Brooklyn did in respect to the crimes charged in the 
first, second and fourth specifications. 

It is no answer to this argument to say that crimes, 
otherwise excluded by the law of limitation, may, because 
similar to other crimes not thus excluded and actually 
charged, be made the matter of judicial accusation and 
trial, considered as showing the habit of committing such 
offenses. This is simply an artifice to evade the plain 
meaning and intent of the law. On this theory, thefts 
that are outlawed might be charged and tried, and, if 
proved, penalty might be inflicted, because they would go 
to show that a theft not outlawed and charged corresponds 
with the stealing habit of the party accused of the latter 
offense. 

The question to be determined is not whether the accused 
has the habit of stealing, but whether he did steal in the 
instance or instances alleged ; and nothing could be more 
monstrous than to try him for alleged thefts excluded from 


118 


trial by the law. of limitation, and punish him therefor, if 
convicting him, in order to show the habit of stealing, and 
that, too, as the means of establishing guilt in respect to 
alleged acts of theft not excluded from trial. If this would 
not be a judicial hodge-podge of incongruities, then it is 
difficult to conceive what would be such. It would be a 
mere dodge, with hardly the appearance of candor, to get 
round a positive law, and get into a judicial accusation 
charges of crime excluded by that law. 

There is no analogy, sustaining this theory, between the 
renewal of a debt, by the payment of a portion of it, out- 
lawed by limitation of time, so far as collecting it by law is 
concerned, and the application of the theory to the case of 
Dr. Talmage, or to any similar case. In the first instance, 
the debtor, by making the partial payment, confesses the 
debt, and by his own act gives it validity as if it were con- 
tracted on the very day of this payment. Though the debt 
is outlawed, he himself cures this defect, and is legally pre- 
sumed to acknowledge the debt by paying a part of it. 

This legal principle in respect to debts has no application 
to crime. One who has committed two crimes, one of which, 
so far as trial is concerned, is outlawed by limitation of time, 
and the other not thus outlawed, does not, by the commis- 
sion of the latter crime, commit the former crime, or confess 
that he has committed it, or repeal the law which excludes 
it from trial. Whether these two crimes be two different 
acts of theft, so that both may be called stealing, or one 
be a forgery and the other a theft, will make no difference 
as to the trial of the crime which the law of limitation 
forbids to be tried. The crime, and that only, which is not 
excluded from trial, can be tried. 

Such, then, is my argument upon the indictment against 
Dr. Talmage, considered independently of the evidence. 
There is not a single one of the five specifications or parti- 
cular charges of crime which are before the Synod, that is 
not exposed to a fatal objection on the ground of illegality ; 
and some of them are exposed to more than one such objec- 
tion. The inception of the procedure was in violation of 
law, and the indictment was equally so. 


119 


IV. The demand of Dr. Talmage that his whole life should 
be investigated, made on the floor of the Presbytery when 
the judicial process was being resistlessly pressed upon 
him, against his known wishes, and his vote for the charge 
and specifications in these circumstances, did not cure or 
cancel the violation of his rights by illegal proceedings. 
Nobody believed that he sought the arraignment and trial, 
or doubted that he was anxious to avoid both. What he 
said and did was said and done when he saw that it was a 
foregone conclusion that he must be arraigned and tried, 
and not because he thought that there was any occasion 
for the process, or desired to pass through the ordeal. His 
sayings and action, in the circumstances then existing, 
furnish no reason for the course pursued by the Presbytery, 
and to use them for such a purpose would be alike unjust 
to him and untrue to the facts. He did not desire the ju- 
dicial investigation, and not a solitary member of the Pres- 
bytery could have supposed that he did. It was forced 
upon him, independently of his wishes. 

It is, moreover, a well settled principle of law, applied in 
our civil and criminal courts, and almost as old as the law 
itself, that the consent of a party or of parties can never 
give jurisdiction, either over the subject-matter involved or 
over the person or persons to be affected, where jurisdiction 
does not exist under the authority of law. The law, and 
that only, confers jurisdiction, if it exists at all. It was not 
in the power of Dr. Talmage to add a solitary item to the 
jurisdiction of the Presbytery of Brooklyn, by anything that 
he could do or say. He could not repeal the law of limita- 
tion, or make it lawful for the Presbytery to repeal it by 
disregarding it. He could not make an illegal indictment a 
good one by voting for it. The Presbytery was bound to 
follow the Book of Discipline and conform its action there- 
to ; and this it did not do, as I have endeavored to show in 
the foregoing argument. 

The well-known fact is, that the procedure was not based 
upon that provision of the Book of Discipline, chapter iii., 
section 5, which says : “ It may happen, however, that in 

9 


120 


consequence of a report, which does not fully amount to a 
general rumor , as just described, a slandered individual may 
request a judicial investigation, which it may be the duty 
of the judicatory to institute.” The procedure was under 
a formal indictment on the ground of common fame, and not 
at the instigation or by the procurement of Dr. Talmage; 
and hence it did not and does not rest on this provision of 
the Book of Discipline. The foundation for this procedure, 
if it has any foundation in law, is in those provisions that 
relate to charges and trial on the basis of common fame. 


THE CONCLUSION, 

The result which I have reached from this argument is 
the following : 1. That Dr. Talmage was entitled to an 
acquittal on the ground of „ the evidence, and hence that the 
Presbytery, in acquitting him, did right. 2. That the in- 
auguration of the trial, and especially the indictment, were 
contrary to law, and hence that the Presbytery, in trying 
him under such an indictment, did wrong. Had he been 
convicted, he would, on both of these grounds, have had 
ample reason for an appeal to the higher courts of the 
church; and this is just the course which I should have ad- 
vised him to take. His acquittal is really the only bright 
spot in this strange procedure. It made some amende to 
him for the injustice of putting him on trial at all. Had 
•the views of these complainants prevailed, there would have 
been two wrongs instead of one, with no remedy in the Pres- 
bytery for either. Fortunately, the Presbytery, though 
starting wrong, ended right on the vital question of guilt or 
innocence. 

I am entirely aware that the spectacle thus presented is 
that of a juridical monstrosity. I know not what else to 
call it. It is that of a man tried for offenses which, if com- 
mitted at all, were excluded from such trial by limitation of 
time, and yet j iistly acquitted upon evidence taken under 
the forms of law. The Book of Discipline declares that a 


121 


complaint, when properly made, “brings the whole proceed- 
ings in the case under the review of the superior judicatory P 
Remembering this fact, and, consequently, that not simply 
the verdict complained of, but also the inaugurating pro- 
cedure and the indictment in the case of Dr. Talmage, are 
before the Synod for review, I have felt it my duty, as an 
act of simple justice to him who, though not technically, is 
really the party most deeply involved in this issue, to dis- 
cuss the whole case, including the evidence bearing upon 
the question of guilt or inuocence, and also the legal points 
that are in the case, and make a part of it. I have done 
so that I might, according to the best of my ability, give 
the Synod a full view of the case. The whole of it is not 
seen at a glance. The vision I now have has been gained 
only by long reflection and repeated study of the facts and 
the law. 

What I approve of is the verdict of acquittal, considered 
simply in relation to the evidence, which is one of the ques- 
tions before the Synod. What I condemn and am more 
than willing that the Synod should condemn, is the act of 
trying Dr. Talmage upon such an indictment. This, as I 
maintain, was in violation of law, and I assign this fact as 
one among the reasons why the Synod, ip disposing of this 
case, should do nothing to dispossess him of the full benefit 
of his acquittal. If the Synod shall see fit to quash the 
whole proceeding, and on this ground dismiss the complaint, 
either with or without a censure upon the Presbytery, I 
have no objection. The great point that interests my mind 
is that Dr. Talmage shall, in respect to his good name and 
his rights as a minister of the Gospel, receive that protection 
to which he is entitled by the evidence and by the law of 
the church. I look upon him as a man illegally indicted 
and justly acquitted upon the evidence ; and for this opinion 
in both respects I have given my reasons at large. Hence, 
from a simple sense of justice, and from a strong sympathy 
with him in this peculiar crisis of his life, I stand by his 
side, and there I shall stand to my latest breath, and, touch- 
ing the matters contained in this issue, do all that I can to 
protect him against any harm. 


122 


The horror of these complainants at the acquittal of Dr. 
Talmage is mainly limited to themselves. The great body 
of the people, in the church and out of it, have felt no such 
horror, and seen no occasion for it. The congregation of 
Dr. Talmage has not felt it. The reception accorded to him 
upon his return from Europe, not only by his own people, 
but by the people of Brooklyn, in which judges, lawyers, 
ministers of various denominations, the Mayor of the city, 
two ex-mayors — indeed, the best citizens of Brooklyn, were 
glad to share, shows that the moral sense of the city in 
which he dwells, where he preaches, and where he is best 
known, was not shocked by his acquittal. The repeated 
advice and even entreaty of the religious press, as, for ex- 
ample, the New York Evangelist , the New York Observer , 
and other religious papers, urging the complainants to sus- 
pend all further action in the case, prove that there is no 
general thought or feeling that was offended by the verdict 
of the Presbytery. 

The truth is, that, at the bar of public opinion, the com- 
plainants have no case, except among the enemies of Dr. 
Talmage, including the editors of a few secular papers who 
for years have made it a business to pour their venom upon 
his name. There is no general judgment standing behind 
them which they' represent and express. There is no 
scandal resting upon the acquittal, which the people any- 
where recognize and feel, or which needs to be cured by the 
corrective action of this Synod. If these complainants had 
acquiesced in the verdict nobody would have censured them, 
and almost everybody would have commended the course 
as sensible and wise. 

The verdict was not reached hastily, and not without the 
most strenuous efforts on the part of the prosecution to se- 
cure the conviction of the accused. I have had some expe- 
rience in ecclesiastical trials, and I must say that I never 
before witnessed such zeal and untiring labor to make a case 
worthy of judicial condemnation. Dr. Talmage was searched 
through and through. Every nook and corner of his life 
were looked into. His casual words, his pulpit notices, his 


123 


correspondence, the services of hostile minds, even a diffi- 
culty with a Christian friend, which, having been honorably 
settled, was dead and buried, and had been for two years, 
were all put in requisition to fix upon him the charge of 
falsehood and deceit. But few men in this world could 
stand such an ordeal without revealing some dark spots in 
their history. Dr. Talmage did stand it, with more patience 
and self-possession than most persons would or could prac- 
tice ; and the result was an acquittal — a verdict which his 
own people approve without a dissenting voice, and to which 
the general community, having watched the trial and largely 
read the evidence, had given its sanction even before it was 
rendered. 

Dr. Talmage is the pastor of a large congregation, with 
work enough to task the best energies of his head and heart. 
He is by conviction and preference a Presbyterian. His 
orthodoxy no one disputes. He has his own way of preach- 
ing, and so has every preacher. His way has given him 
hearers by the thousands, who like the way, and are profited 
by it. ♦ There is room enough for him and his peculiar tal- 
ents in the Presbyterian Church. If there were not, it 
would be best to make the room. He naturally wishes to 
have this causeless and unnecessary vexation brought to a 
close. He does not desire, and no man would desire, to be 
hunted and haunted, and virtually persecuted under the 
forms of an ecclesiastical procedure. He has had his full 
share of vituperative clamor. The Presbytery, wrong in the 
outset and right at last, has said by its verdict that there is 
no just foundation for this clamor. As to the matters upon 
which it passed judgment, it stands between him and his 
assailants, and, whether they be saints or sinners, it tells 
them in plain words that they are false accusers. 

These complainants who arraign the Presbytery, and vir- 
tually arraign Dr. Talmage, have shown great confidence 
and positiveness in their cause, and great zeal in pursuing 
it. Yet I am sure that this Synod will not take for granted 
that capacity to estimate evidence, purity of purpose, can- 
dor in judgment, and devotion to the honor of Christ, are, 


124 


in the Presbytery of Brooklyn, their exclusive attributes. 
Relentless pursuit is not to win a victory by mere inten- 
sity. The character of Dr. Talmage is not to be victimized 
on the altar of persistent determination. If the complain- 
ants find themselves in an unfortunate position, considered 
relatively to the public judgment, the Presbytery did not 
put them there ; and it is neither the duty nor the province 
of the Synod to afford them, in this respect, any relief. 

It is to me no pleasure that I find myself in sharp col- 
lision with some brethren whom I have reckoned as among 
my personal friends. I regret that I must contend against 
them for what I believe to be truth and righteousness. I 
regret to find them engaged in what seems to me a very 
bad business ; and much as I have respected them, I will 
not and cannot follow them in that business. My convic- 
tions compel me to oppose them with all my might. With 
their cause I have no sympathy. My sympathies are with 
Dr. Talmage. I believe him to have been illegally accused, 
and to be innocent of the charges brought against him ; 
and I have done what I could to make both facts appear to 
the Synod. 

I have, since the acquittal of Dr. Talmage, heard him 
preach several times to his great congregation ; and I give 
it, as my sober opinion, that in certain respects God has 
wonderfully endowed him for his work, and that he is faith- 
fully doing the work for which God endowed him. lie has 
the willing ears of thousands ; and, if 1 am any judge, he 
brings home the Gospel of the Son of God to the heart with a 
simplicity, directness and power that but few preachers in this 
world can equal. I have felt the power in my own heart, and 
have seen it in the impression on others. It is there. God 
put it there. Let it be there ; and let neither Presbytery 
nor Synod do anything to impair its effect, or cripple the 
arm that wields the power. 

And now, Mr. Moderator, Fathers and Brethren, after 
this long, perhaps to you wearisome, discussion, I have only 
to add my earnest prayer that the great Spirit with whom 
all wisdom dwells, would guide the members of this Synod 


125 


in making up tlieir judgment upon the questions of fact 
and the points of law which it is their province to determine, 
subject, of course, to the review of the General Assembly 
of the Presbyterian Church of these United States. 




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